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Quaest. 2

Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Christi · Quaestio II: Utrum Deus res cognoscat per similitudines rerum, an per earum essentiam

Textus Latinus

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Quaestio II. Utrum Deus res cognoscat per similitudines rerum, an per earum essentiam.

Supposito, quod Deus cognoscat infinita, quaeritur, utrum cognoscat illa quae cognoscit per similitudines rerum, an per earum essentiam⁷. Et quod per similitudines, videtur:

1. Primo auctoritate Scripturae. Ioannis primo⁸: Quod factum est in ipso vita erat: ergo omnia, quae facta sunt, prius erant in Deo cognoscente: ergo vel per similitudinem, vel per veritatem; sed non per veritatem, cum nondum aliquid esset: ergo per similitudinem.

2. Item, Augustinus sexto de Trinitate⁹ dicit, quod « Filius est ars plena omnium rationum viven-

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tium incommutabilium »; sed rationes in arte nihil aliud sunt quam similitudines rerum artificiatarum et ab artifice cognitarum: ergo idem quod prius.

3. Item, Augustinus nono de Trinitate, capitulo undecimo¹, dicit: « Omnis secundum speciem notitia similis est ei rei, quam novit »; sed divina cognitio, cum non sit secundum privationem, est secundum speciem: ergo necesse est, quod sit similis ei rei, quam novit. Sed non esset similis, nisi haberet rei similitudinem: ergo etc.

4. Item, Philosophus² dicit, « quod intellectus quodam modo est omnia »; sed hoc non est ob aliud, nisi quia intelligens hoc ipso, quod intelligit, assimilatur intellecto: ergo si hoc est de generali ratione intelligendi; si Deus aliquid intelligit et cognoscit, necesse est, quod habeat similitudines rerum, quas cognoscit: ergo etc.

5. Item, ad hoc, quod aliquid perfecte cognoscatur, necesse est, esse adaequationem intellectus ad intelligibile³; sed res creata non potest adaequari intellectui creanti per propriam naturam, cum ille sit simplex, et ipsa composita: ergo necesse est, quod adaequetur ei per similitudinem aliquam simplicem et ab omni materia separatam: ergo etc.

6. Item, eodem modo cognoscit Deus res, postquam factae sunt, quo modo cognoscebat, antequam fierent, quia divina notitia non mutatur; sed antequam fierent, non poterat eas cognoscere per proprias essentias; et cognoscebat eas vel per similitudines earum, vel per essentias; et non per essentias: ergo per similitudines. Et eodem modo cognoscit nunc, quo tunc, ergo etc.

7. Item, Deus est agens a proposito⁴; sed omne agens a proposito praeconcipit illud quod facturum est; omne autem, quod praeconcipit aliquid, habet aliquo modo illud penes se vel per veritatem, vel per similitudinem: ergo si, antequam res fierent, non habebat eas Deus penes se quantum ad suas essentias, ergo quantum ad earum similitudines.

8. Item, Deus est exemplar vere et proprie, sicut vere et proprie est efficiens et finis; sed exemplar vere et proprie non est, nisi quod habet similitudines rerum exemplatarum, per quas illas cognoscit et facit: ergo sicut Deo competit ratio exemplaritatis, sic et ratio similitudinis⁵.

9. Item, Deus vere⁶ est speculum aeternum, ductivum in omne aliud cognoscibile cognoscendum; sed speculum non ducit in aliud cognoscendum, nisi eius habeat similitudinem; ergo idem quod prius.

10. Item, Deus vere et proprie est verbum; sed verbum est similitudo eius quod dicitur: ergo si Filius Dei est verbum, quo dicuntur omnia⁷, necesse est, quod in ipso sint similitudines omnium dictorum.

11. Item, ad perfectionem cognitionis duo concurrunt, scilicet lux et similitudo; sed ratio perfectissimae lucis omnino salvatur in divina cognitione: ergo similiter et ratio expressivae similitudinis.

Contra: 1. Anselmus in Monologio, trigesimo primo capitulo: « Manifestum est, in Verbo, per quod facta sunt omnia⁸, non esse ipsorum similitudinem, sed veram simplicemque essentiam »: ergo si Deus non cognoscit per aliquid extra se, non cognoscit per similitudinem, sed potius per essentiam.

2. Item, ubicumque est similitudo, ibi est convenientia, ubicumque autem est convenientia, ibi est communicatio alicuius unius a pluribus; sed Deus et creatura nihil unum communicant, quia tunc illud esset simplicius⁹ Creatore; ergo impossibile est, quod aliqua sit similitudo in Creatore respectu creaturae, vel e converso.

3. Item, similitudo est relatio aequiparantiae¹⁰; sed inter Creatorem et creaturam nulla potest esse relatio aequiparantiae: ergo nec similitudo.

4. Item, sicut aequalitas causatur ab unitate in quantitate, sic similitudo causatur ab unitate in qualitate¹¹; sed inter Creatorem et creaturam nullo modo reperitur aequalitas, nec vere nec transumtive: ergo nec similitudo consimili ratione; aut si ibi reperitur similitudo et non aequalitas, quaeritur, unde hoc sit.

5. Item, si aliqua est similitudo inter Creatorem et creaturam, minima est: ergo si similitudo est ratio cognoscendi, per se loquendo, ubi maior similitudo, ibi maior ratio cognoscendi, et ubi minima, minima: si ergo Deus cognoscit res per similitudines, sequitur ex hoc, quod minimam habeat rerum cognitionem; quod blasphemum est dicere.

6. Item, una creatura magis assimilatur Deo quam alia, sicut illa quae est, vivit et sentit, quam

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illa quae tantum est: si ergo¹ maior similitudo est maior ratio cognoscendi, ergo Deus magis cognoscit unam creaturam quam aliam.

7. Item, si intellectus noster esset omnino in actu, non indigeret similitudine: ergo cum divinus intellectus omnino sit in actu² et lux respectu omnis cognoscibilis, videtur, quod ad Dei cognitionem nulla requiritur ratio similitudinis.

8. Item, similitudo est ratio ductiva in aliud, scilicet in illud cuius est similitudo; ubi autem est talis ductio, ibi est decursus et collatio ratiocinativa, hoc autem nullo modo competit divinae cognitioni: ergo nec ratio similitudinis.

9. Item, veritas est ratio cognoscendi, ergo in potissima cognitione potissime salvatur intentio veritatis; sed veritas magis salvatur in ipsa re quam in eius similitudine: ergo si divina cognitio est nobilissima, non cognoscit res per similitudines, sed per essentias.

10. Item, Philosophus, in tertio de Anima³: « In separatis a materia idem est quod intelligitur et quo »; sed Deus est omnino separatus a materia: ergo quod cognoscit et quo cognoscit est idem. Sed cognoscit res extra: ergo cognoscit eas per suas essentias, non per similitudines aliquas.

11. Item, ubicumque est immediata et indivisa coniunctio cognoscentis et cognoscibilis, non est opus similitudine; sed Deus est intimus cuilibet rei creatae: ergo ad eius cognitionem non indiget aliqua similitudine.

12. Item, nobilior est modus cognoscendi per essentiam quam per similitudinem; quod patet, quia iste modus cognoscendi spectat ad tertium caelum, sicut dicit Augustinus duodecimo super Genesim ad litteram⁴: ergo si nobiliora sunt Deo tribuenda, videtur, quod magis conveniens sit ponere, quod Deus cognoscat res per essentias quam per similitudines.

13. Item, quanto cognitio est nobilior, tanto immediatior est coniunctio et unio cognoscentis ad cognoscibile; sed divina cognitio habet omnimodam nobilitatem: ergo et perfectissimam unionem. Sed immediatior est coniunctio⁵ et unio, quando cognoscens unitur cognoscibili quantum ad eius essentiam, quam quantum ad eius similitudinem: ergo etc.

Conclusio. Deus cognoscit res per rationes aeternas, quae sunt rerum similitudines exemplares et perfectissime repraesentativae ac expressivae atque idem essentialiter, quod est ipse Deus.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod secundum beatum Dionysium et secundum beatum Augustinum in pluribus locis, Deus cognoscit res per rationes aeternas. Ait enim beatus Dionysius in libro de Divinis Nominibus, capitulo quinto⁶: « Exemplaria dicimus esse in Deo existentium rationes substantificatas et singulariter praeexistentes, quas theologia praedefinitiones vocat, et divinas et bonas voluntates existentium determinativas et effectivas, secundum quas supersubstantialis existentia omnia praedefinivit et produxit ». Item, Augustinus in primo Confessionum, circa principium, ad Deum loquens, ait sic: « Deus et dominus omnium quae creasti, et apud te rerum omnium instabilium stant causae, et rerum omnium mutabilium immutabiles manent origines, et omnium irrationabilium et temporalium sempiternae vivunt rationes ». Item, in undecimo de Civitate Dei, capitulo decimo⁷, ait idem: « Non multae, sed una sapientia est, in qua sunt infinita quaedam eique finiti thesauri rerum intelligibilium, in quibus sunt omnes invisibiles atque incommutabiles rationes rerum, etiam visibilium et mutabilium, quae per ipsam factae sunt, quoniam Deus non aliquid nesciens fecit » etc.

Hae autem sempiternae rationes non sunt rerum essentiae verae et quidditates, cum non sint aliud a Creatore; creatura autem et Creator necessario habent essentias differentes: et ideo necesse est, quod sint formae exemplares, ac per hoc ipsarum rerum similitudines repraesentativae; et ideo cognoscendi rationes sunt, quia cognitio, hoc ipso quod cognitio, assimilationem dicit et expressionem inter cognoscentem et cognoscibile. Et ideo ponendum est, secundum quod Sancti dicunt et rationes ostendunt, Deum cognoscere res per earum similitudines.

Ad intelligentiam autem ipsius quaestionis et obiectorum notandum est, quod similitudo dupliciter dicitur: uno modo per convenientiam duorum in ter-

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tio, per quem modum dicitur esse « similitudo rerum differentium eadem qualitas¹ ». Alio modo dicitur similitudo, quia unum est similitudo alterius; et hoc est dupliciter: quaedam est similitudo imitativa, et sic creatura est similitudo Creatoris; quaedam autem est similitudo exemplativa, et sic in Creatore ratio exemplaris est similitudo creaturae. Utroque autem modo dicta similitudo, videlicet imitativa et exemplativa, est exprimens et expressiva²; et haec est similitudo, quae requiritur ad rerum notitiam habendam. — Sed notitia quaedam est causans res, quaedam est causata a rebus. Ad notitiam causatam a rebus requiritur similitudo imitativa³; et haec similitudo est ab extra, et ideo aliquam compositionem et additionem ponit circa intellectum cognoscentem; et inde est, quod attestatur imperfectioni. — Ad notitiam autem causantem res requiritur similitudo exemplativa, et haec quidem non est ab extra nec inducit aliquam compositionem nec attestatur alicui imperfectioni, sed omnimodae perfectioni. Quia enim ipse intellectus divinus est summa lux et veritas plena et actus purus; sicut divina virtus in causando res sufficiens est se ipsa omnia producere, sic divina lux et veritas omnia exprimere; et quia exprimere est actus intrinsecus, ideo aeternus; et quia expressio est quaedam assimilatio, ideo divinus intellectus, sua summa veritate omnia aeternaliter exprimens, habet aeternaliter omnium rerum similitudines exemplares, quae non sunt aliud ab ipso, sed sunt quod est essentialiter⁴. — Rursus, quia exprimit in quantum summa lux et actus purus, ideo exprimit lucidissime, expressissime, perfectissime, ac per hoc aequaliter et secundum intentionem similitudinis in nullo diminutae; et hinc est, quod omnia cognoscit perfectissime, distinctissime et integerrime. — His visis, facile est ad obiecta respondere.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur de Anselmo, dicendum, quod Anselmus loquitur ibi de similitudine, quae est causata a rei veritate; unde accipit ibi similitudinem, secundum quod exprimit sub ratione imitationis potius quam exemplaritatis; et hoc modo ponitur in producto respectu producentis, et non e converso, sicut subdit⁵; alio vero modo nihil impedit poni in producente respectu producti.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur: ubicumque est similitudo, ibi est convenientia etc.; dicendum, quod similitudo, quae est convenientia duorum in tertio, non ponitur in Deo respectu creaturae; sed similitudinem, qua aliquid dicitur esse imitativum alicuius, bene contingit ponere in creatura respectu Creatoris, et similitudinem, qua aliquid dicitur esse exemplativum alicuius, in Creatore respectu creaturae. Ad hanc enim similitudinem non requiritur convenientia per participationem alicuius communis, sed sufficit convenientia ordinis secundum rationem causantis et causati, exprimentis et expressi.

3. 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod similitudo est relatio aequiparantiae etc.; dicendum, quod verum est de illa similitudine, quae causatur per convenientiam unius tertii participati; et hoc modo non ponimus eam hic. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad illud quod obiicitur de aequalitate. — Quod tamen quaeritur: cur non est aliquo modo aequalitas, sicut similitudo? dicendum, quod aequalitas includit in se commensurationem, quae nullo modo potest esse inter finitum et infinitum; similitudo autem dicit expressionem, et haec bene potest esse inter Creatorem et creaturam. Unde sicut non sequitur: hoc non aequatur illi, ergo non imitatur illud, vel non exemplatur ab illo; sic intelligendum est in proposito.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si aliqua est similitudo inter Creatorem et creaturam, minima est etc.; iam patet responsio: quia similitudo per participationem non solum minima est, verum etiam nulla; similitudo vero per imitationem est maior et minor in creatura, secundum quod ipsa plus vel minus accedit ad bonitatem divinam; similitudo autem per exemplationem et expressionem summa est in Creatore respectu omnis creaturae, quia ipsa veritas, cum sit summa lux, summe exprimit omnia; et ideo non sequitur, quod magis cognoscat unam creaturam quam aliam.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod una creatura magis assimilatur Deo quam alia etc.; iam similiter patet responsio: hoc enim verum est de similitudine imitativa ex parte creaturae; sed haec non est ratio cognoscendi, sed altera, videlicet exemplativa, quae summe⁶ et aequaliter exprimit omnia.

7. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si intellectus noster esset omnino in actu, non indigeret similitudine etc.; dicendum, quod verum est, quod non indigeret similitudine accepta vel recepta ab extra, sed nihilominus ipse uteretur se ut similitudine ad cognoscendum alia; et hoc modo, non alio, ponimus similitudinem in cognitione divina.

8. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod similitudo est ratio ductiva in aliud etc.; dicendum, quod verum est de similitudine, quae dependet a re extra; de

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alia autem similitudine non est verum, quod per modum decursus et viae, sed solum per modum lucis perfecte exprimentis et quietantis ipsum¹ cognoscentem.

9. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod veritas est ratio cognoscendi etc.; dicendum, quod veritas dupliciter dicitur: uno modo veritas idem est quod rei entitas, secundum quod dicit Augustinus in Soliloquiis², quod « verum est id quod est ». Alio modo veritas est lux expressiva in cognitione intellectuali, secundum quod dicit Anselmus in libro de Veritate³, quod « veritas est rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis ». Primo modo veritas est ratio cognoscendi, sed remota; secundo modo est ratio cognoscendi proxima et immediata. Cum ergo dicitur, quod veritas magis salvatur in ipsa rei entitate quam in similitudine; verum est de veritate primo modo, non secundo. Sed veritas illa, quae est ratio cognoscendi proxima et immediata, illa magis salvatur in similitudine, quae est apud intellectum, maxime et potissime in illa similitudine, quae est exemplativa rerum; illa enim similitudo exemplaris perfectius exprimit rem, quam ipsa res causata exprimat se ipsam. Et propter hoc Deus perfectius cognoscit res per similitudines illas, quam cognosceret per suas essentias; et Angeli perfectius cognoscunt in Verbo quam in proprio genere. Propter quod et Augustinus frequenter dicit⁴, quod cognitio in Verbo assimilatur luci diei, cognitio autem in proprio genere assimilatur vesperi, propter hoc quod omnis creatura tenebra est respectu divinae lucis.

10. Ad illud autem quod obiicitur, quod in separatis a materia non differt etc.; dicendum, quod verbum illud non tantum intelligitur de separatis a materia a parte intelligentium⁵, verum etiam intelligibilium, utpote quando separatum a materia intelligit separatum a materia, tunc idem erit quod intelligit et quo intelligitur; et hoc non semper, sed quando intellectus convertitur in se ipsum. Et hoc locum habet, quando Deus intelligit se; non autem habet locum in ipso respectu creaturae, quia, licet Deus sit separatus a materia, non tamen res intellectae.

11. Ad illud autem quod obiicitur, quod ubi est immediatio cognoscentis et cognoscibilis etc.; dicendum, quod unio cognoscentis et cognoscibilis dupliciter potest esse: aut secundum rationem essendi et conservandi et causandi; aut secundum rationem cognoscendi. Tunc autem est immediata coniunctio secundum rationem causandi, quando causa immediate producit et causat et tenet effectum; tunc autem est immediata coniunctio secundum rationem cognoscendi, quando cognoscens cognoscit cognoscibile vel per essentiam cognoscentis, vel per essentiam cogniti; et tunc non est opus similitudine intermedia, quae differat ab utroque extremorum. Nihilominus tamen ipsa essentia, in quantum est ratio cognoscendi, tenet rationem similitudinis; et hoc modo ponimus similitudinem circa divinam cognitionem, quae non est aliud quam ipsa essentia cognoscentis.

12. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nobilior est cognitio per essentiam quam per similitudinem etc.; dicendum, quod verum est de illa similitudine, quae est abstracta et causata ab ipsa rei essentia, cuiusmodi requiritur similitudo ad cognitionem causatam; sed non est verum de similitudine, quae est idem quod essentia cognoscentis. Perfectior enim est cognitio, qua cognoscens utitur se ipso ut similitudine ad cognoscendum aliquid, quam cognitio, qua cognoscens recipit aliquid ex parte cogniti⁶.

13. Ad illud autem quod obiicitur, quod quanto cognitio est nobilior, tanto immediatior est coniunctio et unio cognoscentis ad cognoscibile etc.; iam patet responsio: quia similitudo, quae non est aliud quam ipsum cognoscens, non ponit distantiam aliquam secundum rem nec etiam secundum rationem, quia cognoscens in quantum cognoscens dicit rationem similitudinis; et ideo similitudo, quae est ratio⁷ cognoscendi, in nullo egreditur extra rationem cognoscentis et cognoscibilis.

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English Translation

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Question II. Whether God knows things through the likenesses of things, or through their essence.

Granted that God knows infinite things, it is asked whether he knows those things which he knows through the likenesses of things, or through their essence⁷. And that it is through likenesses seems to be shown thus:

1. First, by the authority of Scripture. John, chapter one⁸: That which was made, in him was life: therefore all things which have been made were beforehand in God as knowing them: therefore either through a likeness or through their truth; but not through their truth, since as yet nothing existed: therefore through a likeness.

2. Likewise, Augustine in On the Trinity VI⁹ says that "the Son is an art full of all the living

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and unchangeable accounts"; but the accounts in an art are nothing else than the likenesses of the things made by art and known by the artificer: therefore the same as before.

3. Likewise, Augustine in On the Trinity IX, chapter eleven¹, says: "All knowledge according to species is like to that thing which it knows"; but divine cognition, since it is not according to privation, is according to species: therefore it is necessary that it be like to that thing which it knows. But it would not be like unless it had the likeness of the thing: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, the Philosopher² says "that the understanding is in a certain way all things"; but this is for no other reason than that the one understanding, by the very fact that he understands, is made like to the thing understood: therefore if this belongs to the general account of understanding, then if God understands and knows anything, it is necessary that he have the likenesses of the things which he knows: therefore, etc.

5. Likewise, for anything to be perfectly known it is necessary that there be an adequation of the understanding to the intelligible³; but a created thing cannot be made adequate to the creating understanding by its own nature, since that understanding is simple and the thing itself composite: therefore it is necessary that it be made adequate to it through some likeness that is simple and separated from all matter: therefore, etc.

6. Likewise, God knows things in the same way after they have been made in which he knew them before they came to be, because divine knowledge does not change; but before they came to be, he could not know them through their proper essences; and he knew them either through their likenesses or through their essences; and not through their essences: therefore through likenesses. And he knows now in the same way in which he knew then; therefore, etc.

7. Likewise, God is an agent acting from a purpose⁴; but every agent acting from a purpose preconceives that which it is going to make; and everything which preconceives something has that thing in some manner in its own keeping, either through its truth or through its likeness: therefore if, before things came to be, God did not have them in his keeping as to their essences, then he had them as to their likenesses.

8. Likewise, God is exemplar truly and properly, just as he is truly and properly efficient cause and end; but nothing is exemplar truly and properly except what has the likenesses of the things exemplified, through which it knows and makes them: therefore, as the account of exemplarity belongs to God, so also does the account of likeness⁵.

9. Likewise, God truly⁶ is the eternal mirror, leading to the knowing of every other knowable thing; but a mirror does not lead to the knowing of another thing unless it has that thing's likeness; therefore the same as before.

10. Likewise, God is truly and properly word; but a word is the likeness of that which is said: therefore if the Son of God is the Word by which all things are said⁷, it is necessary that in him there be the likenesses of all the things said.

11. Likewise, two things concur for the perfection of cognition, namely light and likeness; but the account of the most perfect light is wholly preserved in the divine cognition: therefore likewise also the account of expressive likeness.

Contra: 1. Anselm in the Monologion, chapter thirty-one: "It is manifest that in the Word, through which all things were made⁸, there is not the likeness of those things, but their true and simple essence": therefore if God does not know through anything outside himself, he does not know through a likeness, but rather through their essence.

2. Likewise, wherever there is likeness, there is agreement, and wherever there is agreement, there is a sharing of some one thing by several; but God and the creature share nothing as one, since then that thing would be simpler⁹ than the Creator; therefore it is impossible that there be any likeness in the Creator with respect to the creature, or conversely.

3. Likewise, likeness is a relation of equiparance¹⁰; but between the Creator and the creature there can be no relation of equiparance: therefore neither any likeness.

4. Likewise, just as equality is caused by unity in quantity, so likeness is caused by unity in quality¹¹; but between the Creator and the creature equality is in no way found, neither truly nor by transference: therefore neither is likeness, by the like account; or if likeness is found there and not equality, it is asked whence this comes.

5. Likewise, if there is any likeness between the Creator and the creature, it is the least: therefore if likeness is the account of knowing, then, speaking as such, where there is greater likeness there is a greater account of knowing, and where there is least likeness, least: if therefore God knows things through likenesses, it follows from this that he has the least cognition of things; which it is blasphemous to say.

6. Likewise, one creature is more assimilated to God than another, as that which exists, lives and senses is more assimilated than

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that which only exists: if therefore¹ a greater likeness is a greater account of knowing, then God knows one creature more than another.

7. Likewise, if our understanding were wholly in act, it would not need a likeness: therefore since the divine understanding is wholly in act² and is light with respect to everything knowable, it seems that no account of likeness is required for God's cognition.

8. Likewise, a likeness is an account leading to something else, namely to that of which it is the likeness; but where there is such a leading, there is a running-through and a ratiocinative comparison, and this in no way belongs to divine cognition: therefore neither does the account of likeness.

9. Likewise, truth is the account of knowing; therefore in the most powerful cognition the intention of truth is most powerfully preserved; but truth is more preserved in the thing itself than in its likeness: therefore if divine cognition is the most noble, it does not know things through likenesses, but through their essences.

10. Likewise, the Philosopher, in On the Soul III³: "In things separated from matter, that which is understood and that by which it is understood are the same"; but God is wholly separated from matter: therefore that which he knows and that by which he knows are the same. But he knows things outside himself: therefore he knows them through their own essences, not through any likenesses.

11. Likewise, wherever there is an immediate and undivided conjunction of the knower and the knowable, there is no need of a likeness; but God is most inward to every created thing: therefore for the cognition of it he does not need any likeness.

12. Likewise, the mode of knowing through the essence is more noble than that through a likeness; which is clear, because that mode of knowing pertains to the third heaven, as Augustine says in On Genesis to the Letter XII⁴: therefore, if what is more noble is to be attributed to God, it seems more fitting to hold that God knows things through their essences rather than through likenesses.

13. Likewise, the more noble a cognition is, the more immediate is the conjunction and union of the knower to the knowable; but divine cognition has nobility in every way: therefore also the most perfect union. But the conjunction⁵ and union is more immediate when the knower is united to the knowable as to its essence than as to its likeness: therefore, etc.

Conclusio. God knows things through the eternal accounts, which are the exemplar likenesses of things, most perfectly representative and expressive, and essentially the same as what God himself is.

I respond: It must be said that, according to blessed Dionysius and according to blessed Augustine in many places, God knows things through the eternal accounts. For blessed Dionysius says in the book On the Divine Names, chapter five⁶: "We call exemplars those substantified and singularly pre-existing accounts of existing things which theology calls predefinitions, and the divine and good wills, determinative and effective of existing things, according to which the supersubstantial existence predefined and produced all things." Likewise, Augustine in Confessions I, near the beginning, speaking to God, says thus: "O God and Lord of all things which thou hast created, with thee stand the causes of all unstable things, and the unchangeable origins of all changeable things abide, and the everlasting accounts of all irrational and temporal things live." Likewise, in On the City of God XI, chapter ten⁷, the same man says: "There are not many wisdoms, but one wisdom, in which are certain infinite and, to it, finite treasures of intelligible things, in which are all the invisible and unchangeable accounts of things, even of visible and changeable things, which were made through it, since God made nothing unknowingly," etc.

But these everlasting accounts are not the true essences and quiddities of things, since they are not other than the Creator; whereas the creature and the Creator necessarily have differing essences: and therefore it is necessary that they be exemplar forms, and through this representative likenesses of the things themselves; and therefore they are accounts of knowing, since cognition, by the very fact that it is cognition, bespeaks an assimilation and an expression between the knower and the knowable. And therefore it must be held, according as the Saints say and reasons show, that God knows things through their likenesses.

But for the understanding of the question itself and of the objections, it must be noted that likeness is said in two ways: in one way through the agreement of two things in a

p. 9

third, in which way it is said that "likeness is the same quality of differing things¹." In another way likeness is said because one thing is the likeness of another; and this is twofold: one likeness is imitative, and thus the creature is the likeness of the Creator; another is exemplative, and thus in the Creator the exemplar account is the likeness of the creature. But likeness spoken of in either way, namely imitative and exemplative, is expressing and expressive²; and this is the likeness which is required for having knowledge of things. — But some knowledge causes things and some is caused by things. For knowledge caused by things an imitative likeness is required³; and this likeness is from without, and therefore it posits some composition and addition about the knowing understanding; and hence it is that it bears witness to imperfection. — But for knowledge causing things an exemplative likeness is required, and this indeed is not from without, nor does it induce any composition, nor does it bear witness to any imperfection, but to perfection in every way. For since the divine understanding itself is the highest light and full truth and pure act, then, just as the divine power in causing things is of itself sufficient to produce all things, so the divine light and truth is sufficient to express all things; and since to express is an intrinsic act, it is therefore eternal; and since expression is a kind of assimilation, therefore the divine understanding, expressing all things eternally by its own highest truth, has eternally the exemplar likenesses of all things, which are not other than himself, but are essentially what he is⁴. — Again, since he expresses inasmuch as he is the highest light and pure act, he therefore expresses most lucidly, most expressly, most perfectly, and through this equally and according to an intention of likeness in no way diminished; and hence it is that he knows all things most perfectly, most distinctly and most entirely. — These things seen, it is easy to answer the objections.

1. To that, then, which is objected in the first place from Anselm, it must be said that Anselm is there speaking of the likeness which is caused by the truth of the thing; whence he there takes likeness according as it expresses under the account of imitation rather than of exemplarity; and in this way it is posited in the product with respect to the producer, and not conversely, as he adds⁵; but in the other way nothing prevents its being posited in the producer with respect to the product.

2. To that which is objected — wherever there is likeness, there is agreement, etc. — it must be said that the likeness which is the agreement of two things in a third is not posited in God with respect to the creature; but the likeness by which something is said to be imitative of another may well be posited in the creature with respect to the Creator, and the likeness by which something is said to be exemplative of another, in the Creator with respect to the creature. For this likeness does not require agreement through the participation of something common, but agreement of order suffices, according to the account of causing and caused, of expressing and expressed.

3. 4. To that which is objected, that likeness is a relation of equiparance, etc., it must be said that this is true of that likeness which is caused through the agreement of one participated third; and in this way we do not posit it here. — And through this the answer is clear to that which is objected concerning equality. — But as to what is asked — why there is not equality in some way, as there is likeness — it must be said that equality includes in itself a commensuration which can in no way exist between the finite and the infinite; whereas likeness bespeaks expression, and this can well exist between the Creator and the creature. Hence, just as it does not follow: this is not equal to that, therefore it does not imitate it, or is not exemplified by it; so it is to be understood in the case proposed.

5. To that which is objected, that if there is any likeness between the Creator and the creature it is the least, etc., the answer is already clear: because likeness through participation is not only the least but rather none at all; whereas likeness through imitation is greater and less in the creature, according as the creature approaches more or less to the divine goodness; but likeness through exemplation and expression is highest in the Creator with respect to every creature, since truth itself, being the highest light, expresses all things in the highest degree; and therefore it does not follow that he knows one creature more than another.

6. To that which is objected, that one creature is more assimilated to God than another, etc., the answer is likewise already clear: for this is true of imitative likeness on the part of the creature; but this is not the account of knowing, but the other, namely the exemplative, which in the highest degree⁶ and equally expresses all things.

7. To that which is objected, that if our understanding were wholly in act it would not need a likeness, etc., it must be said that it is true that it would not need a likeness taken or received from without, but nonetheless it would use itself as a likeness for knowing other things; and in this way, and no other, do we posit a likeness in the divine cognition.

8. To that which is objected, that a likeness is an account leading to something else, etc., it must be said that this is true of the likeness which depends on a thing outside; but of

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the other likeness it is not true — not, that is, after the manner of a running-through and a way, but only after the manner of a light perfectly expressing and quieting the knower himself¹.

9. To that which is objected, that truth is the account of knowing, etc., it must be said that truth is spoken of in two ways: in one way truth is the same as the entity of the thing, according as Augustine says in the Soliloquies² that "the true is that which is." In another way truth is the expressive light in intellectual cognition, according as Anselm says in the book On Truth³ that "truth is a rightness perceptible by the mind alone." In the first way truth is the account of knowing, but a remote one; in the second way it is the proximate and immediate account of knowing. When therefore it is said that truth is more preserved in the very entity of the thing than in a likeness, this is true of truth in the first way, not in the second. But that truth which is the proximate and immediate account of knowing is more preserved in the likeness which is present to the understanding, and most of all and most powerfully in that likeness which is exemplative of things; for that exemplar likeness expresses the thing more perfectly than the caused thing itself expresses itself. And on this account God knows things more perfectly through those likenesses than he would know them through their own essences; and the Angels know more perfectly in the Word than in the proper genus. On which account Augustine also frequently says⁴ that cognition in the Word is likened to the light of day, whereas cognition in the proper genus is likened to evening, for the reason that every creature is darkness with respect to the divine light.

10. But to that which is objected, that in things separated from matter there is no difference, etc., it must be said that that saying is understood not only of things separated from matter on the side of the things understanding⁵, but also on the side of the things intelligible — as, for instance, when what is separated from matter understands what is separated from matter, then that which it understands and that by which it is understood will be the same; and this not always, but when the understanding is turned back upon itself. And this has place when God understands himself; but it does not have place in him with respect to the creature, since, although God is separated from matter, the things understood are not.

11. But to that which is objected, that where there is immediacy of the knower and the knowable, etc., it must be said that the union of knower and knowable can be twofold: either according to the account of being and of conserving and of causing; or according to the account of knowing. Now the conjunction is immediate according to the account of causing when the cause immediately produces and causes and sustains the effect; and the conjunction is immediate according to the account of knowing when the knower knows the knowable either through the essence of the knower or through the essence of the thing known; and then there is no need of an intermediate likeness differing from both of the extremes. Nevertheless the essence itself, inasmuch as it is the account of knowing, holds the account of likeness; and in this way we posit a likeness about the divine cognition, which is nothing other than the very essence of the knower.

12. To that which is objected, that cognition through the essence is more noble than through a likeness, etc., it must be said that this is true of that likeness which is abstracted and caused from the essence of the thing itself, of which sort is the likeness required for a caused cognition; but it is not true of the likeness which is the same as the essence of the knower. For that cognition is more perfect by which the knower uses himself as a likeness for knowing something, than the cognition by which the knower receives something from the side of the thing known⁶.

13. But to that which is objected, that the more noble a cognition is, the more immediate is the conjunction and union of the knower to the knowable, etc., the answer is already clear: because a likeness which is nothing other than the knower himself posits no distance either in reality or even in account, since the knower inasmuch as he is a knower bespeaks the account of likeness; and therefore the likeness which is the account⁷ of knowing in no way goes out beyond the account of the knower and the knowable.

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Apparatus Criticus

7
De hac quaest. cfr. I. Sent. d. 35. q. 1. — Pro earum essentiam D ipsas essentias, F earum essentias, C falso essentiam suam.
On this question compare I Sentences, d. 35, q. 1. — In place of earum essentiam, D has ipsas essentias, F earum essentias, C wrongly essentiam suam.
8
Vers. 3. seq. — Inferius pro aliquid esset cod. F aliquid essent.
Verse 3 f. — Below, in place of aliquid esset, codex F has aliquid essent.
9
Cap. 10. n. 11. — Inferius A B C F omittunt et.
Chapter 10, n. 11. — Below, A B C F omit et.
1
Ibid. n. 16, ubi verbis praedictis addit: Est enim alia notitia secundum privationem, quam cum improbamus, loquimur; et haec privationis improbatio speciem laudat, ideoque approbatur.
Ibid., n. 16, where to the aforesaid words he adds: For there is another knowledge according to privation, of which we speak when we disapprove; and this disapproval of privation praises the species, and is therefore approved.
2
Libr. III. de Anima, text. 37. (c. 8.). — Pro intellectus textus originalis anima, A intelligens.
On the Soul III, text 37 (c. 8). — In place of intellectus the original text has anima, and A has intelligens.
3
In qua adaequatione consistit veritas; cfr. tom. I. pag. 707, nota 5.
In which adequation truth consists; compare tome I, p. 707, note 5.
4
De hac dictione cfr. tom. I. pag. 714, nota 3.
On this expression compare tome I, p. 714, note 3.
5
Respicitur in hoc arg. definitio ideae i. e. exemplaris, ad quod respiciens artifex id quod proposuit effecit. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 600, nota 7.
In this argument regard is had to the definition of the idea, i.e. of the exemplar, looking to which the artificer brings about what he has purposed. Compare tome I, p. 600, note 7.
6
Cod. D vere et proprie.
Codex D has vere et proprie.
7
Vide I. Sent. d. 27. p. II. q. 2. — In fine arg. D cognitorum pro dictorum.
See I Sentences, d. 27, p. II, q. 2. — At the end of the argument D has cognitorum for dictorum.
8
Ioan. 1, 3: Omnia per ipsum facta sunt. — Verbo Manifestum D F praemittunt Satis (textus originalis Satis itaque).
John 1:3: All things were made through him. — Before the word Manifestum, D F prefix Satis (the original text has Satis itaque).
9
Quia universalius, sicut genus simplicius est speciebus; cfr. Aristot., XI. Metaph. c. 1. (X. c. 1.).
Because more universal, as the genus is simpler than the species; compare Aristotle, Metaphysics XI, c. 1 (X, c. 1).
10
Scilicet in qua sunt eiusdem rationis et eodem nomine denominantur extrema; cfr. tom. I. pag. 346, nota 5.
Namely, one in which the extremes are of the same account and are denominated by the same name; compare tome I, p. 346, note 5.
11
Ut docet Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 20. (IV. c. 15.). — Inferius pro transumtive D F H interpretative.
As Aristotle teaches, Metaphysics V, text 20 (IV, c. 15). — Below, in place of transumtive, D F H have interpretative.
1
C addit similitudo in Deo est ratio cognoscendi, et in fine arg. subiungit sed hoc est falsum: ergo etc.
C adds similitudo in Deo est ratio cognoscendi, and at the end of the argument subjoins sed hoc est falsum: ergo etc.
2
D E H sit actus.
D E H have sit actus.
3
Text. 15. (c. 4.), ubi docet, in substantiis immaterialibus idem esse intelligens ac intelligibile, et sic idem a se et per se intelligi. — In fine arg. pro aliquas F suas.
Text 15 (c. 4), where he teaches that in immaterial substances the one understanding and the intelligible are the same, and that thus the same thing is understood by itself and through itself. — At the end of the argument, in place of aliquas, F has suas.
4
Cap. 6. n. 15. seqq., ubi distinguit triplicem visionem, scil. corporalem (per corporis sensus), spiritualem et intellectualem; ultima respondet tertio caelo, in quod raptus est Apostolus Paulus (II. Cor. 12, 2.).
Chapter 6, n. 15 ff., where he distinguishes a threefold vision, namely bodily (through the senses of the body), spiritual and intellectual; the last answers to the third heaven, into which the Apostle Paul was caught up (II Cor. 12:2).
5
Ita H, in aliis cognitio.
So H; in the others, cognitio.
6
Paragr. 8. — D H haec verba Dionysii omittunt et verborum August., I. Confess. c. 6. n. 9, principium sic exhibent: Tu Domine, qui et semper vivis, et nihil moritur in te, quoniam ante primordia saeculorum et ante omne, quod vel ante dici potest, tu es et Deus es etc.
Paragraph 8. — D H omit these words of Dionysius and give the beginning of the words of Augustine, Confessions I, c. 6, n. 9, thus: Thou, Lord, who both ever livest, and in whom nothing dies, since before the beginnings of the ages and before everything that can even be called "before," thou art and thou art God, etc.
7
Num. 3. Post Non, pro quo H cum textu originali Neque, E H, textu originali approbante, addunt enim. Subinde post in qua sunt textus originalis prosequitur immensi quidam atque infiniti thesauri (Col. 2, 3.); de hoc loco cfr. supra pag. 1, nota 2.
Number 3. After Non — for which H, with the original text, has Neque — E H, with the approval of the original text, add enim. Then, after in qua sunt, the original text continues immensi quidam atque infiniti thesauri (Col. 2:3); on this passage compare above, p. 1, note 2.
1
Ut ait Boeth. III. de Differentiis topic. Cfr. tom. IV. pag. 139, nota 5. — De duplici hac similitudine cfr. I. Sent. d. 35. q. 1. in corp. et ad 2, ubi refertur similitudo univocationis (duorum in tertio), imitationis et expressionis.
As Boethius says, On Topical Differences III. Compare tome IV, p. 139, note 5. — On this twofold likeness compare I Sentences, d. 35, q. 1, in the body and ad 2, where the likeness of univocation (of two things in a third), of imitation and of expression is reported.
2
Scilicet quatenus intellectui facit obiecta cognoscere; cfr. I. Sent. d. 35. q. 1. in corp., et Hexaëm. Serm. 12. et etiam solut. ad 9.
Namely, inasmuch as it makes the objects known to the understanding; compare I Sentences, d. 35, q. 1, in the body, and the Hexaëmeron, Sermon 12, and also the solution ad 9.
3
Ita recte A G, alii exemplativa.
So rightly A G; the others have exemplativa.
4
Ita B E G (G supplet id ante quod), qui tamen perperam omittunt aliud ante ab ipso, refragantibus aliis codd., sed hi deinde corrupte varia exhibent.
So B E G (G supplies id before quod), which however wrongly omit aliud before ab ipso, the other codices opposing; but these latter then present various corrupt readings.
5
Loc. cit.: In factis vero non esse simplicem absolutamque essentiam, sed verae illius essentiae vix aliquam imitationem. Unde necesse est, non idem Verbum secundum rerum creatarum similitudinem magis vel minus esse verum, sed omnem creatam naturam eo altiori gradu essentiae dignitatisque consistere, quo magis illi propinquare videtur.
Loc. cit.: But in the things made there is not a simple and absolute essence, but scarcely any imitation of that true essence. Whence it is necessary that the same Word be not more or less true according to the likeness of created things, but that every created nature stand at a higher degree of essence and of dignity in proportion as it is seen to approach nearer to it.
6
C simul similiter, F similiter.
C has simul similiter, F similiter.
1
F spiritum.
F has spiritum.
2
Libr. II. c. 5. n. 8: Verum mihi videtur esse id quod est.
Book II, c. 5, n. 8: The true seems to me to be that which is.
3
Sive in Dialogo de veritate, c. 11.
Or rather in the Dialogue on Truth, c. 11.
4
Cfr. II. Sent. d. 4. a. 3. q. 2, ubi diversi loci August. in nota 5. allegati sunt. — Superius vocibus quam cognosceret D H interserunt si, et post cognoscunt A supplet res.
Compare II Sentences, d. 4, a. 3, q. 2, where various passages of Augustine are alleged in note 5. — Above, between the words quam cognosceret, D H insert si, and after cognoscunt A supplies res.
5
A B intellectus. Inferius post tunc F prosequitur enim idem intelligit se, non autem habet etc. Pro quod intelligit D H quod intelligitur.
A B have intellectus. Below, after tunc, F continues enim idem intelligit se, non autem habet etc. In place of quod intelligit, D H have quod intelligitur.
6
Vide I. Sent. d. 35. q. 1. ad 3.
See I Sentences, d. 35, q. 1, ad 3.
7
F medium.
F has medium. ---