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Pars 5, Cap. 2

Breviloquium · Pars V: De gratia Spiritus sancti

Textus Latinus
English Translation
p. 253

Capitulum II. De gratia, in quantum iuvat ad bonum meritorium.

Secundo, Spiritus sancti gratia nobis occurrit consideranda in comparatione ad liberum arbitrium, et hoc secundum duplicem modum. Primo scilicet, in quantum ipsa est adiutorium ad meritum; secundo vero, in quantum est remedium contra peccatum5.

De gratia igitur Dei, in quantum est adiutorium ad merendum6, haec tenenda sunt, quod cum gratia dicatur generaliter, specialiter et proprie; generaliter dicitur adiutorium divinum creaturae liberaliter et gratis impensum et indifferenter ad quemcumque actum; et sine huiusmodi adiutorio gratiae nec possumus aliquid efficere nec durare in esse. — Specialiter dicitur gratia adiutorium divinitus datum, ut quis praeparet se ad suscipiendum Spiritus sancti donum, quo perveniat ad meriti statum; et talis dicitur gratia gratis data, et sine hac nullus sufficienter facit quod in se est, ut se praeparet ad salutem. — Proprie vero gratia dicitur adiutorium datum divinitus ad merendum, quod quidem dicitur donum gratiae gratum facientis, sine quo nullus potest mereri nec in bono proficere nec ad aeternam pervenire salutem. Ipsa enim tanquam radix merendi omnia merita antecedit; propter quod dictum est7, quod « praevenit voluntatem, ut velit; subsequitur autem, ne frustra velit ». Unde nullus ipsam mereri potest merito condigni, sed « ipsa meretur augeri a Deo in via, ut aucta mereatur et perfici » in patria et gloria sempiterna ab ipso Deo, cuius est gratiam infundere, augere et perficere secundum cooperationem voluntatis nostrae et secundum propositum sive beneplacitum praedestinationis aeternae.

Ratio autem ad intelligentiam praedictorum haec est: quia, cum primum principium sua omnipotenti virtute et benignissima largitate creaturam omnem de nihilo produxerit ad esse; ac per hoc creatura de se habeat non-esse, totum autem esse habeat aliunde: sic facta fuit, ut ipsa pro sua defectibilitate semper suo principio indigeret et primum principium pro sua benignitate influere non cessaret8. Cum ergo spiritus rationalis, hoc ipso quod de nihilo, sit in se defectivus; hoc ipso quod natura limitata et egena, sit in se recurvus, amans proprium bonum; hoc ipso quod totus a Deo, sit totaliter Deo obnoxius; et quia defectivus est, de se tendit in non-esse; quia recurvus, per se non assurgit ad rectitudinem perfectae iustitiae; quia totaliter Deo obnoxius, et Deus bonis eius non indiget9, nihil potest facere de se et propria virtute, per quod Deum sibi constituat debitorem, et maxime mercedis aeternae, quae Deus est, nisi per divinam condescensionem: hinc est, quod ad hoc, quod salvetur in esse, cum sit defectivus, indiget semper adiutorio divinae praesentiae, manutenentiae et influentiae, per quam manuteneatur in esse; quae, quamvis sit universalis in creaturas omnes, nominatur tamen nomine gratiae, quia non ex debito procedit, sed ex liberalitate bonitatis divinae. — Hinc est etiam, quod ad hoc, ut se praeparet ad donum supernae gratiae, cum sit recurvus, indiget dono alterius gratiae gratis datae, maxime post naturam lapsam, per quam habilis efficiatur ad bona moralia, quae sunt bona ex circumstantia1, quae nullo modo possunt dici bona, nisi procedant ex intentione recta, videlicet quod non propter nos, sed propter summum bonum fiant, ad quod non assurgit spiritus noster recurvus, nisi praeveniatur a Deo per aliquam gratiam gratis datam. — Hinc nihilominus est, quod ad hoc, quod faciat opera meritoria mercedis aeternae; cum totaliter sit Deo obnoxius et debitor sui totius, indiget dono gratiae gratum facientis, per quam Deus sibi condescendat, prius acceptans suam imaginem et voluntatem quam operationem ex ipsa manantem; quia, cum « causa nobilior sit effectu2 », nullus potest se facere meliorem nec facere opus Deo placens, nisi prius placeat ipse, ut Deus prius ipsum respiciat quam ad munera eius3. Et ideo omnis radix merendi fundatur in gratia gratum faciente, cuius est facere hominem Deo dignum; propter quod nullus potest eam mereri merito condigni, sed solum merito congrui.

p. 254Ipsa autem habita meretur sui ipsius augmentum in statu viae per bonum eius usum merito digni. Nam cum solus Deus sit ipsius gratiae fontale principium influendi, ipse solus est principium augmentandi per modum infundentis, et gratia per modum meriti et dignitatis, et liberum arbitrium per modum cooperantis et merentis, pro eo quod liberum arbitrium cooperatur gratiae et quod est gratiae suum facit.

Et ideo non tantum liberum arbitrium per gratiam meretur gratiae augmentum in statu viae merito digni, verum etiam complementum in statu patriae merito condigni, tum propter sublimitatem doni Spiritus sancti cooperantis in merito; tum propter veracitatem Dei promittentis; tum propter vertibilitatem liberi arbitrii consentientis et finaliter perseverantis; tum propter difficultatem status merendi4; tum propter dignitatem Christi nostri capitis intervenientis, quod debet glorificari cum suis membris; tum propter liberalitatem Dei retribuentis, quem non decet parva reddere propter obsequium sibi fideliter obtemperantis; tum propter nobilitatem operis, quod ex caritate procedit, quod tantum ponderat in conspectu iudicis, quantum amor, ex quo procedit, qui Deum incomparabiliter praeponit omnibus creaturis, et ideo non sufficienter et competenter potest nisi in Deo et summo bono remunerari. — Ex quibus omnibus tanquam ex septem rationibus gloriam aeternam merito non tantum congrui, sed etiam condigni mereri facit gratia septiformis.

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Chapter II. On grace, in so far as it helps toward meritorious good.

Second, the grace of the Holy Spirit presents itself to us as to be considered in comparison with free choice, and this according to a twofold mode. First, namely, in so far as it is a help toward merit; second, in so far as it is a remedy against sin5.

Concerning the grace of God, therefore, in so far as it is a help toward meriting6, these things are to be held: that whereas grace is spoken of generally, specially and properly; generally, that divine help is called grace which is bestowed on the creature liberally and gratuitously and indifferently toward any act whatever; and without a help of grace of this kind we can neither accomplish anything nor endure in being. — Specially, grace is said to be a help divinely given, that one may prepare himself to receive the gift of the Holy Spirit, whereby he may arrive at the state of merit; and such is called gratuitously given grace, and without this no one sufficiently does what is in him, that he may prepare himself for salvation. — Properly, however, grace is said to be a help given divinely for meriting, which indeed is called the gift of grace making gracious, without which no one can merit, nor make progress in good, nor arrive at eternal salvation. For it, as the root of meriting, goes before all merits; on account of which it has been said7 that it « goes before the will, that it may will; and follows after, lest it will in vain ». Hence no one can merit it by the merit of condignity, but « it itself merits to be increased by God on the way, so that, being increased, it may merit also to be perfected » in the fatherland and in everlasting glory by God himself, whose it is to infuse, to increase and to perfect grace according to the cooperation of our will and according to the purpose or good pleasure of eternal predestination.

Now the reason for the understanding of the foresaid is this: since, when the first principle by its omnipotent power and most benign bounty produced every creature out of nothing into being, and through this the creature has of itself non-being but has its whole being from elsewhere: it was so made that it should, by reason of its defectibility, always stand in need of its principle, and that the first principle should, by reason of its benignity, not cease to flow into it8. Since therefore the rational spirit, by this very thing that it is from nothing, is in itself defective; by this very thing that it is a limited and needy nature, is curved in upon itself, loving its own good; by this very thing that it is wholly from God, is wholly beholden to God; and because it is defective, of itself it tends toward non-being; because curved in, of itself it does not rise up to the rectitude of perfect justice; because wholly beholden to God, and God has no need of its goods9, it can do nothing of itself and by its own power whereby it might constitute God its debtor, and most of all of the eternal reward, which is God, except through divine condescension: hence it is that, in order that it may be preserved in being, since it is defective, it always stands in need of the help of the divine presence, maintenance and influence, whereby it may be maintained in being; which help, although it is universal toward all creatures, is nevertheless named by the name of grace, because it proceeds not out of debt but out of the liberality of the divine goodness. — Hence it is also that, in order that it may prepare itself for the gift of supernal grace, since it is curved in, it stands in need of the gift of another grace gratuitously given, most of all after nature's fall, whereby it may be made capable of moral goods, which are goods from circumstance1, and which can in no way be called good unless they proceed from a right intention, namely, that they be done not on account of ourselves but on account of the highest good, to which our curved-in spirit does not rise unless it be prevented by God through some grace gratuitously given. — Hence it is nonetheless that, in order that it may do works meritorious of the eternal reward, since it is wholly beholden to God and the debtor of its whole self, it stands in need of the gift of grace making gracious, through which God may condescend to it, first accepting its image and will before the operation flowing from them; because, since « the cause is nobler than the effect2 », no one can make himself better nor do a work pleasing to God unless he himself first please, so that God may regard himself first rather than his gifts3. And therefore every root of meriting is founded in grace making gracious, whose it is to make man worthy of God; on account of which no one can merit it by the merit of condignity, but only by the merit of congruity.

But grace once had merits its own increase in the state of the way through the good use of it, by the merit of worthiness. For since God alone is the fontal principle of the infusing of that grace, he alone is the principle of its increasing after the manner of one infusing, and grace after the manner of merit and dignity, and free choice after the manner of one cooperating and meriting, inasmuch as free choice cooperates with grace and makes its own that which is grace's.

And therefore free choice through grace merits not only the increase of grace in the state of the way by the merit of worthiness, but also completion in the state of the fatherland by the merit of condignity, both on account of the sublimity of the gift of the Holy Spirit cooperating in the merit; and on account of the veracity of God promising; and on account of the vertibility of free choice consenting and finally persevering; and on account of the difficulty of the state of meriting4; and on account of the dignity of Christ our head interceding, who must be glorified together with his own members; and on account of the liberality of God rewarding, whom it does not befit to render small things in return for the service of one faithfully obeying him; and on account of the nobility of the work, which proceeds from charity, which weighs as much in the sight of the judge as does the love from which it proceeds, which sets God incomparably before all creatures, and which therefore cannot sufficiently and fittingly be rewarded except in God and the highest good. — From all which, as from seven reasons, sevenfold grace makes one merit eternal glory not only by the merit of congruity, but also by the merit of condignity.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. 5
    De his agitur hic et seq. cap. Sed observandum, quod in tabula supra pag. 209 secundum codd. relata ordo 2. et 3. capituli invertitur cum quadam differentia verborum.
    These matters are treated here and in the following chapter. But it must be observed that, in the table given above on p. 209 as reported according to the codices, the order of the second and third chapters is inverted, with a certain difference of wording.
  2. 6
    B C E I M T meritum.
    B C E I M T have meritum.
  3. 7
    Ab August., Enchirid. c. 32. n. 9. — Seq. locus est August., Epist. 186. (alias 106.) c. 3. n. 10. Cfr. II. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. XXVI. c. 2, et Comment. ibid. d. 27. dub. 1, in cuius fine triplex gratiae acceptio explicatur; ibid. a. 2. per totum et d. 28. dub. 2. ostenditur, quid mereri contingat et quid non.
    From Augustine, Enchiridion, c. 32, n. 9. — The following passage is Augustine, Epistle 186 (otherwise 106), c. 3, n. 10. Cf. II Sent., the text of the Master, d. XXVI, c. 2, and the Commentary on the same place, d. 27, dub. 1, at the end of which the threefold acceptation of grace is explained; in the same place, a. 2, throughout, and d. 28, dub. 2, it is shown what may be merited and what may not.
  4. 8
    Vide I. Sent. d. 37. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. in corp.; II. Sent. d. 37. a. 1. q. 1. et 2. — Superius pro editionum lectione de se non habeat esse cum B I O P Q S substituimus de se habeat non-esse (1 de se habet non-esse, quae etiam paulo ante cum aliis edd. pro-duxit pro produxerit).
    See I Sent., d. 37, part I, a. 1, q. 1, in the body of the article; II Sent., d. 37, a. 1, qq. 1 and 2. — Above, for the editions' reading de se non habeat esse we have substituted, with B I O P Q S, de se habeat non-esse (edition 1 has de se habet non-esse, which also, a little before, together with the other editions, has pro-duxit for produxerit).
  5. 9
    Psalm. 15, 2: Dixi Domino: Deus meus es tu, quoniam bonorum meorum non eges. — Gen. 15, 1: Ego [Deus] protector tuus sum et merces tua magna nimis. — Mox pro et propria 1 ex propria, quae etiam cum aliis edd. et nonnullis codd. pro per quod substituit propter quod. Inferius pro manutenentiae et influentiae 2 cum aliquot codd. manutenente et influente, et pro universalis B C et 1 generalis.
    Psalm 15, 2: I said to the Lord: Thou art my God, for thou hast no need of my goods. — Genesis 15, 1: I [God] am thy protector, and thy reward exceeding great. — Shortly after, for et propria edition 1 has ex propria, which also, together with the other editions and some codices, substitutes propter quod for per quod. Below, for manutenentiae et influentiae edition 2, with a few codices, has manutenente et influente, and for universalis B C and edition 1 have generalis.
  6. 1
    Cfr. II. Sent. d. 36. dub. 5. et d. 41. a. 1. q. 1. in corp.
    Cf. II Sent., d. 36, dub. 5, and d. 41, a. 1, q. 1, in the body of the article.
  7. 2
    Ut notat Avicenna, Metaph. tr. 6. c. 3. Vide tom. IV. pag. 19, nota 9. — De gratiae subiecto cfr. II. Sent. d. 26. q. 5. — Pro ex ipsa 2 cum pluribus codd. perperam ex ipso, aliae edd. ex eo.
    As Avicenna notes, Metaphysics, tract 6, c. 3. See tom. IV, p. 19, note 9. — On the subject of grace cf. II Sent., d. 26, q. 5. — For ex ipsa edition 2, with several codices, wrongly has ex ipso; the other editions have ex eo.
  8. 3
    Gen. 4, 4: Et respexit Dominus ad Abel et ad munera eius. — Inferius edd., excepta 2, cum pluribus codd. condigni pro digni; subinde pro augmentandi et infundentis plures codd. augendi et influentis.
    Genesis 4, 4: And the Lord had respect to Abel and to his gifts. — Below, the editions, except edition 2, together with several codices, have condigni for digni; thereupon, for augmentandi and infundentis several codices have augendi and influentis.
  9. 4
    Plures codd. et 1 merentis. Superius pro digni M congrui (cfr. II. Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. 2. in corp.), econtra in fine cap. G H K N digni pro congrui.
    Several codices and edition 1 have merentis. Above, for digni M has congrui (cf. II Sent., d. 27, a. 2, q. 2, in the body of the article); on the contrary, at the end of the chapter G H K N have digni for congrui.
Cite this

St. Bonaventure, Breviloquium, Pars 5, Cap. 2, in Opera Omnia (Quaracchi, 1891), tom. V, pp. 253–254.

English translation: Wroot Press, Bonaventure Opera Omnia Translation Project, bonaventure.wrootpress.com/breviloquium/p5-c2. Licensed CC BY-NC 4.0.

Authorities cited here

Augustine of Hippo, Enchiridion, Epistolae · Avicenna (Ibn Sina), Metaphysica (Philosophia prima)