Dist. 32, Art. 2, Q. 1
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 32
Articulus II.
De locutione: Pater est sapientia genita, et de alia: Pater est potens virtute, quam genuit.
The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).
Consequenter est quaestio principalis de hac locutione: Pater est sapiens sapientia genita. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo quaeritur, utrum illa locutio sit admittenda. Secundo, ad intellectum1 huius, utrum sit haec admittenda: Pater est potens virtute, quam genuit.
Quaestio I.
Utrum recte dici possit: Pater est sapiens sapientia genita.
Quod autem prima locutio sit admittenda, ostenditur hoc modo.
1. Primae ad Corinthios primo2: Christum dicimus Dei virtutem et Dei sapientiam; sed unusquisque est sapiens sua sapientia: ergo si Christus est sapientia Patris et est sapientia genita, Pater est sapiens sapientia genita.
2. Item, Augustinus sexto de Trinitate3: «Filius est ars quaedam omnipotentis et sapientis Dei, ubi omnia novit»; sed unusquisque artifex est sapiens sua arte: ergo Pater est sapiens Filio: ergo etc.
3. Item, hoc videtur ratione per simile: quia omnis amans, a quo procedit amor, est amans amore a se procedente: ergo omnis sapiens, a quo procedit sapientia, est sapiens sapientia a se emanante; sed Pater est huiusmodi: ergo etc.
4. Item, Augustinus decimo quinto de Trinitate4: «Novit Deus Pater omnia in se ipso, et novit in Filio»; sed idem est nosse omnia et sapientissimum esse: si ergo omnia novit, non tantum se ipso, sed etiam Filio est sapiens.
5. Item, Deus Pater omnia dicit Verbo, sicut dicit Augustinus undecimo Confessionum5: «Verbo tibi coaeterno dicis quaecumque dicis»; sed «dicere, ut dicit Anselmus, est intelligere»: ergo Pater omnia intelligit mediante Verbo: ergo cum idem sit esse sapientem et intelligere, patet etc.
Contra:
1. In divinis sapere est esse6: ergo si Pater est sapiens sapientia genita, ergo est sapientia genita; hoc autem falsum est: ergo et primum.
2. Item, non intellecta generatione, adhuc est intelligere Deum sapientem: ergo sapientia genita non est ratio sapientiae Dei.
Conclusio.
Locutio: Pater est sapiens sapientia genita, est simpliciter falsa.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sine distinctione, cum esse sapientem dicatur essentialiter, quod locutio est simpliciter falsa; et si alicubi legitur ab aliquo Sancto, est exponenda. Unde Augustinus in libro Retractationum7 illam retractat dicens, quod melius illam quaestionem in libro de Trinitate tractavit, ubi scilicet dicit contrarium ostendens, illam rationem non valere: si Pater fuit sine Filio, cum Filius sit eius sapientia, Pater fuit insipiens; quia sapientia non tantum convenit Filio, sed Patri et Filio et Spiritui sancto. Et hoc ipsum dicit de Trinitate in pluribus locis, sed maxime in sexto et decimo quinto8.
Ad argumenta...
Ad 1, 2, 3. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod Filius est sapientia et ars9 Patris; dicendum, quod ista conceditur: Filius est sapientia Patris sapientis: nec tamen ista: Pater est sapiens sapientia genita. Unde notandum, quod cum dicitur sapientia alicuius, hoc dicitur dupliciter: aut sicut subiecti, ut albedo Petri, aut sicut principii; genitivus enim originem importat10. Quoniam ergo Filius est sapientia habens originem a Patre, ideo haec est vera: Filius est sapientia Patris. Cum autem dicitur: Pater est sapiens sapientia genita, ablativus construitur in ratione alicuius causalitatis, vel in habitudine formae vel principii, et maxime formae; et ideo falsa est, quia Filius nec forma nec principium est Patris. — Si tu quaeras, quare non construitur in ratione formalis effectus, sicut amor cum amante, a quo procedit11; dicendum, quod non est simile. Et huius duplex est ratio, una communis, alia specialis: communis, quae sumta est a creaturis12, quoniam quidam sunt actus, qui dicunt motum a rebus ad animam, ut sapientia, quidam ab anima ad res, ut amare13. Ideo comparatio amoris ad amantem est in ratione exeuntis, non in ratione impartientis, et ideo amor de se importat formam et effectum; sed sapientia, quia dicit ut ad intelligentem, non ut ab intelligente, ideo ablativus tantum importat formam, non effectum: et ideo est locutio falsa. — Alia ratio est specialis in divinis, quia amor procedens est amor proprie, non per appropriationem, et diligere est similiter dictum notionaliter, unde importat originem, ut supra monstratum est; sed sapientia semper essentialiter, et hoc quod est esse sapientem nullo modo dicitur notionaliter, quia nullo modo importat originem. Et ideo est locutio falsa.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Pater novit omnia in Filio; dicendum, quod differt dicere: novit Filio et in Filio. Nam cum dicitur: novit Filio, ablativus importat rationem formae vel principii cognoscendi; et ideo falsa est simpliciter. Haec tamen est distinguenda: novit in Filio, quia p. 563praepositio in cum suo casuali potest determinare hoc verbum novit in comparatione ad subiectum; et tunc est locutio falsa: est enim sensus, quod Filius sit Patri ratio cognoscendi. Vel potest verbum determinare in comparatione ad obiectum; et tunc vera est, et est sensus, quod Filius sit rebus cognitis ratio et exemplar et causa exemplandi. Et quod iste possit esse sensus locutionis, patet. Qui enim perfecte cognoscit aliquem, cognoscit omne quod est in illo: si ergo Pater perfecte cognoscit Filium, et in Filio sunt omnia, ergo omnia cognoscit in Filio. Nec tamen ex hoc sequitur, quod sit sapiens Filio, quia tunc significatur, quod Filius sit ratio cognoscendi ipsi Patri.
Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo, quod Pater dicit omnia Verbo; dicendum, quod hoc quod est dicere importat originem, importat etiam effectum in creatura, quem efficit per Verbum14; sed intelligere non importat de se nisi solummodo actum essentialem, ita quod nec importat de se respectum ad personam nec ad creaturam. Ideo non omnino idem est dicere dicit omnia Verbo, et intelligit omnia Verbo: dicere enim idem est quod intelligere, sed amplius importat.
I. Cum sapientia, quae est attributum essentiale et tribus divinis personis commune, approprietur Filio, qui vocatur sapientia genita, in hac quaestione tractatur de sapientia ut appropriata Filio. — Circa retractationem, quam fecit S. Augustinus, quaeritur, quo sensu intelligi debeat, cum non supponendum sit, illuminatum hunc doctorem unquam negasse, Patrem sapientem esse per suam essentialem sapientiam. Fortasse ipse antea crediderat, Patrem posse aliquo modo denominari sapientem a Sapientia genita, quod, ut valde improprium retractavit (cfr. hic dub. 3.).
II. De solut. ad 1. et significatione genitivi vide dub. 7. In solut. ad 1. S. Doctor duplicem sensum locutionis nosse in aliquo distinguit. Eandem distinctionem S. Thom. (hic q. 2. a. 1. ad 3.) sic explicat: «Videre in aliquo dicitur dupliciter: aut cuius cognitionem in eo accipit, sicut... discipulus in verbo magistri, dicto vel scripto; aut rem cognitam in alio repraesentatam intueri, sicut aedificator videt artem suam in domo, quam facit».
III. Conclusio constat apud omnes. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 67. m. 3. a. 2. § 3. — Scot., in utroque Scripto, hic q. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1; S. I. q. 39. a. 7. ad 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 3. 4; S. p. I. tr. 12. q. 50. m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Ægid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 38. q. 2, a. 40. q. 6. n. 8. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, hic q. 1.
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Article II.
On the manner of speaking: "The Father is begotten wisdom," and on the other: "The Father is powerful by the power which he begot."
Consequently there is a principal question concerning this manner of speaking: The Father is wise with begotten wisdom. And concerning this two questions are asked. First, it is asked whether that locution is to be admitted. Second, for the understanding1 of this, whether this is to be admitted: The Father is powerful by the power which he begot.
Question I.
Whether it can rightly be said: The Father is wise with begotten wisdom.
That this first locution is to be admitted is shown in the following way.
1. First to the Corinthians, chapter 12: We preach Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God; but each one is wise by his own wisdom: therefore if Christ is the wisdom of the Father and is begotten wisdom, the Father is wise with begotten wisdom.
2. Likewise, Augustine, On the Trinity VI3: "The Son is a certain art of the omnipotent and wise God, in which he knows all things"; but each artisan is wise by his own art: therefore the Father is wise by the Son: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, this seems [to follow] by reason from a parallel: because every lover, from whom love proceeds, is one who loves with a love proceeding from himself: therefore every wise one, from whom wisdom proceeds, is wise with a wisdom emanating from himself; but the Father is of this sort: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, Augustine, On the Trinity XV4: "God the Father knows all things in himself, and knows [them] in the Son"; but to know all things and to be most wise are the same: if therefore he knows all things, not only by himself, but also by the Son he is wise.
5. Likewise, God the Father speaks all things by the Word, as Augustine says in Confessions XI5: "By the Word coeternal to you, you say whatever you say"; but "to speak, as Anselm says, is to understand": therefore the Father understands all things by means of the Word: therefore since to be wise and to understand are the same, it is clear etc.
On the contrary:
1. In the divine [things] to be wise is to be6: therefore if the Father is wise with begotten wisdom, then he is begotten wisdom; but this is false: therefore the first one [is also false].
2. Likewise, generation not being understood, it is still [possible] to understand God to be wise: therefore begotten wisdom is not the ground of God's wisdom.
Conclusion.
The locution "The Father is wise with begotten wisdom" is simply false.
I respond: It must be said that, without distinction, since to be wise is said essentially, this locution is simply false; and if it is read anywhere by some Saint, it must be expounded. Whence Augustine in the book of Retractations7 retracts it, saying that he treated that question better in the book On the Trinity, where indeed he says the contrary, showing that the [former] reasoning does not hold: that if the Father were without the Son, since the Son is his wisdom, the Father would have been unwise; for wisdom belongs not only to the Son, but to the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. And he says this same thing On the Trinity in many places, but most of all in book six and book fifteen8.
To the arguments...
To 1, 2, 3. To that which is objected, that the Son is the wisdom and art9 of the Father; it must be said that this is conceded: The Son is the wisdom of the wise Father; but not this: The Father is wise with begotten wisdom. Whence it must be noted that when wisdom of someone is said, this is said in two ways: either as of a subject, like Peter's whiteness, or as of a principle; for the genitive imports origin10. Since therefore the Son is wisdom having origin from the Father, this is true: The Son is the wisdom of the Father. But when it is said: The Father is wise with begotten wisdom, the ablative is construed in the account of some causality, or in the relation of form or principle, and especially of form; and so it is false, because the Son is neither form nor principle of the Father. — If you ask why it is not construed in the account of formal effect, as love [is construed] with the lover from whom it proceeds11; it must be said that it is not similar. And of this there is a twofold reason, one common, the other special: the common one, taken from creatures12, because some acts are which express motion from things to the soul, like wisdom, and some [express motion] from the soul to things, like loving13. Hence the comparison of love to the lover is in the account of [something] going out, not in the account of [something] imparting, and therefore love of itself imports form and effect; but wisdom, since it is said as [going] toward one understanding, not as [going] from one understanding, therefore the ablative imports only form, not effect: and so the locution is false. — The other reason is special in the divine [things], because proceeding love is love properly, not by appropriation, and to love is similarly said notionally, whence it imports origin, as was shown above; but wisdom always [is said] essentially, and that which is to be wise is in no way said notionally, since it in no way imports origin. And therefore the locution is false.
To 4. To that which is objected, that the Father knows all things in the Son; it must be said that there is a difference between saying "knows by the Son" and "knows in the Son." For when it is said "he knows by the Son," the ablative imports the account of form or principle of knowing; and therefore it is simply false. This, however, must be distinguished: "he knows in the Son," because p. 563the preposition in with its case-form can determine this verb novit in comparison to the subject; and then the locution is false: for the sense is that the Son is to the Father the ground of knowing. Or the verb can determine [it] in comparison to the object; and then it is true, and the sense is that the Son is to the things known the ground and exemplar and cause of being exemplified. And that this can be the sense of the locution is clear. For he who perfectly knows someone, knows everything which is in him: if therefore the Father perfectly knows the Son, and in the Son are all things, then he knows all things in the Son. Nor yet does it follow from this that he is wise by the Son, because then it would be signified that the Son is the ground of knowing for the Father himself.
To 5. To that which is objected last, that the Father speaks all things by the Word; it must be said that to speak imports origin, [and] also imports effect in the creature, which he produces through the Word14; but to understand of itself imports nothing except an essential act alone, in such wise that it imports of itself neither a relation to a person nor to a creature. Therefore to say "he speaks all things by the Word" and "he understands all things by the Word" are not entirely the same: for to speak is the same as to understand, but imports more.
I. Since wisdom, which is an essential attribute and common to the three divine persons, is appropriated to the Son, who is called begotten wisdom, in this question wisdom is treated as appropriated to the Son. — Concerning the retractation which St. Augustine made, it is asked in what sense it ought to be understood, since it must not be supposed that this enlightened Doctor ever denied that the Father is wise by his own essential wisdom. Perhaps he had previously believed that the Father could in some way be denominated wise from begotten Wisdom, which, as very improper, he retracted (cf. here dub. 3.).
II. On the solution to [argument] 1 and the signification of the genitive, see dub. 7. In the solution to [argument] 1 the holy Doctor distinguishes a twofold sense of the locution to know in someone. The same distinction is explained thus by St. Thomas (here q. 2, a. 1, ad 3): "To see in something is said in two ways: either [in him] from whom one receives knowledge of it, as a disciple [sees] in the word of the master, whether spoken or written; or to behold the thing known as represented in another, as a builder sees his art in the house which he makes."
III. The conclusion is established by all. Alex. Hal., S. p. I, q. 67, m. 3, a. 2, § 3. — Scotus, in both Scripta, here q. 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 1; S. I, q. 39, a. 7, ad 2. — B. Albert, here a. 3, 4; S. p. I, tr. 12, q. 50, m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 2, a. 1. — Richard a Med., here a. 2, q. 1. — Ægid. R., here 2 princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 38, q. 2, a. 40, q. 6, n. 8. — Durand., here q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., here q. 2. — Biel, here q. 1.
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- Ed. 1 intelligentiam.Edition 1 [reads] intelligentiam ["the understanding"].
- Vers. 24.Verse 24.
- Cap. 10. n. 11. Integrum textum vide supra Magistri, d. XXXI. c. 2.Chapter 10, n. 11. For the full text see above the text of the Master, d. XXXI, c. 2.
- Cap. 14. n. 23.Chapter 14, n. 23.
- Cap. 7. n. 9. — Textus Anselmi invenitur in eius Monolog. c. 32: Si nihil apud se (summus spiritus) diceret — cum sit illi sic dicere aliquid quod est intelligere — non aliquid intelligeret. Cfr. et supra d. 27. p. II. q. 1. seq.Chapter 7, n. 9. — The text of Anselm is found in his Monologion, c. 32: "If [the supreme spirit] should say nothing within himself — since for him to say something is the same as to understand — he would not understand anything." Cf. also above d. 27, p. II, q. 1 seq.
- August., VII. de Trin. c. 1. n. 1. 2. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.Augustine, On the Trinity VII, c. 1, n. 1–2. See here the text of the Master, c. 2.
- Libr. 1. c. 26, ubi hanc sententiam, in libr. 83 Qq. q. 23. prolatam, retractat. — Subinde plures codd. cum ed. 1 recitat pro retractat.Book 1, c. 26, where he retracts this opinion, set forth in the book 83 Questions, q. 23. — Then several codices with edition 1 [read] recitat in place of retractat.
- Libr. VI. c. 1. n. 1. seqq., et XV. c. 7. n. 12. Cfr. etiam VII. c. 1–4.Book VI, c. 1, n. 1ff., and XV, c. 7, n. 12. Cf. also VII, c. 1–4.
- Pro ars Vat. et nonnulli codd. virtus; non bene, quia haec solutio respicit etiam secundam obiectionem, quae agit de arte.In place of ars, the Vatican [edition] and several codices [read] virtus; not well, since this solution regards also the second objection, which deals with art.
- Cfr. supra d. 3. p. II. dub. 3, et d. 11. dub. 3. Vide et Scot., Grammat. specul. c. 19.Cf. above d. 3, p. II, dub. 3, and d. 11, dub. 3. See also Scotus, Grammatica speculativa, c. 19.
- De quo vide art. praec. q. 2.On which see the preceding article, q. 2.
- Vat. cum uno et altero cod. distinguit pro distinguitur, ut ex obiect. 1. patet.The Vatican [edition], with one or another codex, [reads] distinguit in place of distinguitur, as is clear from objection 1.
- Cfr. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 38. 46. et 54. (c. 8–10.). Idem VI. Metaph. text. 8, (V. c. 4.) respectu obiecti horum actuum dicit, quod bonum et malum sint in rebus, sed verum et falsum in mente. — Paulo inferius Vat. cum cod. cc dicitur pro dicit.Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul III, text 38, 46, and 54 (c. 8–10). The same one, Metaphysics VI, text 8 (V, c. 4), with respect to the object of these acts says that good and evil are in things, but true and false in the mind. — A little below, the Vatican [edition] with codex cc [reads] dicitur in place of dicit.
- Dist. 10. a. 2. q. 1, et hic a. 1. q. 1. — Paulo superius post dictum cod. addit non essentialiter tantum, sed.Distinction 10, a. 2, q. 1, and here a. 1, q. 1. — A little above, after dictum, a codex adds non essentialiter tantum, sed ["not only essentially, but"].