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Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Christi · Quaestio III: Utrum Deus res cognoscat per similitudines realiter differentes

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Quaestio III. Utrum Deus res cognoscat per similitudines realiter differentes.

Supposito, quod Deus cognoscat res per similitudines exemplares, quaeritur, utrum per similitudines realiter differentes. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Auctoritate. Augustinus, Octoginta trium Quaestionum, quaestione de ideis⁸: « Si dici recte aut credi non potest, Deum condidisse omnia irrationa-

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biliter; restat, ut omnia sint ratione condita, nec eadem ratione homo, qua equus; hoc enim absurdum est existimare: singula igitur propriis sunt creata rationibus ».

2. Item, ibidem¹: « Ideae sunt formae incommutabiles, quae divina intelligentia continentur »; sed omnis forma res: ergo si plures sunt formae, plures sunt res. Si ergo ideae sunt plures, necesse est, eas realiter esse differentes.

3. Item, Dionysius, de Divinis Nominibus, capitulo quinto²: « Exemplaria in Deo esse dicimus existentium rationes substantificas et singulariter praeexistentes, quas theologia praedefinitiones vocat »; sed diversarum rerum diversae sunt rationes substantificae: ergo cum res creatae realiter sint diversae, necesse est, rationes illas substantificas esse realiter distinctas.

4. Item, Philosophus, septimo Metaphysicae³: « Omne agens per exemplar in fine operationis est forma rei actae »; sed Deus est agens ad exemplar: ergo si formae completivae rerum factarum habent differentiam realem, necesse est, rationes illas exemplares habere diversitatem realem.

5. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione. Deus est agens a proposito⁴; sed agens a proposito non producit res, nisi habeat eas penes se; ergo si producit rerum diversitatem, necesse est, quod penes se habeat ipsas sub ratione diversitatis. Sed non habet eas nisi per earum rationes: ergo necesse est, rerum rationes realiter diversificari.

6. Item, quidquid res habent accipiunt a Deo; ergo cum habeant diversitatem ad invicem, recipiunt illam ab illa nobilissima arte: ergo si illam inde accipiunt, necesse est, illam ibi reperiri. Sed non est ibi nisi in rationibus exemplaribus: ergo necesse est, illas realiter distingui.

7. Item, oppositorum effectuum oppositae sunt causae proximae et immediate et uniformiter agentes⁵; sed rationes exemplares rerum sunt causae proximae et immediate et uniformiter agentes: ergo cum sint causae rerum non tantum diversarum, verum etiam oppositarum; necesse est, quod non tantum distinguantur realiter, verum etiam ad invicem opponantur.

8. Item, « numerus, ut dicit Boethius⁶, fuit maximum in animo Conditoris exemplar »; et Augustinus in secundo de Libero Arbitrio dicit, quod idem est numerus et sapientia; et constans est, quod non reperitur in Deo numerus exemplaris nisi quantum ad rationes exemplares. Si ergo numerus veram ponit pluralitatem, et in illis rationibus vere et proprie ponitur ratio numeri: vere ergo et proprie ponitur diversitas realis.

9. Item, ad perfectionem cognitionis facit distincte cognoscere: ergo perfectissima cognitio⁷ distinctissime cognoscit; sed Deus non cognoscit res nisi eo modo, quo eas penes se habet: ergo necesse est, quod eas penes se habeat distinctissime. Sed non habet eas nisi per rationes suas: ergo necesse est, eas esse distinctissimas: ergo non tantum est ibi distinctio secundum rationem, verum etiam secundum rem.

10. Item, Deus non aliter cognoscit res intra se et extra se, immo uniformiter; sed extra cognoscit eas sub reali distinctione: ergo et intra. Sed eo modo cognoscit, quo habet: ergo penes se habet eas ut realiter distinctas.

11. Item, simile simili cognoscitur; haec est per se vera, cum dicat Augustinus nono de Trinitate⁸: « Omnis secundum speciem notitia similis est ei rei, quae cognoscitur »: ergo ab oppositis, dissimile dissimili cognoscitur; sed dissimilia sunt cognita realiter⁹: ergo et rationes cognoscendi sunt realiter dissimiles, ergo et realiter differentes.

12. Item, quod est simile uni oppositorum in quantum tale est dissimile eius opposito: ergo si idea albi est similis albo, est dissimilis nigro, pari ratione et idea nigri dissimilis est albo: ergo necesse est, ideas albi et nigri esse dissimiles a se invicem: ergo et realiter differentes.

13. Item, idea est similitudo; aut ergo secundum totum, aut secundum partem. Si secundum partem: ergo nunquam per eam totaliter res cognoscitur. Si secundum totum; sed quaecumque sunt similia secundum totum alicui uni, secundum totum¹⁰ in nullo sunt dissimilia: ergo si una esset similitudo creaturarum secundum rem, impossibile esset, eas realiter esse differentes. Sed constat, quod realiter differunt: ergo necesse est, quod eis correspondeat realis differentia similitudinum exemplarium.

14. Item, ratio exemplaris est similitudo rei cognitae; aut ergo similitudo communis, aut pro-

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pria. Si communis: ergo per eam non cognoscuntur proprietates rerum; si propria; sed similitudines propriae multiplicantur secundum pluralitatem rerum: si igitur res creatae sunt realiter diversae, necesse est, et earum similitudines realiter differre ad invicem.

15. Item, appelletur A ratio, qua factus est homo; B ratio, qua factus est asinus; constans est, quod A non est B: si ergo illa quorum unum de altero non praedicatur in divinis differunt realiter, et non solum secundum rationem; videtur, quod illa sint realiter diversa. Minor manifesta est, quia licet bonitas, sapientia et potentia sint differentia ratione, nihilominus tamen praedicantur de se invicem.

16. Item, A non est similitudo asini, nec B similitudo hominis: ergo A aliquo modo plus accedit ad hominem quam ad asinum; sed hoc non esset, nisi aliquo modo plus conveniret cum homine¹ A quam B; hoc autem esse non posset, nisi aliquo modo haberet differentiam realem: ergo etc.

17. Item, si rationes illae ideales plurificantur ratione, aut rationi respondet aliquid, aut nihil. Si nihil: ergo vana est; si aliquid: ergo necesse est aliquo modo, quod in illis rationibus sit differentia realis.

18. Item, rationes illae aut differunt ratione connotati, aut ratione sui. Si ratione connotati: ergo cum illud sit temporale, erit² causa aeterni; si ratione sui; sed quae se ipsis distinguuntur, realiter differunt: ergo rationes illae realiter diversificantur.

19. Item, si differunt ratione connotati: ergo cum verbum magis connotet effectum quam ratio vel idea — quia, ut dicitur Octoginta tribus Quaestionibus³, « Verbum dicit operativam potentiam » — videtur ergo, quod si hoc esset causa, plura in divinis dicerentur esse verba; sed constat, quod hoc est falsum: ergo ad hoc, quod plures rationes dicantur, non sufficit differentia connotatorum.

20. Item, res causatae sunt a rationibus et non e converso: ergo et pluralitas rationum est prior pluralitate rerum connotatarum: ergo si plurificantur, hoc non facit differentia connotatorum; necesse est ergo, quod se ipsis realiter distinguantur.

21. Item, pluralitas personarum maior est quam pluralitas specierum vel rationum; sed divinae simplicitati non repugnat realis differentia personarum⁴: ergo nec pluralitas realis rationum idealium. Si ergo Sancti dicunt, eas esse plures; videtur, quod fatendum sit, eas esse realiter differentes.

Sed contra: 1. Dionysius capitulo quinto⁵ de Divinis Nominibus, loquens de Deo dicit sic: « Omnia quidem in se praehabet secundum unam simplicitatis excellentiam, omnem duplicitatem renuens ». Si ergo Deus praehabet in se res per rerum rationes; et illae refugiunt omnem duplicitatem: ergo nullam habent realem diversitatem.

2. Item, ibidem⁶: « Multorum participantium unus sol causas in se ipso uniformiter praeaccipit; multo fortius in causa ipsius et omnium praeexistere existentium omnium exemplaria secundum supersubstantialem unionem est concedendum »; sed hoc non esset, si rationes illae essent realiter distinctae: ergo nullam habent realem diversitatem.

3. Item, Augustinus, sexto de Trinitate, decimo capitulo⁷: « Filius est ars omnipotentis plena omnium rationum viventium, et omnia in ipso unum sunt »; sed hoc non esset, si rationes illae essent realiter diversae: ergo necessario sunt realiter indistinctae.

4. Item, hoc ipsum ostendit Dionysius, de Divinis Nominibus, quinto capitulo⁸, tali ratione: omnes lineae originaliter sunt in puncto, et omnes numeri in unitate; et tamen ex hoc non ponitur in puncto et in unitate realis diversitas in creatura: ergo nec in causa suprema.

5. Item, non est status nisi in uno; sed in quolibet genere causae necesse est ponere statum⁹: ergo si Deus est causa exemplaris, in qua est status omnium causarum formalium; necesse est ergo, quod habeat omnimodam unitatem secundum rem.

6. Item, quod est perfectius Deo est attribuendum; sed perfectius est uno cognoscere plura, quam pluribus plura: ergo etc.

7. Item, divina cognitio est infinita, ergo nullo modo est arctata nec limitata: ergo nec ratio cognoscendi in Deo aliquo modo limitatur; sed si ad plures res cognoscendas requirerentur plures rationes realiter differentes, tunc esset aliquo modo limitata et arctata¹⁰: ergo si hoc est impossibile ponere, impossibile est, quod rationes illae sint realiter diversae.

8. Item, ratio cognoscendi in divinis nominat quid essentiale, quia commune tribus personis; sed

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quae essentialia sunt in divinis, nullo modo plurificantur secundum rem, quia, si realiter plurificarentur, essent in divinis¹ plures essentiae; sed hoc est impossibile: ergo impossibile est, rationes illas realiter differre.

9. Item, quaecumque distinguuntur realiter aut distinguuntur origine, aut qualitate, sicut dicit Richardus²; sed rationes illae non possunt distingui qualitate, quia talis distinctio non cadit in divinis; nec origine, quia una non manat ab alia: ergo impossibile est, eas esse realiter diversas.

10. Item, rationes illae aeternae sunt rerum productivae; aut ergo producentes tantum, aut producentes et productae. Si producentes et productae: ergo cum producens et productum distinguantur realiter, rationes illae realiter a Deo distinguerentur, cum non sit dare aliquid aliud, a quo producantur: ergo non essent ipse Deus, nec Deus se ipso cognosceret res; quod est impossibile. Si sunt producentes tantum: ergo tenent rationem principii solius; sed principium tale est principium primum, et principium primum non est nisi unice unum: ergo impossibile est, quod rationes illae realiter distinguantur.

11. Item, ratio exemplaris nominat illud, per quod res cognoscitur; sed illud quo res cognoscitur non est nisi forma: ergo si Deus cognosceret res per rationes exemplares realiter differentes, necesse esset, ipsum divinum esse esse multiforme. Sed hoc est omnino impossibile: ergo et primum.

12. Item, si realiter distinguuntur; cum sint res, quibus est fruendum, et res, quibus est fruendum, faciunt nos beatos³; nullus esset beatus, nisi cognosceret omnes rationes exemplares, sicut nullus est beatus, cui deest notitia alicuius trium personarum. Sed hoc est falsum et absurdum: ergo et primum.

13. Item, ratio idealis in Deo non dicit quid inhaerens, sed magis per se stans, quemadmodum et Verbum: ergo si plures essent rationes realiter differentes; quot sunt ibi rationes, tot essent substantiae per se stantes: ergo tot essent divinae personae, vel essentiae, quot sunt ideae. Sed hoc est falsum et contra fidem: ergo erroneum⁴ est dicere, eas realiter differre.

14. Item, si realiter differunt, aut sicut res absolutae, aut sicut respectus; sed non sicut respectus, quia nullus respectus censetur nomine eius, ad quod refertur, maxime in relatione superpositionis⁵; sed ratio hominis dicitur ipse homo: in Deo ergo ratio idealis non est imposita a respectu reali. Si igitur plurificantur realiter, plurificantur sicut formae absolutae; ergo si hoc est impossibile, impossibile est, rationes illas realiter differre.

15. Item, si distinguuntur realiter sicut diversi respectus reales; cum in respectu reali relativa sint simul natura⁶, simul natura essent idea et ideatum, ergo Creator et creatura; sed hoc est omnino absurdum: ergo impossibile est, quod rationes illae diversificentur sicut diversi respectus reales; nec sicut diversae res absolutae; hoc constat: ergo nullam habent realem diversitatem.

16. Item, omnis realis diversitas aut facit aliud et aliud, aut alium et alium, aut alterum et alterum⁷; sed nullo istorum modorum est ponere circa illas aeternas rationes, quia nec est ibi essentialis diversitas nec personalis nec accidentalis: ergo nullo modo est distinctio vel differentia realis.

Conclusio. Deus res cognoscit se ipso ut similitudine expressiva omnium, ita ut rationes ideales non plurificentur in Deo secundum rem, sed tantum secundum rationem.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod absque dubio Deus res cognoscit; et quod se ipso cognoscit; et quod cognoscit se ipso ut similitudine; et quod similitudo illa, qua cognoscit, non est accepta similitudo ab extra nec similitudo per convenientiam in aliqua tertia natura, sed similitudo illa nihil aliud est quam veritas expressiva, sicut ostensum fuit in quaestione praemissa. Dicere ergo, quod Deus cognoscit res se ipso ut similitudine, non est aliud quam dicere, quod Deus cognoscat res se ipso ut veritate sive ut summa luce res ceteras⁸ exprimente. Et quoniam divina veritas potentissima est ad res omnes totaliter exprimendas, sicut divina virtus ad res omnes totaliter faciendas; ideo Deus cognoscit se ipso ut veritate exprimente res multimodas et totaliter. Potens est autem divina veritas, quamvis sit una, omnia exprimere per modum similitudinis exemplaris, quia ipsa est omnino extra genus et ad nihil coarctata; ipsa etiam est actus purus, cetera autem respectu eius sunt materialia et possibilia. Quoniam ergo unum secundum formam potest assimilari pluribus secundum materiam, sicut

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patet de albedine in homine et lapide; cum ipsa veritas indifferenter se habeat ad omnia, et cetera sint sibi materialia, ipsa ut actus purus esse potest similitudo expressiva omnium.

In hac autem expressione est tria intelligere, scilicet ipsam veritatem, ipsam expressionem et ipsam rem. Veritas exprimens una sola est et re et ratione; ipsae autem res, quae exprimuntur, habent multiformitatem vel actualem, vel possibilem; expressio vero, secundum id quod est, nihil aliud est quam ipsa veritas; sed secundum id ad quod est, tenet se ex parte rerum, quae exprimuntur. Unde expressio unius rei et alterius rei in divina, vel a divina veritate, secundum id quod est, non est aliud et aliud; sed secundum id ad quod est, plurificari dicitur; quia exprimere hominem non est exprimere asinum, sicut praedestinare Petrum non est praedestinare Paulum, nec creare hominem est creare Angelum, licet actus divinus sit unus. Quoniam ergo rationes ideales nominant ipsas expressiones divinae veritatis respectu rerum, ideo plurificari dicuntur non secundum id quod significant, sed secundum id quod connotant, non secundum id quod sunt, sed secundum id ad quod sunt sive ad quod comparantur. Et quia ad illud sunt non secundum realem respectum, qui sit in Deo, quia Deus ad nihil extrinsecum realiter refertur, sed solum secundum rationem intelligendi, cui correspondet realis respectus in actu vel aptitudine ex parte rerum¹: ideo dicendum, quod rationes ideales in Deo plurificantur non secundum rem, sed secundum rationem, quae quidem ratio non tantum est ex parte intelligentis, sed etiam ex parte rei intellectae.

Huius autem simile non perfecte reperitur in creatura; sed si intelligeretur per impossibile, quod lux esset sua illuminatio et irradiatio; dicere possumus, quod eiusdem lucis et luminis essent plures irradiationes, propter hoc quod irradiatio dicit diametralem sive orthogonalem² ipsius luminis directionem; propter quod diversorum illuminatorum plures dicerentur irradiationes, in una tamen luce et in uno lumine. Sic et in proposito intelligendum est, quia ipsa divina veritas est lux, et ipsius expressiones respectu rerum sunt quasi luminosae irradiationes, licet intrinsecae, quae determinate ducunt et dirigunt in id quod exprimitur. Et hoc est quod dicit Dionysius septimo capitulo³ de Divinis Nominibus: « Non ex entibus entia dicens novit divinus intellectus, sed ex se ipso et in ipso secundum omnium causam, notitiam et scientiam et substantiam praehabet et praeconcipit, non secundum ideam singulis se immittens; hoc est, non secundum ideas realiter differentes, sed secundum unam causae excellentiam omnia noscens et continens, sicut et lux secundum causam in se notitiam tenebrarum praeaccepit et non aliunde cognoscens tenebras quam a lucis defectu. Sese igitur divina sapientia agnoscens, cognoscit omnia materialia immaterialiter, et indivisim divisibilia, et singulariter multa, ipso uno omnia cognoscens et producens ». In quo manifeste ostendit Dionysius, quod in ratione cognoscendi non cadit realis pluralitas, quia hoc derogaret perfectioni cognitionis divinae; et hoc ipsum perfectius ostendit in quinto capitulo, sicut supra⁴ allegatum est. Et ideo concedendae sunt rationes, quae factae sunt ad partem istam.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium de Augustino, quod alia ratione conditus est homo, alia equus etc.; dicendum, quod alietas ibi non dicit realem differentiam, sed tantum secundum rationem.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod idea est forma et res etc.; dicendum, quod idea et dicit rem et dicit modum rei — dicit enim formam comparatam ad illud quod exprimitur — nec plurificatur, in quantum dicit rem, sed in quantum dicit modum rei; et ideo, cum procedit a pluralitate idearum ad pluralitatem rerum in divinis, procedit a pluralitate modi ad pluralitatem rei; et ideo peccat secundum accidens, vel secundum figuram dictionis⁵.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod secundum Dionysium ideae sunt rationes substantificae; dicendum, quod substantificae dicuntur, vel quia in se subsistunt, vel quia substantias⁶ rerum efficiunt, vel substantias rerum exprimunt, non quia sint substantiae vel essentiae ipsarum rerum. Licet autem essentiae ipsarum rerum in rebus multiplicentur, quia ipsis rebus intrinsecae sunt; non tamen oportet de illis rationibus exemplaribus, quia constitutionem rerum non ingrediuntur.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod agens ad exemplar est forma rei operatae; dicendum, quod illud intelligitur de agente ad exemplar, quod ab ipso exemplari dirigitur et regulatur, sicut est agens creatum; nec de illo adhuc intelligitur proprie, quod secundum veritatem sit forma rei productae, sed aliquid penes se habet, quod tenet rei producendae similitudinem, sicut medicus in curando prius sanitatem habet in mente et arte, quam postea facit in opere; et ita ex duplici parte deficit ratio introducta.

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5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod agens a proposito non producit res, nisi eas habeat penes se; dicendum, quod non oportet, quod eas habeat per veritatem, sed per similitudinem, quam quidem similitudinem non est necesse per omnia esse conformem his quorum est similitudo; sicut patet, quia materialium est ratio vel idea immaterialis, corruptibilium incorruptibilis, ac per hoc et multorum potest esse uniformis et differentium indivisa; et ideo non sequitur, quodsi pluralitas repraesentatur ab ipsis rationibus exemplaribus, quod ipsae sint realiter plures; sicut non sequitur, quod materialium sint materiales.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quidquid res habent accipiunt a Deo; dicendum, quod accipiunt ab eo, sicut ab eo qui de nihilo potest aliquid facere, non quia accipiant aliquid, quod sit suae substantiae; et ideo non sequitur, quodsi creatura habeat aliquid in proprio genere, quod propter hoc necesse sit illud reperire in dante¹ actu; sed sufficit, quod solum reperiatur secundum potentiam efficientem, vel exemplaritatem repraesentantem.

7. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod oppositorum effectuum oppositae sunt causae proximae et immediate etc.; dicendum, quod illud habet veritatem in causis coarctatis, quae non producunt multa nisi per multa, ideo nec opposita nisi per opposita; non autem in causa causarum, quae nullam coarctationem seu limitationem habet, sed omnimodam libertatem respectu effectuum producendorum, quantumcumque differentium².

8. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod numerus fuit maximum exemplar in animo Conditoris; dicendum, quod hoc dicitur, non quia in Deo proprie sit numerus, cum ille sit ex aggregatione diversarum unitatum³, sed quia Deus ipse cognoscit numerum, secundum quem omnes proportiones rerum creandarum attenduntur. — Vel si dicatur alicubi, quod in Deo sit numerus idearum, ille distrahit a ratione numeri proprie dicti, sicut et numerus personarum, qui non est per plurificationem unitatum, sed per replicationem eiusdem unitatis circa diversas hypostases⁴; sic et numerus idearum vel rationum non dicit plurificationem unitatum aeternalium, cum illa sit tantum una, sed comparationem ipsius ad plures res exprimendas.

9. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ad perfectionem cognitionis facit distincte cognoscere etc.; dicendum, quod actus cognoscendi respicit ipsum cognoscentem et ipsum cognitum: unde distincte cognoscere potest dupliciter accipi: vel ex parte ipsius cognoscentis, vel ex parte cogniti. Licet autem distincte cognoscere ex parte rei cognitae faciat ad perfectionem cognitionis, non tamen ex parte cognoscentis, quia perfectius est uno multa cognoscere quam multis. — Aliter potest dici, quod distincte cognoscere dupliciter est: vel ita, quod dicat distinctionem secundum diversitatem⁵ essentialem, vel ita, quod dicat expressionem exemplarem sive cognoscitivam. Primo modo facit ad perfectionem cognitionis ex parte rei cognitae; secundo modo ex parte cognoscentis; et hoc modo Deus distinctissime cognoscit, quia veritas aeterna, licet una, varias tamen res distinctissime exprimit, nulla in se ex hoc reperta distinctione.

10. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod uniformiter Deus cognoscit res intra et extra etc.; dicendum, quod si ita intelligatur, quod non habet cognitionem rerum ab extra, sed solum ab intra; sic sermo praemissus habet veritatem. Si autem intelligatur, quod cognoscit, res eodem modo se habere intra et extra; habet falsitatem: quia intra se habet eas sub omnimoda indifferentia reali, et sic scit, se habere eas; extra vero scit eas habere esse sub differentia multiformi.

11. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod simile simili cognoscitur; dicendum, quod illa illatio tenet in similitudine coarctata, quae est in genere; et ideo non habet locum in proposito. — Vel dicendum, quod haec non est similitudo secundum convenientiam, sed solum secundum expressionem exemplativam; et haec similitudo sive dissimilitudo non ponit differentiam rationis ad rationem, sive similitudinem ad similitudinem, sed secundum id quod connotat et exprimit extra se ipsam.

12. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod simile uni opposito est dissimile eius opposito; dicendum, quod illud habet locum in similitudine, quae est per participationem naturae communis, vel per limitatam expressionem, sicut illa, quae est accepta a re extra.

13. Ad illud quod obiicitur: aut similitudo illa est secundum totum, aut secundum partem; dicendum, quod secundum totum, quia dicitur similitudo; in quantum exprimens et totum exprimit. — Et si obiiciat, quod nulla diversa possunt secundum totum eidem assimilari; dicendum, quod verum est de illa similitudine, quae est per communicationem, non per

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expressionem. — Et si quaerat, qualiter possit illud intelligi; dicendum, sicut dictum fuit supra¹, quod hoc est, quia illa similitudo est extra genus et actus purus, et cetera sunt materialia respectu illius.

14. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aut est similitudo communis, aut propria; dicendum, quod Deo attribuendum est quidquid est completionis in creatura; et ideo quodam modo communis², quia omnia communiter exprimit; et quodam modo propria, quia perfecte et integre exprimit unumquodque.

15. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod A non est B; dicendum, quod in divinis ad hoc, ut unum vere negetur de altero, non oportet, quod sit ibi realis distinctio secundum id quod sunt, sed secundum id quod connotant; sicut patet, quod praedestinatio non est reprobatio, et hoc est, quia, licet utriusque significatum sit idem, scilicet divina essentia vel voluntas, connotatum tamen est alterum et alterum, scilicet gloria et poena³.

16. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod similitudo hominis non est similitudo asini etc.; patet responsio: hoc enim non est ratione divinae veritatis, quae aequaliter se habet ad hominem exprimendum et asinum, sed ratione connotati; sicut dicimus, quod creare hominem non est creare Angelum⁴.

17. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si est ibi pluralitas secundum rationem, aut aliquid respondet ei in re, aut nihil; dicendum, quod aliquid respondet. — Si autem quaeratur, quid sit illud; dico, quod ex parte veritatis divinae non respondet nisi unum, quod tamen est potentius in repraesentando multa quam aliqua multiformitas creata, quia, licet illa veritas sit simplex, est tamen infinita. Ex parte vero connotatorum respondet pluralitas vel actualis, vel potentialis. Plura enim possibilia sunt plura actu scita, licet actu non sint in natura propria⁵.

18. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si differunt ratione connotati, tunc temporale est causa aeterni; dicendum, quod dupliciter est loqui de connotato: aut quantum ad esse proprium, aut in quantum connotatur. Quantum ad esse proprium verum est, quod temporale est; verumtamen aeternaliter connotatur, quia quod est temporale in esse proprio aeternaliter scitur a Deo.

19. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tunc Verbum debet similiter plurificari, si ratio plurificatur ratione connotati; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia Verbum dicit ipsam divinam virtutem⁶ operativam vel expressivam, quae secundum rem et rationem intelligendi magis se tenet ex parte Dei. Idea autem vel ratio dicit expressionem vel similitudinem, quae, licet secundum rem plus se teneat ex parte Dei cognoscentis, secundum tamen modum intelligendi plus se tenet ex parte cogniti; et ideo, licet habeant unitatem re, ut possint plures ideae dici una veritas et unum Verbum, non tamen possunt habere unitatem ratione, ut possint dici plures ideae vel rationes una idea vel una ratio.

20. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod res sunt causatae a rationibus, ergo et pluralitas etc.; dicendum, quod pluralitas rerum in proprio genere est a pluralitate rationum; sed pluralitas rationum nihil aliud est quam ipsae res, ut sunt existentes in causa. Unde quamvis pluralitas idearum vel rationum aliquo modo habeat sibi correspondentem pluralitatem rerum, non tamen ab illa causatur, quia non ideo Deus scit plura, vel divina veritas exprimit plura, quia plura futura sunt; sed magis e converso, quia plura scit, ideo plura fiunt, sicut dicit Augustinus undecimo de Civitate Dei⁷: « Iste mundus nobis notus esse non posset, nisi esset; Deo autem nisi notus esset, esse non posset ».

21. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod pluralitas personarum maior est quam pluralitas specierum; dicendum, quod non est simile hinc inde: quia pluralitas personarum est propter originem et propter respectum mutuum personae ad personam et intrinsecum; idea autem vel ratio una non oritur ab altera, nec habent respectum mutuum vel intrinsecum, nec respectum realem ad aliquid extra habere possunt, quia habere respectum⁸ ad extrinsecum aliquo modo importat dependentiam nec permittit, illud, circa quod ponitur, esse summe simplex et absolutum. Et ideo realis pluralitas idearum nullo modo competit divino esse, quod est simplicissimum et absolutissimum. Si ergo ponitur ibi pluralitas, ponenda est secundum rationem intelligendi, sicut prius dictum est, et antiqui doctores communiter senserunt. — Et per hoc patet solutio obiectorum.

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English Translation

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Question III. Whether God knows things through likenesses really differing.

Supposing that God knows things through exemplary likenesses, it is asked whether through likenesses really differing. And that he does, it seems:

1. By authority. Augustine, in the Eighty-three Questions, in the question on ideas⁸: « If it cannot rightly be said or believed that God founded all things irrationa-

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lly, it remains that all things were founded by an account, and not man by the same account as the horse; for it is absurd to think this: single things, therefore, were created by their own proper accounts ».

2. Again, in the same place¹: « Ideas are unchangeable forms, which are contained in the divine intelligence »; but every form is a thing: therefore if there are many forms, there are many things. If therefore the ideas are many, it is necessary that they really differ.

3. Again, Dionysius, On the Divine Names, chapter five²: « We say that the exemplars in God are the substantifying accounts of existing things, singularly pre-existing, which theology calls predefinitions »; but of diverse things the substantifying accounts are diverse: therefore, since created things are really diverse, it is necessary that those substantifying accounts be really distinct.

4. Again, the Philosopher, in the seventh of the Metaphysics³: « Every agent acting through an exemplar is, at the end of the operation, the form of the thing done »; but God is an agent acting to an exemplar: therefore if the completive forms of things made have a real difference, it is necessary that those exemplary accounts have a real diversity.

5. Again, this same thing seems to hold by reason. God is an agent acting from a purpose⁴; but an agent acting from a purpose does not produce things unless it has them with itself; therefore if it produces a diversity of things, it is necessary that it have them with itself under the account of diversity. But it does not have them except through their accounts: therefore it is necessary that the accounts of things be really diversified.

6. Again, whatever things have they receive from God; therefore, since they have diversity from one another, they receive it from that most noble art: therefore if they receive it thence, it is necessary that it be found there. But it is not there except in the exemplary accounts: therefore it is necessary that those be really distinguished.

7. Again, of opposite effects the proximate causes acting immediately and uniformly are opposite⁵; but the exemplary accounts of things are the proximate causes acting immediately and uniformly: therefore, since they are the causes of things not only diverse but even opposite, it is necessary that they be not only really distinguished but even opposed to one another.

8. Again, « number, as Boethius says⁶, was the greatest exemplar in the mind of the Founder »; and Augustine in the second of On Free Choice says that number and wisdom are the same; and it is agreed that the exemplary number is not found in God except as regards the exemplary accounts. If therefore number posits a true plurality, and in those accounts the account of number is truly and properly posited: truly, therefore, and properly is a real diversity posited.

9. Again, to know distinctly makes for the perfection of cognition: therefore the most perfect cognition⁷ knows most distinctly; but God does not know things except in the way in which he has them with himself: therefore it is necessary that he have them with himself most distinctly. But he does not have them except through his accounts: therefore it is necessary that they be most distinct: therefore there is there not only a distinction according to account, but even according to the thing.

10. Again, God does not know things otherwise within himself and outside himself, but rather uniformly; but outside he knows them under a real distinction: therefore also within. But he knows in that way in which he has: therefore he has them with himself as really distinct.

11. Again, like is known by like; this is true of itself, since Augustine says in the ninth of On the Trinity⁸: « All knowledge according to species is like that thing which is known »: therefore, from the opposites, the unlike is known by the unlike; but the things known are really unlike⁹: therefore the accounts of knowing are also really unlike, and therefore also really differing.

12. Again, what is like one of two opposites is, in so far as it is such, unlike its opposite: therefore if the idea of white is like white, it is unlike black, and by parity of reasoning the idea of black is unlike white: therefore it is necessary that the ideas of white and black be unlike one another: therefore also really differing.

13. Again, an idea is a likeness; either therefore according to the whole, or according to a part. If according to a part: therefore a thing is never known totally through it. If according to the whole; but whatever things are like some one thing according to the whole, are according to the whole¹⁰ in nothing unlike: therefore if there were one likeness of creatures according to the thing, it would be impossible that they really differ. But it is agreed that they do really differ: therefore it is necessary that there correspond to them a real difference of exemplary likenesses.

14. Again, an exemplary account is a likeness of the thing known; either therefore a common likeness, or a pro-

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per one. If common: therefore through it the properties of things are not known; if proper; but proper likenesses are multiplied according to the plurality of things: if therefore created things are really diverse, it is necessary that their likenesses too really differ from one another.

15. Again, let A be called the account by which man was made; B the account by which the ass was made; it is agreed that A is not B: if therefore those things of which one is not predicated of the other in divine matters differ really, and not only according to account, it seems that those are really diverse. The minor is manifest, because although goodness, wisdom and power differ in account, they are nevertheless predicated of one another.

16. Again, A is not the likeness of the ass, nor B the likeness of man: therefore A in some way approaches man more than the ass; but this would not be unless in some way A agreed more with man¹ than B; and this could not be unless in some way it had a real difference: therefore etc.

17. Again, if those ideal accounts are made many in account, either something corresponds to the account, or nothing. If nothing: therefore it is empty; if something: therefore it is necessary in some way that in those accounts there be a real difference.

18. Again, those accounts either differ by the account of the connoted, or by the account of themselves. If by the account of the connoted: therefore, since that is temporal, it will be² the cause of the eternal; if by the account of themselves; but those things which are distinguished by themselves differ really: therefore those accounts are really diversified.

19. Again, if they differ by the account of the connoted: therefore, since the word connotes the effect more than the account or the idea — because, as is said in the Eighty-three Questions³, « The Word says an operative power » — it seems therefore that if this were the cause, several words would be said to be in divine matters; but it is agreed that this is false: therefore for this, that several accounts be spoken of, a difference of connoted things does not suffice.

20. Again, things are caused by the accounts and not conversely: therefore the plurality of accounts is also prior to the plurality of connoted things: therefore if they are made many, a difference of connoted things does not do this; it is necessary therefore that they be really distinguished by themselves.

21. Again, the plurality of persons is greater than the plurality of species or accounts; but a real difference of persons is not repugnant to the divine simplicity⁴: therefore neither is a real plurality of ideal accounts. If therefore the Saints say that they are many, it seems that it must be confessed that they really differ.

But on the contrary: 1. Dionysius, in the fifth chapter⁵ of On the Divine Names, speaking of God says thus: « He has all things beforehand in himself according to one excellence of simplicity, refusing all duplicity ». If therefore God has things beforehand in himself through the accounts of things, and those flee all duplicity: therefore they have no real diversity.

2. Again, in the same place⁶: « Of many participants the one sun takes up the causes beforehand in itself uniformly; much more strongly must it be conceded that in the cause of itself and of all things there pre-exist the exemplars of all existing things according to a supersubstantial union »; but this would not be if those accounts were really distinct: therefore they have no real diversity.

3. Again, Augustine, in the sixth of On the Trinity, chapter ten⁷: « The Son is the art of the omnipotent, full of all living accounts, and all things in him are one »; but this would not be if those accounts were really diverse: therefore they are necessarily really undistinguished.

4. Again, this same thing Dionysius shows, in On the Divine Names, chapter five⁸, by this reasoning: all lines are originally in the point, and all numbers in unity; and yet from this no real diversity is posited in the point and in unity in the creature: therefore neither in the supreme cause.

5. Again, there is no stopping-place except in one; but in every genus of cause it is necessary to posit a stopping-place⁹: therefore if God is the exemplary cause, in which is the stopping-place of all formal causes, it is necessary therefore that he have unity in every way according to the thing.

6. Again, what is more perfect is to be attributed to God; but it is more perfect to know many things by one than many by many: therefore etc.

7. Again, the divine cognition is infinite, therefore it is in no way narrowed nor limited: therefore neither is the account of knowing in God in any way limited; but if for knowing many things many really differing accounts were required, then it would be in some way limited and narrowed¹⁰: therefore if it is impossible to posit this, it is impossible that those accounts be really diverse.

8. Again, the account of knowing in divine matters names something essential, because common to the three persons; but

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those things which are essential in divine matters are in no way made many according to the thing, because, if they were really made many, there would be in divine matters¹ several essences; but this is impossible: therefore it is impossible that those accounts really differ.

9. Again, whatever things are really distinguished are distinguished either by origin or by quality, as Richard says²; but those accounts cannot be distinguished by quality, because such a distinction does not fall in divine matters; nor by origin, because one does not flow from another: therefore it is impossible that they be really diverse.

10. Again, those eternal accounts are productive of things; either therefore producing only, or producing and produced. If producing and produced: therefore, since the producer and the produced are really distinguished, those accounts would be really distinguished from God, since there is nothing else to be assigned by which they are produced: therefore they would not be God himself, nor would God know things by himself; which is impossible. If they are producing only: therefore they hold the account of a principle alone; but such a principle is a first principle, and a first principle is not except uniquely one: therefore it is impossible that those accounts be really distinguished.

11. Again, an exemplary account names that through which a thing is known; but that by which a thing is known is nothing but a form: therefore if God knew things through exemplary accounts really differing, it would be necessary that the divine being itself be multiform. But this is altogether impossible: therefore so is the first.

12. Again, if they are really distinguished; since they are things which are to be enjoyed, and things which are to be enjoyed make us blessed³, no one would be blessed unless he knew all the exemplary accounts, just as no one is blessed to whom the knowledge of one of the three persons is lacking. But this is false and absurd: therefore so is the first.

13. Again, an ideal account in God does not say something inhering, but rather something standing through itself, just as the Word does: therefore if there were several accounts really differing, as many as there are accounts there would be substances standing through themselves: therefore there would be as many divine persons, or essences, as there are ideas. But this is false and against the faith: therefore it is erroneous⁴ to say that they really differ.

14. Again, if they really differ, either as absolute things or as respects; but not as respects, because no respect is reckoned by the name of that to which it is referred, especially in a relation of superposition⁵; but the account of man is called man himself: in God, therefore, the ideal account is not imposed from a real respect. If therefore they are really made many, they are made many as absolute forms; therefore if this is impossible, it is impossible that those accounts really differ.

15. Again, if they are really distinguished as diverse real respects; since in a real respect the correlatives are simultaneous in nature⁶, the idea and the ideated would be simultaneous in nature, and therefore the Creator and the creature; but this is altogether absurd: therefore it is impossible that those accounts be diversified as diverse real respects; nor as diverse absolute things; this is agreed: therefore they have no real diversity.

16. Again, every real diversity makes either one thing and another thing, or one person and another person, or one other and another other⁷; but in none of these ways is it to be posited concerning those eternal accounts, because there is there neither an essential diversity nor a personal nor an accidental one: therefore in no way is there a real distinction or difference.

Conclusion. God knows things by himself as by a likeness expressive of all things, so that the ideal accounts are not made many in God according to the thing, but only according to account.

I answer: For the understanding of the foregoing it is to be noted that without doubt God knows things; and that he knows by himself; and that he knows by himself as by a likeness; and that that likeness by which he knows is not a likeness received from without, nor a likeness by agreement in some third nature, but that likeness is nothing other than an expressive truth, as was shown in the preceding question. To say, therefore, that God knows things by himself as by a likeness is nothing other than to say that God knows things by himself as by a truth, or as by the highest light expressing all other things⁸. And since the divine truth is most powerful for expressing all things totally, just as the divine power is for making all things totally, therefore God knows by himself as by a truth expressing things in many modes and totally. Now the divine truth, although it is one, is able to express all things by way of an exemplary likeness, because it is altogether outside a genus and narrowed to nothing; it is also pure act, while all else in comparison with it is material and possible. Since therefore what is one according to form can be assimilated to many according to matter, as

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is plain of whiteness in a man and in a stone; since that truth itself is indifferently related to all things, and all else is material to it, it, as pure act, can be a likeness expressive of all things.

Now in this expression there are three things to understand, namely the truth itself, the expression itself, and the thing itself. The expressing truth is one alone both in the thing and in account; but the things themselves which are expressed have a multiformity either actual or possible; the expression, however, according to that which it is, is nothing other than the truth itself; but according to that to which it is, it holds itself on the side of the things which are expressed. Whence the expression of one thing and of another thing in the divine truth, or by the divine truth, according to that which it is, is not one thing and another; but according to that to which it is, it is said to be made many; because to express man is not to express the ass, just as to predestine Peter is not to predestine Paul, nor is to create a man to create an angel, although the divine act is one. Since therefore the ideal accounts name the very expressions of the divine truth in respect of things, therefore they are said to be made many not according to that which they signify, but according to that which they connote, not according to that which they are, but according to that to which they are, or to which they are compared. And because they are to that not according to a real respect which is in God, since God is not really referred to anything extrinsic, but only according to the account of understanding, to which there corresponds a real respect in act or in aptitude on the side of things¹: therefore it is to be said that the ideal accounts in God are made many not according to the thing, but according to account, which account indeed is not only on the side of the one understanding, but also on the side of the thing understood.

A likeness of this is not perfectly found in the creature; but if it were understood, by the impossible, that light were its own illumination and irradiation, we can say that of the same light and lumen^tr. there would be several irradiations, because irradiation says the diametral or orthogonal² direction of the lumen itself; on account of which, of diverse things illuminated several irradiations would be spoken of, yet in one light and in one lumen. So too in the case proposed it is to be understood, because the divine truth itself is light, and its expressions in respect of things are as it were luminous irradiations, though intrinsic, which determinately lead and direct into that which is expressed. And this is what Dionysius says in the seventh chapter³ of On the Divine Names: « Not by saying beings from beings does the divine understanding know, but from itself and in itself, according to the cause of all things, it has beforehand and preconceives the knowledge and the science and the substance, not letting itself into single things according to an idea; that is, not according to ideas really differing, but knowing and containing all things according to the one excellence of the cause, just as light also, according to the cause, has taken up beforehand in itself the knowledge of darkness, knowing darkness from nowhere else than from the failure of light. Therefore the divine wisdom, in knowing itself, knows all material things immaterially, and divisible things undividedly, and many things singularly, by that one knowing and producing all things ». In which Dionysius manifestly shows that a real plurality does not fall in the account of knowing, because this would derogate from the perfection of the divine cognition; and this same thing he shows more perfectly in the fifth chapter, as was alleged above⁴. And therefore the arguments which were made for that side are to be conceded.

1. To that, then, which is first objected on the contrary out of Augustine, that man was founded by one account, the horse by another, etc.; it is to be said that otherness there does not say a real difference, but only one according to account.

2. To that which is objected, that an idea is a form and a thing, etc.; it is to be said that an idea both says a thing and says a mode of the thing — for it says a form compared to that which is expressed — nor is it made many in so far as it says a thing, but in so far as it says a mode of the thing; and therefore, when the argument proceeds from a plurality of ideas to a plurality of things in divine matters, it proceeds from a plurality of mode to a plurality of thing; and therefore it errs according to accident, or according to the figure of speech⁵.

3. To that which is objected, that according to Dionysius the ideas are substantifying accounts; it is to be said that they are called substantifying either because they subsist in themselves, or because they effect the substances⁶ of things, or because they express the substances of things, not because they are the substances or essences of the things themselves. And although the essences of the things themselves are multiplied in things, because they are intrinsic to those things, it need not be so of those exemplary accounts, because they do not enter into the constitution of things.

4. To that which is objected, that an agent acting to an exemplar is the form of the thing worked; it is to be said that this is understood of an agent acting to an exemplar which is directed and regulated by the exemplar itself, as a created agent is; nor is it even of that understood properly that it is in truth the form of the thing produced, but it has something with itself which holds the likeness of the thing to be produced, as a physician in curing first has health in mind and in art, which afterwards he makes in the work; and so on a twofold side the argument brought forward fails.

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5. To that which is objected, that an agent acting from a purpose does not produce things unless it has them with itself; it is to be said that it need not have them by truth, but by a likeness — which likeness indeed need not be in all respects conformed to those things of which it is the likeness; as is plain, because the account or idea of material things is immaterial, of corruptible things incorruptible, and through this it can also be uniform for many things and undivided for differing ones; and therefore it does not follow that, if a plurality is represented by the exemplary accounts themselves, those accounts are really many; just as it does not follow that the accounts of material things are material.

6. To that which is objected, that whatever things have they receive from God; it is to be said that they receive from him as from one who can make something from nothing, not because they receive something which is of his substance; and therefore it does not follow that, if a creature has something in its own genus, it is on that account necessary to find that in the giver¹ in act; but it suffices that it be found only according to the efficient power, or the exemplarity representing.

7. To that which is objected, that of opposite effects the proximate causes acting immediately are opposite, etc.; it is to be said that this holds true in narrowed causes, which do not produce many things except through many, and therefore do not produce opposites except through opposites; but not in the cause of causes, which has no narrowing or limitation, but complete freedom in respect of the effects to be produced, however greatly differing².

8. To that which is objected, that number was the greatest exemplar in the mind of the Founder; it is to be said that this is said not because number is properly in God, since number is from the aggregation of diverse unities³, but because God himself knows the number according to which all the proportions of the things to be created are attended to. — Or, if it be said somewhere that in God there is a number of ideas, that draws away from the account of number properly so called, as does also the number of persons, which is not by a making many of unities, but by the replication of the same unity about diverse hypostases⁴; so too the number of ideas or accounts does not say a making many of eternal unities, since that unity is only one, but the comparison of it to the many things to be expressed.

9. To that which is objected, that to know distinctly makes for the perfection of cognition, etc.; it is to be said that the act of knowing regards the knower himself and the thing known: whence to know distinctly can be taken in two ways: either on the side of the knower himself, or on the side of the thing known. Now although to know distinctly on the side of the thing known makes for the perfection of cognition, it does not do so on the side of the knower, because it is more perfect to know many things by one than by many. — Otherwise it can be said that to know distinctly is twofold: either so that it says a distinction according to an essential diversity⁵, or so that it says an exemplary or cognitive expression. In the first way it makes for the perfection of cognition on the side of the thing known; in the second way on the side of the knower; and in this way God knows most distinctly, because the eternal truth, though one, nevertheless expresses various things most distinctly, no distinction being found in itself on this account.

10. To that which is objected, that God uniformly knows things within and without, etc.; it is to be said that if it is so understood that he does not have cognition of things from without, but only from within, then the aforesaid statement holds true. But if it is understood that he knows things to be in the same way within and without, it holds falsehood: because within himself he has them under a complete real indifference, and so he knows that he has them; but without he knows them to have being under a multiform difference.

11. To that which is objected, that like is known by like; it is to be said that that inference holds in a narrowed likeness, which is in a genus; and therefore it has no place in the case proposed. — Or it is to be said that this is not a likeness according to agreement, but only according to an exemplative expression; and this likeness or unlikeness does not posit a difference of account to account, or of likeness to likeness, but according to that which it connotes and expresses outside itself.

12. To that which is objected, that what is like one opposite is unlike its opposite; it is to be said that this has place in a likeness which is by participation of a common nature, or by a limited expression, such as that which is received from a thing outside.

13. To that which is objected: either that likeness is according to the whole or according to a part; it is to be said that it is according to the whole, because it is called a likeness; in so far as it is expressive, it expresses the whole also. — And if it be objected that no diverse things can be assimilated to the same thing according to the whole; it is to be said that this is true of that likeness which is by communication, not by

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expression. — And if it be asked how that can be understood; it is to be said, as was said above¹, that this is because that likeness is outside a genus and is pure act, and all else is material in comparison with it.

14. To that which is objected, that it is either a common likeness or a proper one; it is to be said that whatever is of completeness in the creature is to be attributed to God; and therefore in a certain way it is common², because it expresses all things in common; and in a certain way proper, because it expresses each thing perfectly and entirely.

15. To that which is objected, that A is not B; it is to be said that in divine matters, for one thing to be truly denied of another, it is not required that there be there a real distinction according to that which they are, but according to that which they connote; as is plain, because predestination is not reprobation, and this is because, although the thing signified by both is the same, namely the divine essence or will, the thing connoted is nevertheless one and another, namely glory and punishment³.

16. To that which is objected, that the likeness of man is not the likeness of the ass, etc.; the answer is plain: for this is not by reason of the divine truth, which is equally related to expressing man and the ass, but by reason of the connoted; just as we say that to create a man is not to create an angel⁴.

17. To that which is objected, that if there is there a plurality according to account, either something corresponds to it in the thing or nothing; it is to be said that something corresponds. — But if it be asked what that is, I say that on the side of the divine truth nothing corresponds except one thing, which is nevertheless more powerful in representing many things than any created multiformity, because, although that truth is simple, it is nevertheless infinite. But on the side of the connoted things there corresponds a plurality either actual or potential. For many possible things are many things actually known, although they do not actually exist in their proper nature⁵.

18. To that which is objected, that if they differ by the account of the connoted, then the temporal is the cause of the eternal; it is to be said that there are two ways of speaking of the connoted: either as regards its proper being, or in so far as it is connoted. As regards its proper being it is true that it is temporal; nevertheless it is eternally connoted, because what is temporal in its proper being is eternally known by God.

19. To that which is objected, that then the Word ought likewise to be made many, if the account is made many by the account of the connoted; it is to be said that it is not alike: because the Word says the divine operative or expressive power⁶ itself, which according to the thing and the account of understanding holds itself more on the side of God. But the idea or account says an expression or likeness, which, although according to the thing it holds itself more on the side of God the knower, nevertheless according to the mode of understanding it holds itself more on the side of the thing known; and therefore, although they have unity in the thing, so that many ideas can be called one truth and one Word, they cannot nevertheless have unity in account, so that many ideas or accounts can be called one idea or one account.

20. To that which is objected, that things are caused by the accounts, therefore the plurality also, etc.; it is to be said that the plurality of things in their proper genus is from the plurality of accounts; but the plurality of accounts is nothing other than the things themselves, as they are existing in their cause. Whence, although the plurality of ideas or accounts in some way has a plurality of things corresponding to it, it is nevertheless not caused by it, because God does not know many things, nor does the divine truth express many things, because many things are to be; but rather conversely, because he knows many, therefore many come to be, as Augustine says in the eleventh of On the City of God⁷: « This world could not be known to us unless it were; but to God, unless it were known, it could not be ».

21. To that which is objected, that the plurality of persons is greater than the plurality of species; it is to be said that it is not alike on the one side and the other: because the plurality of persons is on account of origin and on account of the mutual and intrinsic respect of person to person; but one idea or account does not arise from another, nor do they have a mutual or intrinsic respect, nor can they have a real respect to anything outside, because to have a respect⁸ to something extrinsic in some way imports dependence, and does not permit that about which it is posited to be supremely simple and absolute. And therefore a real plurality of ideas in no way belongs to the divine being, which is most simple and most absolute. If therefore a plurality is posited there, it is to be posited according to the account of understanding, as was said before, and as the ancient doctors commonly held. — And by this the solution of the objections is plain.

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Apparatus Criticus

8
Quaest. 46. n. 2. — Cfr. I. Sent. d. 35. q. 2. seqq., ubi eadem quaestio solvitur.
Question 46, n. 2. — Compare I Sentences, d. 35, q. 2 and following, where the same question is solved.
1
Textus originalis: Sunt namque ideae principales formae quaedam vel rationes rerum stabiles atque incommutabiles, quae ipsae formatae non sunt, ac per hoc aeternae ac semper eodem modo sese habentes, quae in divina intelligentia continentur.
The original text: For ideas are certain principal forms, or stable and unchangeable accounts of things, which are not themselves formed, and through this are eternal and always holding themselves in the same way, which are contained in the divine intelligence.
2
Paragr. 8.
Paragraph 8.
3
Text. 23. (VI. c. 7.), ubi ostendit, quomodo fiant ea quae fiunt ab arte [i. e. quorum forma est in anima], scil. ex sanitate v. g. et ex domo in anima existente fieri sanitatem et domum in materia.
Text 23 (VI, c. 7), where he shows how those things come to be which come to be from art [i.e. of which the form is in the soul], namely that from health, for example, and from a house existing in the soul, health and a house come to be in matter.
4
Vide supra pag. 7, nota 4.
See above, p. 7, note 4.
5
Aristot., II. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 56. (c. 10.) et IV. Meteor. text. 41. (c. 7.): Contrariae contrariorum causae.
Aristotle, II On Generation and Corruption, text 56 (c. 10), and IV Meteorology, text 41 (c. 7): The causes of contraries are contrary.
6
Libr. I. Arithmet. c. 2: Hoc enim fuit principale in animo Conditoris exemplar. — Sententia August. habetur II. de Lib. Arb. c. 11. n. 30. seqq. Cfr. Glossa ordinaria (ex Rabano) in Sap. 11, 21: Omnia in mensura et numero et pondere disposuisti. — Finem arg. D exhibet sic: videtur, quod vere et proprie poneretur ratio diversitatis realis.
Book I of the Arithmetic, c. 2: For this was the principal exemplar in the mind of the Founder. — The opinion of Augustine is found in II On Free Choice, c. 11, n. 30 and following. Compare the Glossa ordinaria (from Rabanus) on Wisdom 11:21: Thou hast disposed all things in measure and number and weight. — D gives the end of the argument thus: it seems that the account of a real diversity would be truly and properly posited.
7
C perfectissime cognoscens, qui in fine arg. legit ergo habet eas distinctissimas; quare non tantum distinguuntur secundum rationem, verum etiam secundum rem.
C has perfectissime cognoscens, and at the end of the argument reads therefore he has them most distinct; wherefore they are distinguished not only according to account, but even according to the thing.
8
Cap. 11. n. 16: Sed omnis... ei rei, quam novit.
Chapter 11, n. 16: But all... that thing which it knows.
9
Supple: dissimilia.
Supply: unlike.
10
D G omittunt secundum totum, C addit ipsa inter se.
D G omit secundum totum; C adds ipsa inter se.
1
D G addunt quam cum asino, vel plus. Inferius pro haberet B G H haberent.
D G add quam cum asino, vel plus. Below, in place of haberet, B G H have haberent.
2
C supplet temporale.
C supplies temporale.
3
Quaest. 63: Sed hoc loco melius verbum interpretamur, ut significetur non solum ad Patrem respectus, sed ad illa etiam, quae per Verbum facta sunt operativa potentia; ratio autem, etsi nihil per illam fiat, recte ratio dicitur. — Pro ut dicitur G ut dicit Augustinus. Infra pro plura F pluralitatis; fortasse legendum: si hoc esset causa pluralitatis, plura in divinis etc.
Question 63: But in this place we better interpret word, so that there is signified not only the respect to the Father, but also to those things which were made through the Word by an operative power; but account, even if nothing be made through it, is rightly called an account. — In place of ut dicitur, G has ut dicit Augustinus. Below, in place of plura, F has pluralitatis; perhaps to be read: if this were the cause of the plurality, several in divine matters etc.
4
Vide infra Quaest. de Trin. q. 3. a. 2.
See below, Questions on the Trinity, q. 3, a. 2.
5
Paragr. 9. Pro renuens (ἀπαναινομένη) Scotus Erigena et abbas Vercellensis utuntur voce respuens.
Paragraph 9. In place of renuens (ἀπαναινομένη), Scotus Eriugena and the abbot of Vercelli use the word respuens.
6
Paragr. 8.
Paragraph 8.
7
Num. 11: Ars quaedam omnipotentis atque sapientis Dei plena omnium rationum viventium incommutabilium, et omnes unum in ea, sicut ipsa unum de uno, cum quo unum. — D G finem arg. sic exhibent: ergo nullam habent realem diversitatem.
N. 11: A certain art of the omnipotent and wise God, full of all the living and unchangeable accounts, and all are one in it, as it itself is one from one, with which it is one. — D G give the end of the argument thus: therefore they have no real diversity.
8
Paragr. 6. Nonnulli codd. allegant etiam c. 2, ubi § 5. de lineis agitur. — Inferius pro realis A B C E H realiter.
Paragraph 6. Some codices allege also c. 2, where in § 5 the lines are treated. — Below, in place of realis, A B C E H have realiter.
9
Ut ostendit Aristot., II. Metaph. text. 5. seqq. (I. brevior, c. 2.). — Superius pro in uno D G H in summo. Aristot., II. de Caelo et mundo, text. 22. (c. 4.): Prius natura in unoquoque genere est unum multis et simplex composito. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 26, nota 11, pag. 99, nota 3. et pag. 355, nota 3.
As Aristotle shows, II Metaphysics, text 5 and following (I, the shorter, c. 2). — Above, in place of in uno, D G H have in summo. Aristotle, II On the Heaven and the World, text 22 (c. 4): In every genus the one is prior in nature to the many, and the simple to the composite. Compare tom. II, p. 26, note 11, p. 99, note 3, and p. 355, note 3.
10
A B E perperam tunc essent... limitatae et arctatae.
A B E wrongly have tunc essent... limitatae et arctatae.
1
C alias in divinis essent, D G quia sic essent in Deo.
C otherwise has in divinis essent, D G quia sic essent in Deo.
2
Scil. a S. Victore, IV. de Trin. c. 13. seq. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 103, nota 6. et pag. 104, nota 5.
Namely, of Saint-Victor, IV On the Trinity, c. 13 and following. Compare tom. II, p. 103, note 6, and p. 104, note 5.
3
Secundum August., I. de Doctr. christiana, c. 31. n. 34.
According to Augustine, I On Christian Doctrine, c. 31, n. 34.
4
B haereticum.
B has haereticum.
5
Relatio praedicamentalis dividitur in relationem aequiparantiae (v. g. similitudinis) et relationem disquiparantiae; posterior sub se continet relationes superpositionis v. g. relationes patris, domini, causae, producentis etc., et relationes suppositionis v. g. filii, servi, effectus, producti etc.
A predicamental relation is divided into a relation of equiparance (for example, of likeness) and a relation of disquiparance; the latter contains under itself the relations of superposition, for example the relations of father, lord, cause, producer, etc., and the relations of supposition, for example of son, servant, effect, produced, etc.
6
Vide Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de His quae ad aliquid.
See Aristotle, On the Categories, the chapter on Things said relatively.
7
Cfr. Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Differentia. — Hoc arg. desideratur in C D G. — Inferius ex E H posuimus accidentalis, in aliis actualis.
Compare Porphyry, On the Predicables, the chapter on Difference. — This argument is wanting in C D G. — Below, from E H we have put accidentalis; in the others, actualis.
8
Pro ceteras, quod G omittit, A H creatas. D omnes res terrenas.
In place of ceteras, which G omits, A H have creatas. D has omnes res terrenas.
1
Cfr. I. Sent. d. 30. q. 3. — Inferius pro intelligentis A B intellectus.
Compare I Sentences, d. 30, q. 3. — Below, in place of intelligentis, A B have intellectus.
2
Sive rectangularem. — Superius ex D F G posuimus eiusdem lucis et eiusdem luminis; in aliis eiusdem lucis et illuminationis.
Or right-angled. — Above, from D F G we have put eiusdem lucis et eiusdem luminis; in the others, eiusdem lucis et illuminationis.
3
Paragr. 2. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 600, nota 5; quae ibidem dicta sunt de vocibus se immittens valent etiam hic [loc. cit. pro apud Scotum Erigenam substituendum: in versione antiqua apud S. Thomam], scil. quod codd. omittunt se. A B C E F H omittunt omnium, textus originalis omittit hoc est non secundum ideas realiter differentes, ex quo substituimus praeaccepit (προείληφεν) pro lectione codicum percipit.
Paragraph 2. Compare tom. I, p. 600, note 5; what was said there about the words se immittens holds good here also [in the passage cited, for apud Scotum Erigenam is to be substituted: in the old version, in St Thomas], namely that the codices omit se. A B C E F H omit omnium; the original text omits hoc est non secundum ideas realiter differentes, on the strength of which we have substituted praeaccepit (προείληφεν) for the codices' reading percipit.
4
Fundam. 1. 2. 4, et quaest. praeced. in corp.
Grounds 1, 2, 4, and the preceding question in the body.
5
Cfr. Aristot., I. Elench. c. 3. (c. 4.), ex quo tom. I. pag. 58, nota 5, pag. 375, nota 9. et pag. 740, nota 6, plura retulimus.
Compare Aristotle, I Sophistical Refutations, c. 3 (c. 4), from which we have reported more in tom. I, p. 58, note 5, p. 375, note 9, and p. 740, note 6.
6
B addit ipsas, E H ipsarum.
B adds ipsas, E H ipsarum.
1
G Creatore.
G has Creatore.
2
Cfr. I. Sent. d. 45. a. 2. q. 2. in corp.
Compare I Sentences, d. 45, a. 2, q. 2, in the body.
3
Averroes, Epitom. metaph. tr. 1, agens de uno ait: Numerus [est] aggregatio unitatum. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 363, nota 11. In Dialogo Qq. 65 August. ad Orosium (inter opera August.), q. 39: Numerus et mensura et pondus ipse Deus est. Ipse est numerus sine numero, a quo est omnis numerus etc. — Inferius pro creandarum G creatarum, A E H causandarum.
Averroes, Epitome of the Metaphysics, tr. 1, treating of the one, says: Number [is] an aggregation of unities. Compare tom. I, p. 363, note 11. In the Dialogue of 65 Questions of Augustine to Orosius (among the works of Augustine), q. 39: Number and measure and weight is God himself. He is number without number, from whom is all number, etc. — Below, in place of creandarum, G has creatarum, A E H causandarum.
4
Vide infra Quaest. de Trin. q. 2. a. 2. ad 16. verba Boethii. Cfr. etiam I. Sent. d. 19. p. II. q. 4. ad 1. seqq.
See below, Questions on the Trinity, q. 2, a. 2, ad 16, the words of Boethius. Compare also I Sentences, d. 19, p. II, q. 4, ad 1 and following.
5
Ita B C E, in aliis diversificationem.
So B C E; in the others, diversificationem.
1
Hic in corp. et quaest. praeced. — Inferius post extra genus F id est actus purus, cetera omnia sunt etc.
Here in the body, and the preceding question. — Below, after extra genus, F has id est actus purus, cetera omnia sunt etc.
2
C supplet est illa similitudo.
C supplies est illa similitudo.
3
Cfr. I. Sent. d. 40. a. 1. q. 1. — Superius ex H posuimus utriusque significatum, A B E utrumque significatum, alii utriusque significatio.
Compare I Sentences, d. 40, a. 1, q. 1. — Above, from H we have put utriusque significatum, A B E utrumque significatum, the others utriusque significatio.
4
D F G asinum.
D F G have asinum.
5
C aliam, saltem verbis, solutionem addit: vel potest dici, quod sunt actu in Deo sicut in arte, licet sint in potentia quantum ad esse, quod est in proprio genere.
C adds another solution, at least in words: or it can be said that they are in act in God as in an art, although they are in potency as regards the being which is in their proper genus.
6
Ita B E, alii veritatem. Quare virtus approprietur Filio, docetur I. Sent. d. 32. a. 2. q. 2. ad 4, et d. 34. dub. 7. — C finem solut. sic exhibet: et ideo, licet, ut habent unitatem re, possint dici plures ideae una unitas, unum verbum, non tamen ut plures sunt ratione, sed dicuntur plures ideae; sic et verbum, cum non habeat pluralitatem rationis, sed unitatem re, tamen [tantum?] dicitur verbum unum, non plura in Deo.
So B E; the others have veritatem. Why power is appropriated to the Son is taught in I Sentences, d. 32, a. 2, q. 2, ad 4, and d. 34, dub. 7. — C gives the end of the solution thus: and therefore, although, in so far as they have unity in the thing, many ideas can be called one unity, one word, yet not in so far as they are many in account, but they are called many ideas; so too the word, since it does not have a plurality of account but a unity in the thing, is nevertheless [only?] called one word, not several in God.
7
Cap. 10. n. 3. Cfr. I. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. XXXVIII. c. 1, et Comment. a. 1. q. 2. fundam. 1. — In principio solut. post a rationibus C addit aeternis.
Chapter 10, n. 3. Compare I Sentences, the Master's text, d. XXXVIII, c. 1, and the Commentary, a. 1, q. 2, fundamentum 1. — At the beginning of the solution, after a rationibus, C adds aeternis.
8
Pro habere respectum A B E H respectus. Inferius pro Si ergo ponitur C Praeterea idea ad scientiam pertinet, quae essentialis est, non personalis, et ideo si ponitur.
In place of habere respectum, A B E H have respectus. Below, in place of Si ergo ponitur, C has Praeterea idea ad scientiam pertinet, quae essentialis est, non personalis, et ideo si ponitur.

Translator’s Notes

tr.
Translator’s note: English has one word where this sentence needs two. Lux is light in its source, the thing that shines; lumen is the light it gives off, light as carried and received. The argument supposes, by the impossible, a light that were its own irradiation, and then sets the one lux and the one lumen against the many irradiations that can stand in them — a point about plurality in the divine knowing that simply disappears if both words become "light". So lumen is left untranslated here and wherever it occurs, and lux is rendered "light"; the transliteration is the price of keeping the distinction visible. ---

Cited by

17 places in the Opera Omnia citethis question. Derived from Quaracchi’s own apparatus, never tagged by hand.

On the production of the world as a whole

Breviloquium · Pars II: De creatura mundi

supra pag. 12, nota 9

On the qualities required in the hearers of the divine word, and on Christ the medium of all the sciences

Collationes in Hexaëmeron · Collatio I: De qualitatibus in auditoribus divini verbi requisitis et de Christo omnium scientiarum medio

supra pag. 12, nota 3

On the fulness of understanding, insofar as it is the key of contemplation through the understanding of the Word uncreated, incarnate and inspired

Collationes in Hexaëmeron · Collatio III: De plenitudine intellectus, quatenus est clavis contemplationis per intellectum Verbi increati, incarnati et inspirati

supra pag. 12, nota 8

On the first vision, which is that of the understanding implanted by nature: the first treatment