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Dist. 27, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 27

Textus Latinus

p. 675

ARTICULUS I.

De matrimonii quidditate.

QUAESTIO I.

Utrum matrimonium sit coniunctio maris et feminae.

Quantum ad primum quaeritur, utrum matrimonium sit coniunctio maris et feminae. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Per rationem, quam ponit Magister in littera²: «Matrimonium, inquit, est maris et feminae coniunctio».

2. Et quod ita sit, ostenditur ratione. Solo viro existente, non est matrimonium; similiter sola muliere existente, non est matrimonium: ergo matrimonium est in simultate et in coniunctione unius ad alterum.

3. Item, nihil absolutum est unum³ in duobus subiectis; sed matrimonium unum est in viro et femina: ergo non dicit quid absolutum, sed relatum. Sed illud, quodcumque sit, cum non sit disparitas, sed conformitas, non est disiunctio, sed coniunctio.

4. Item, illud, ad quod consequuntur ista tria bona, scilicet fides, proles et Sacramentum, est recte matrimonium; hoc autem est coniunctio maris et feminae, ubi est fides in singularitate, proles in fecunditate et significatio in insolubilitate⁴: ergo etc.

Contra: 1. Multiplicato superiori essentiali, multiplicatur inferius⁵: ergo si matrimonium est coniunctio, quoties vir et uxor coniunguntur, toties matrimonium contrahitur, et ita inter eundem virum et eandem mulierem erunt plura matrimonia; quod si falsum est: ergo etc.

2. Item, nullum Sacramentum iteratur super eandem materiam: ergo si matrimonium est coniunctio viri cum muliere, ex quo semel coniungitur, non debet amplius coniungi cum eadem. Sed hoc est falsum et inconveniens: ergo etc.

3. Item, omne Sacramentum est signum sensibile; sed nulla relatio est signum sensibile, coniunctio autem maris et feminae est relatio: ergo coniunctio talis non est signum, ergo nec Sacramentum; ergo a simplici conversa⁶, nullum Sacramentum est coniunctio, ergo nec matrimonium.

p. 676 4. Item, si matrimonium est coniunctio, aut ergo corporum, aut animorum. Non animorum, quia tunc matrimonium esset in patria; non corporum, quia tunc inter Mariam et Ioseph non fuisset coniugium.

5. Item, sive sit coniunctio corporum secundum commixtionem, sive animorum secundum consensum; contingit, talem coniunctionem removeri per odium: ergo et matrimonium solvi et destrui. Sed hoc falsum est, ut iam patebit¹: ergo matrimonium non est coniunctio.

CONCLUSIO.

Matrimonium recte dicitur coniunctio maris et feminae.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod matrimonium secundum genus remotum est signum; specificatio autem vel descensus ad genus inferius accipitur secundum comparationem ad signatum; unde cum signatum in hoc Sacramento sit coniunctio Christi et Ecclesiae, et coniunctio non potest melius significari quam per coniunctionem exteriorem², sicut baptismi ablutio per ablutionem aquae exteriorem: ideo, sicut baptismus dicitur ablutio, sic matrimonium dicitur essentialiter et secundum genus suum coniunctio. — Et nota, quod sicut in ablutione baptismi est aliquid permanens, sicut impressio characteris interior, et aliquid transiens, ut lotio exterior, et utrumque dicitur baptismus³; sic in matrimonio est aliquid permanens, et hoc est vinculum, per quod ligatur vir et mulier, quantumcumque exterius separentur; et est aliquid transiens, sicut coniunctio primo facta per verbum exterius, vel per exteriorem actum; et utraque dicitur matrimonium, et utraque est coniunctio. Et ideo recte matrimonium coniunctio dicitur et est, sicut rationes primae ostendunt.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod multoties coniunguntur; dicendum, quod quaedam coniunctio dicitur vinculum, quaedam facit vinculum, quaedam est usus vinculi. Dico igitur, quod prima et secunda, quia respiciunt substantiam matrimonii, non iterantur, sed solum tertia; et ad multiplicationem illius non sequitur multiplicatio matrimonii, quoniam non est genus in essendo, sed actus in utendo sive usus in agendo.

2. Et ex hoc patet sequens, quia non est iteratio Sacramenti; et sicut frequenter manducare corpus Christi non dicit Sacramenti iterationem, sed usum; sic in proposito intelligendum; licet non sit simile omnino, quia quod semel manducatum est iterum manducari non potest; sed haec mulier, quae semel cognita est, iterum cognosci potest.

3. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod est signum sensibile; dicendum, quod sicut similitudo corporalis sensu percipitur non ratione sui⁴, sed ratione qualitatum, in quibus est assimilatio, quae sensu deprehenduntur; sic intelligendum est in proposito, quod quamvis coniunctio secundum se non sit perceptibilis ut relatio, est tamen ratione eorum quae coniunguntur, ut viri et mulieris, et ratione signi, in quod, vel per quod coniunguntur.

4. 5. Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum sit corporum, an animorum; dicendum, quod animorum in corporibus⁵, quia est coniunctio ratione utentium et habentium sexus distinctos; illa autem coniunctio, quae respicit totum coniunctum et est matrimonium essentialiter, non est affectio animorum, vel approximatio corporum, sed quoddam vinculum obligatorium, quod non perimitur, sive affectu, sive corpore separentur. Et per hoc patet responsio ad ultimum.

Scholion

I. Etiam S. Thom. (hic q. 1. a. 1. quaestiunc. 1; Suppl. q. 44. a. 1.) cum aliis docet, matrimonium esse in genere coniunctionis, qua coniuges ordinantur ad aliquod unum, et quae simul est «vinculum, quo ligantur formaliter, non effective»; «coniunctio autem corporum vel animorum ad matrimonium consequitur». Idem (locc. citt. quaestiunc. 3. et a. 3.) explicat etiam definitionem Hugonis a S. Vict., quod matrimonium sit «duarum idonearum personarum legitimus de coniunctione consensus» [definitio per causam]; nec non tertiam, quod sit «consortium vitae communis et communicatio divini et humani iuris» [secundum effectum, ad quem ordinatur]. De 3. definitione dicit B. Albert. (hic a. 2.), quod sit decretistarum, qui «parum solent curare de definitionibus, vel aliis ad subtilem intellectum pertinentibus». Cfr. hic dub. 1.

De 1. quaestione praeter citatos locos: Scot., hic q. 1. et supra d. 16. q. unica n. 17. — B. Albert., loc. cit. et a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., supra d. 26. a. 4.[?] q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.

II. De nomine matrimonii etiam alii coaevi magistri referunt easdem vel similes etymologias, plerumque parum solidas. p. 677 — Cfr. S. Thom., locc. citt. quaestiunc. 2. et a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1.

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English Translation

Article I.

On the quiddity of marriage.

Question I.

Whether marriage is the union of male and female.

Concerning the first point it is asked whether marriage is the union (coniunctio) of male and female. And that it is so, it seems:

1. By the reason which the Master sets down in the [Lombard's] text²: «Marriage, he says, is the union of male and female».

2. And that it is so is shown by reason. With the man alone existing, there is no marriage; likewise with the woman alone existing, there is no marriage: therefore marriage lies in a togetherness and in the joining of one to the other.

3. Likewise, nothing absolute is one³ in two subjects; but marriage is one in the man and the woman: therefore it does not signify something absolute, but relative. But that [relation], whatever it be, since it is not a disparity but a conformity, is not a disjunction but a union.

4. Likewise, that upon which those three goods follow — namely fidelity, offspring, and the Sacrament — is properly marriage; but this is the union of male and female, where there is fidelity in singleness, offspring in fruitfulness, and signification in indissolubility⁴: therefore etc.

On the contrary: 1. When the superior essential [thing] is multiplied, the inferior is multiplied⁵: therefore if marriage is a union, as often as husband and wife are joined, so often is a marriage contracted, and thus between the same man and the same woman there will be several marriages; which if it is false: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, no Sacrament is repeated over the same matter: therefore if marriage is a union of the man with the woman, once he is joined, he ought not to be joined again with the same [woman]. But this is false and unfitting: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, every Sacrament is a sensible sign; but no relation is a sensible sign, and the union of male and female is a relation: therefore such a union is not a sign, therefore neither a Sacrament; therefore, by simple conversion⁶, no Sacrament is a union, therefore neither is marriage.

p. 676 4. Likewise, if marriage is a union, then it is either of bodies or of souls. Not of souls, because then marriage would exist in the fatherland [heaven]; not of bodies, because then between Mary and Joseph there would have been no marriage.

5. Likewise, whether it be a union of bodies according to commingling, or of souls according to consent; it happens that such a union is removed through hatred: therefore marriage too [would be] dissolved and destroyed. But this is false, as will presently be shown¹: therefore marriage is not a union.

Conclusion.

Marriage is rightly called the union of male and female.

I respond: It must be said that marriage according to its remote genus is a sign; but the specification or descent to the inferior genus is taken according to comparison to the thing signified; hence, since the thing signified in this Sacrament is the union of Christ and the Church, and a union cannot be better signified than by an exterior union², just as the washing of baptism [is signified] by the exterior washing of water: therefore, just as baptism is called a washing, so marriage is called, essentially and according to its genus, a union. — And note that, just as in the washing of baptism there is something permanent, like the interior impression of the character, and something transient, like the exterior washing, and each is called baptism³; so in marriage there is something permanent, and this is the bond by which the man and the woman are bound, however far they be exteriorly separated; and there is something transient, like the union first made by the exterior word, or by the exterior act; and each is called marriage, and each is a union. And therefore marriage is rightly called, and is, a union, as the first arguments show.

1. To that which is objected, that they are often joined; it must be said that a certain union is called a bond, a certain [union] makes a bond, a certain [union] is the use of the bond. I say therefore that the first and the second, because they regard the substance of marriage, are not repeated, but only the third; and upon the multiplication of that [third] there does not follow a multiplication of marriage, since it is not a genus in being, but an act in using, that is, a use in acting.

2. And from this the following [objection] is made clear, that there is no repetition of the Sacrament; and just as to eat the body of Christ frequently does not signify a repetition of the Sacrament, but its use; so it is to be understood in the case at hand; although it is not wholly similar, because what has once been eaten cannot be eaten again, whereas this woman, who has once been known, can be known again.

3. To that, then, which is objected, that it is a sensible sign; it must be said that, just as a bodily likeness is perceived by sense not by reason of itself⁴, but by reason of the qualities in which there is the assimilation, which are apprehended by sense; so it must be understood in the case at hand, that although a union in itself is not perceptible as a relation, it is nevertheless [perceptible] by reason of the things which are joined, such as of the man and the woman, and by reason of the sign into which, or through which, they are joined.

4. 5. To that which is asked, whether it be of bodies or of souls; it must be said that [it is] of souls in bodies⁵, because it is a union by reason of those who use and possess distinct sexes; but that union which regards the whole joined thing and is marriage essentially, is not an affection of souls, or an approximation of bodies, but a certain binding bond, which is not destroyed, whether they be separated in affection or in body. And by this the response to the last [objection] is made clear.

Scholion

I. St. Thomas too (here q. 1, a. 1, quaestiuncula 1; Suppl. q. 44, a. 1) teaches with others that marriage is in the genus of union (coniunctio), by which spouses are ordered to some one thing, and which is at the same time «a bond by which they are bound formally, not effectively»; «but a union of bodies or of souls follows upon marriage». The same [Thomas] (in the places cited, quaestiuncula 3 and a. 3) also explains the definition of Hugh of St. Victor, that marriage is «the lawful consent of two fit persons concerning their conjunction» [a definition by cause]; and also a third, that it is «a partnership of common life and a sharing of divine and human law» [according to the effect to which it is ordered]. Concerning the 3rd definition B. Albert (here a. 2) says that it belongs to the decretists, who «are wont to care little about definitions, or about other things pertaining to subtle understanding». Cf. here dub. 1.

On the 1st question, besides the places cited: Scotus, here q. 1 and above, d. 16, q. unica, n. 17. — B. Albert, loc. cit. and a. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, above, d. 26, a. 4[?], q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1.

II. Concerning the name matrimony, other contemporary masters too report the same or similar etymologies, for the most part not very solid. p. 677 — Cf. St. Thomas, in the places cited, quaestiuncula 2 and a. 2. — B. Albert, here a. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, loc. cit., a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 1.

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Apparatus Criticus

2
Hic c. 2.
Here, c. 2 [i.e. in the Master's text, chapter 2].
3
Cod. aa unum et idem, qui etiam maiorem explicat his verbis: sicut patet, quia eadem albedo numero non est in diversis subiectis.
Codex aa [reads] one and the same, which also explains the major [premise] in these words: as is clear, because the same whiteness in number is not in diverse subjects.
4
Cfr. infra lit. Magistri, d. XXXI. c. 1, et Comment. a. 1. q. 2.
Cf. below, the Master's text, d. XXXI, c. 1, and the Commentary, a. 1, q. 2.
5
Vide supra pag. 197, nota 6.
See above, p. 197, note 6.
6
Petr. Hispan. Summul. tr. de Proposition., agens de conversione propositionum, conversionem simplicem ita describit: Simplex conversio est, quando de subiecto fit praedicatum, et de praedicato subiectum, manente eadem qualitate et quantitate propositionis. Et hoc modo convertitur universalis negativa in se, et particularis affirmativa in se. Exemplum, ut: nullus homo est lapis: ergo nullus lapis est homo; quidam homo est animal: ergo quoddam animal est homo. Cfr. Aristot., I. Prior. c. 2. — Vat. a simplici conversione.
Peter of Spain, Summulae, treatise on Propositions, treating of the conversion of propositions, describes simple conversion thus: Simple conversion is when the predicate is made from the subject, and the subject from the predicate, the same quality and quantity of the proposition remaining. And in this way the universal negative is converted into itself, and the particular affirmative into itself. For example: no man is a stone: therefore no stone is a man; some man is an animal: therefore some animal is a man. Cf. Aristotle, Prior [Analytics] I, c. 2. — The Vatican [edition reads] by simple conversion.
1
Art. 3. q. 1. seq.
Article 3, q. 1 and following.
2
Pro exteriorem, quod cod. B omittit, permulti codd. et ed. 1 recte, cod. Q nec interior, codd. S T nec interior recte. Superius pro et coniunctio Vat. et interior, quae etiam mox post baptismi ablutio cum ed. 1 addit interior, cod. O legit: sicut nec interior baptismi ablutio [melius potest significari], lectio non spernenda, si ex cod. Q addatur quam.
For exteriorem, which codex B omits, very many codices and ed. 1 [have it] rightly; codex Q [reads] nec interior, codices S, T nec interior rightly. Above, for et coniunctio the Vatican [edition reads] et interior, which [reading] also, shortly after, following baptismi ablutio, together with ed. 1 adds interior; codex O reads: sicut nec interior baptismi ablutio [can be better signified] — a reading not to be spurned, if from codex Q one adds quam.
3
Cfr. supra d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 1.
Cf. above, d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 1.
4
Quia in se spectata est relatio (cfr. Aristot.; V. Metaph. text. 20.), ad quam cognoscendam requiritur, ut cognoscens conferat extrema (relationis) inter se, quod non est sensitivae, sed rationalis potentiae (cfr. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 57, et August., de Vera Relig. c. 29. n. 53. seqq.). Sensitivae potentiae obiectum per se sunt accidentales corporum qualitates (vide supra pag. 286, nota 9.). — Inferius pro quae sensu deprehenduntur cod. K quas sensus deprehendunt (plures codd. et ed. 1 perperam quae sensus deprehendunt).
Because, considered in itself, it is a relation (cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics V, text 20), for the knowing of which it is required that the knower compare the extremes (of the relation) with each other, which belongs not to the sensitive but to the rational power (cf. Aristotle, On the Soul III, text 57, and Augustine, On True Religion, c. 29, n. 53 ff.). The object of the sensitive power are of themselves the accidental qualities of bodies (see above, p. 286, note 9). — Below, for quae sensu deprehenduntur codex K [reads] quas sensus deprehendunt (several codices and ed. 1 wrongly quae sensus deprehendunt).
5
Vat. quod est corporum et animorum.
The Vatican [edition reads] that it is of bodies and of souls. ---