Dist. 4, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 4
Articulus unicus.
Quaestio I. Utrum haec locutio: Deus genuit Deum, sit concedenda.
Circa primum, quod haec locutio: Deus genuit Deum, sit concedenda,
1. Videtur per hoc quod dicitur in Symbolo: Deum de Deo; sed hoc non est nisi per generationem1: ergo Deus generatur de Deo: ergo ista locutio est concedenda: Deus genuit Deum.
2. Item, generatio est respectu similis in natura, unde « homo generat hominem2 »; unde si in divinis est generatio, producitur similis in natura: ergo cum Pater sit Deus, non generat nisi Deum: ergo haec est vera: Deus generat Deum.
3. Item, quidquid habet Filius, aut habet a se, aut ab alio; sed habet deitatem, et non a se, quia sic esset ingenitus: ergo habet ab alio; sed non habet nisi per generationem, et3 non habet deitatem nisi ab habente deitatem, et habens deitatem est Deus: ergo etc.
Contra:
1. Hoc nomen Deus significat essentiam sive substantiam, cum sit terminus substantialis4; sed haec non conceditur, immo est falsa: essentia generat essentiam: ergo similiter et ista: Deus genuit Deum.
2. Item, hoc nomen Deus aut supponit pro omni persona, aut determinate pro aliqua. Si determinate pro aliqua: ergo restringitur eius significatio5 ab aliquo, nec est dare, quod ab alio nisi ab hoc verbo genuit vel generat. Sed regula est, quod terminus, positus in praedicato, non restringit terminum a parte subiecti ratione significationis: ergo stat pro omni persona. Non ergo videtur locutio vera, secundum quod accipitur pro persona Filii: ergo etc.
3. Item, iste terminus Deus, quantum est de se, aeque bene supponit pro Filio, sicut6 pro Patre: ergo cum Filii sit non generare, sicut et Patris est generare, si haec est vera: Deus generat, pro Patre, eadem ratione et haec: Deus non generat, pro Filio; si ergo haec non conceditur, nec prima.
4. Item, contradictorie opposita sunt vera de quolibet sub disiunctione, quia de quolibet affirmatio vel negatio7: ergo si Deus genuit Deum, aut Deum qui est Pater, aut Deum qui non est Pater. Si Deum qui est Pater, ergo genitus est generans; si Deum qui non est Pater; sed quod implicatur contingit simpliciter inferri, ut si dicatur: homo qui non currit, disputat: ergo homo non currit: ergo similiter, si genuit Deum qui non est Pater, Deus non est Pater; sed si non est Pater, non generat: ergo etc.8
Conclusio. Recte dicitur: Deum genuisse Deum, quod quatuor regulis probatur.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod praedicta locutio, salva essentiae unitate, recipitur tam a magistris quam a Sanctis. Ad cuius intelligentiam quatuor regulae sunt notandae.
Prima est, quod nomen abstractum imponitur formae et a forma, ut albedo imponitur ipsi albedini9 et a forma albedinis; nomen vero concretum imponitur a forma, sed non formae, sed supposito: ut album imponitur a forma albedinis, sed non formae, sed supposito, ut alicui rei albae, homini vel cygno.
Secunda regula est, quod terminus habens multitudinem suppositorum, sine distributione acceptus, stat pro illo, pro quo reddit locutionem veram, ut cum dicitur: homo currit, vera est locutio pro currente, si aliquis sit currens.
Tertia regula est, quod termino habenti formam non multiplicabilem non differt praeponere et postponere negationem. Unde non differt dicere: Petrus non currit, et, non Petrus currit.
Quarta regula est ista, quod relativum refert antecedens sub eodem modo supponendi, sub quo antecedens praecessit ipsum relativum, nisi faciat relationem simplicem10.
1. Ex prima regula patet responsio ad primum. Cum enim iste terminus Deus sit concretus, etsi11 imponatur a forma essentiali, scilicet deitate, tamen imponitur personae sive supposito, sicut album imponitur ab albedine rei albae; et ideo supponit et reddit locutionem veram pro persona, non pro forma. Hoc autem nomen essentia vel deitas est abstractum, et ideo imponitur formae et a forma, sicut albedo, et ideo essentiam significat et supponit. Et ideo haec est falsa: essentia generat essentiam, quia generatio non est formae, sed suppositi12; sed haec est vera: Deus genuit Deum, pro persona.
2. Ex secunda regula patet responsio ad secundum. Quamvis enim significatio termini non arctetur, tamen pro illo stat, pro quo est locutio vera, ut homo currit, pro Petro vel Ioanne, si pro illo, est locutio vera; nec tamen ad illum restringitur. Et hoc patet, quia si addatur distributio, confundet13 illum terminum pro omnibus; sed si esset restrictus, non confunderet nisi pro illis, ad quos se extenderet restrictio. Unde aliud est terminum restringi ad unum, aliud est reddere locutionem veram pro uno.
3. Ex tertia regula patet solutio14 ad tertium. Licet enim haec sit vera pro Patre: Deus generat Deum, tamen haec: Deus non generat Deum, non est vera pro Filio. Cum enim iste terminus Deus dicat formam immultiplicabilem, non differt ei praeponere negationem et postponere; et ideo cum negatio praeposita15 omnino a subiecto removeat praedicatum, sic et negatio postposita removet totaliter praedicatum ab hoc termino Deus, cum dicitur: Deus non generat, quia removet a quolibet supposito. Et ideo alium modum habet supponendi in affirmativa quam in negativa, quia in affirmativa erat locutio vera pro Patre; in negativa vero non potest esse veritas, quia negatio removet totaliter praedicatum illud.
4. Ex quarta regula patet quartum. Cum enim relativum omnino habeat suppositionem antecedentis, et iste terminus Deus16 in praedicato supponat pro Deo genito, relativum refert pro illo. Et ita sensus est: Deus genuit Deum, qui Deus genitus est Pater, vel non est Pater; et haec est vera pro negativa, nec licet inferre: ergo Deus non est Pater; quia mutatur suppositio, immo est ibi figura dictionis17.
I. In gratiam lectorum, qui in antiqua logica minus sunt exercitati, iuvat hic ponere explicationem aliquorum terminorum, quae in hac quaestione et alibi in hoc opere saepe occurrunt. Sumtae sunt hae et aliae multae alibi in notis positae explicationes magna ex parte ex Summulis Petri Hispani, quae tempore S. Bonaventurae in manibus scholarium erant. Postquam Petrus multa de rebus philosophicis et medicina scripsit, a. 1275 electus est in Summum Pontificem et assumsit nomen Ioannis XXI. Mortuus est 16. Maii 1277. Plura videri possunt in quovis libro de logica scholastica tractante.
1. Aliud est significatio, aliud suppositio alicuius termini. Significatio est repraesentatio rei per vocem et convenit omnibus vocabulis tam substantivis quam reliquis, sive in propositione, sive extra propositionem.
Suppositio, ut vult Petrus Hisp., tract. de suppositione, «est acceptio termini substantivi pro aliquo», intellige, de quo
vel de quibus huiusmodi terminus in aliqua propositione verificatur. Sic terminus homo potest supponere vel pro homine in communi, ut in propositione: homo est species; vel pro suis inferioribus sub hac specie comprehensis, v. g. homo currit. Suppositionum alia est communis, alia discreta; illa fit per terminum communem, ut homo est mortalis; haec per terminum discretum (concretum), ut Socrates, vel per communem, sed determinatum per pronomen demonstrativum, ut iste homo. Aliae divisiones suppositionis apud S. Bonav. occurrentes sunt: suppositio simplex et personalis. Illa est acceptio termini communis pro re universali significata per ipsum terminum communem, ut cum dicitur: homo est species; animal est genus. Tunc terminus homo supponit pro homine in communi, et non pro quolibet inferiore; unde non licet facere descensum, uti dicunt, sic arguendo: homo est species: ergo aliquis homo est species. Personalis vero suppositio est acceptio termini communis pro suis inferioribus, ut cum dicitur: homo currit; hic iste terminus homo supponit pro suis inferioribus. — Personalium suppositionum alia est determinata, alia est confusa. Determinata est acceptio termini communis indefinite sumti, vel cum signo particulari, ut homo currit, vel aliquis homo currit; et dicitur determinata, quia licet in utraque istarum propositionum ille terminus homo supponat pro omni homine tam currente quam non currente, tamen uno solo homine currente, propositio est vera; et quia aliud est supponere et aliud locutionem veram vel falsam esse pro aliquo, igitur in praedictis iste terminus homo supponit pro omni homine currente et non currente, licet reddat locutionem veram pro uno solo currente... Confusa suppositio est acceptio termini communis pro pluribus, mediante signo universali, ut cum dicitur: omnis homo est animal; quia supponit terminus homo pro quolibet suo supposito. Ita Petrus Hisp.; alii quoad confusam et determinatam suppositionem rem paulo aliter explicant.
2. Distributio est acceptio termini communis pro suis significatis, sive est multiplicatio termini communis virtute alicuius signi universalis, v. g. in propositione: omnis homo currit, terminus homo distribuitur (sive confunditur) pro omnibus hominibus virtute illius vocabuli omnis, quod signum distributivum appellatur.
3. Restrictio est coarctatio termini communis a maiore suppositione sive extensione ad minorem; sic homo albus non significat omnes homines, sed partem eorum.
4. Reddere locutionem veram significat, quod in propositione, in qua subiectum supponit pro pluribus disiunctive, sensus redditur verus per hoc, quod in uno saltem supposito verificatur; v. g. propositio: homo currit, redditur vera, currente uno qualicumque. Unde reddere locutionem veram differt a restrictione termini ad unum, ut bene dicit S. Bonav., hic ad 2.
II. His suppositis, quatuor regulae logicales in corp. positae earumque applicatio in solutione obiectorum facile intelliguntur. Sic verba (ad 2.): «quia si addatur distributio, confundet illum terminum pro omnibus», hunc sensum habent; si additur signum omnis termino homo, tunc confundet i. e. distribuet illum terminum, ita ut verificetur de omnibus hominibus; si vero terminus homo restringitur per albus, tunc non «confunderet nisi pro albis hominibus». — Pro intelligentia applicationis quartae regulae est notandum, quod est duplex relatio pronominis relativi ad suum nomen, scil. relatio simplex vel personalis. Per relationem simplicem pronomen relativum (qui, quae, quod) non refertur ad idem numero antecedens sive ad idem suppositum, bene vero per relationem personalem. Exemplum: «Mulier damnavit, quae salvavit;» hic relativum quae habet relationem simplicem, non personalem, quia alia mulierum persona damnavit, nempe Eva, alia salvavit, scil. Ss. Virgo Maria. Unde S. Doctor recte concludit, quod in illata obiectione est figura dictionis i. e. fallacia figurae dictionis, quia terminus sumitur sub diversa suppositione. De hoc plura vide dub. 3. huius dist., Alex. Hal., p. 1. q. 50. m. 3. a. 2. § 4. Richard. a Med., hic q. 4.
III. Contra applicationem tertiae regulae ad Deum moverunt subtilem difficultatem Durand. (hic q. 2.), Aureol., Brulifer (hoc loco) aliique posteriores Scholastici. Negant enim, quod Deus sit proprie terminus singularis, cum aliquo modo sit etiam terminus communis, quod etiam S. Bonav. (infra q. 4.) concedit. Inde concludunt, propositionem: Deus non generat Deum, posse concedi. Probatiores vero theologi, ut S. Thomas (S. I. q. 39. a. 4. ad 3.), Richard. (hic q. 1.) aliique cum nostro Seraphico (hic ad 3.) locutionem hanc recte improbant. Cfr. Caietanus ad loc. S. Thomae cit.
IV. Quoad quaestionis solutionem omnes antiqui conveniunt. Cfr. S. Bonav., infra d. 9. q. 1. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 30. m. 3. a. 2. § 1. 4. — Scot., hic q. 1. ad 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. 2; S. I. q. 39. a. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 6. 7; de hac et seqq. qq., S. p. I. tr. 43. q. 51. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 4. et 3. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 1. — Aegid. R., de hac et seq. q. hic 2. princ. q. unica. — Henr. Gand., de hac et seqq. qq., S. a. 54. q. 3. — Durand., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 2. — Biel, de hac et seq. q. hic q. 4.
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Sole Article.
Question I. Whether this expression should be conceded: God begot God.
Concerning the first [point], that this expression — God begot God — should be conceded:
1. It seems so, by what is said in the Creed: God from God; but this is only by generation1: therefore God is generated from God: therefore this expression should be conceded: God begot God.
2. Likewise, generation is with respect to a like in nature, whence "man generates man2"; whence if in divine matters there is generation, a like in nature is produced: therefore, since the Father is God, He generates only God: therefore this is true: God generates God.
3. Likewise, whatever the Son has, He has either from Himself or from another; but He has the deity, and not from Himself, since [if so] He would be unbegotten: therefore He has it from another; but He has it only through generation, and3 He has the deity only from one having the deity, and the one having the deity is God: therefore etc.
On the contrary:
1. The name God signifies essence or substance, since it is a substantial term4; but this is not conceded, rather it is false: the essence generates the essence: therefore likewise this also: God begot God.
2. Likewise, the name God either supposits for every person, or determinately for some [one]. If determinately for some [one]: then its signification5 is restricted by something, and there is no other [source] from which [it could be restricted] except from this verb begot or generates. But the rule is that a term placed in the predicate does not restrict a term on the side of the subject by reason of its signification: therefore it stands for every person. Therefore the expression does not seem true insofar as it is taken for the person of the Son: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, this term God, so far as it is in itself, supposits equally well for the Son as6 for the Father: therefore, since it belongs to the Son not to generate, just as it belongs to the Father to generate, if this is true: God generates, for the Father, then by the same reasoning this also: God does not generate, for the Son; if therefore the latter is not conceded, neither [should] the first [be conceded].
4. Likewise, contradictorily opposed [statements] are true of anything under disjunction, since of anything [there is] either affirmation or negation7: therefore if God begot God, [He begot] either God who is the Father, or God who is not the Father. If God who is the Father, then the begotten is the begetter; if God who is not the Father — but what is implied may simply be inferred, as if it be said: "the man who is not running, is disputing": therefore the man is not running: so likewise, if He begot God who is not the Father, [then] God is not the Father; but if He is not the Father, He does not generate: therefore etc.8
Conclusion. It is rightly said: God to have begotten God, which is proved by four rules.
I respond: It must be said that the foregoing expression, the unity of the essence being preserved, is received both by the masters and by the saints. For the understanding of which, four rules are to be noted.
The first is that an abstract noun is imposed on the form and from the form, as whiteness is imposed on whiteness itself9 and from the form of whiteness; but a concrete noun is imposed from the form, but not on the form, but on the supposit: as white is imposed from the form of whiteness, but not on the form, but on the supposit, namely on some white thing, on a man or a swan.
The second rule is that a term having a multitude of supposits, taken without distribution, stands for that for which it renders the expression true, as when it is said: "man runs," the expression is true for the runner, if there be someone running.
The third rule is that for a term having a non-multipliable form, it makes no difference to place the negation before or after. Whence it makes no difference to say: "Peter is not running," and "not Peter is running."
The fourth rule is this: that the relative refers the antecedent under the same mode of suppositing under which the antecedent preceded the relative itself, unless it makes a simple relation10.
1. From the first rule, the response to the first [argument] is clear. For since this term God is concrete, although11 it is imposed from the essential form, namely the deity, nevertheless it is imposed on the person or supposit, just as white is imposed from whiteness on a white thing; and therefore it supposits and renders the expression true for a person, not for a form. But this name essence or deity is abstract, and therefore is imposed on the form and from the form, like whiteness, and therefore it signifies and supposits the essence. And therefore this is false: the essence generates the essence, because generation is not of a form, but of a supposit12; but this is true: God begot God, [taken] for a person.
2. From the second rule, the response to the second [argument] is clear. For although the signification of the term is not narrowed, nevertheless it stands for that for which the expression is true, as "man runs" [stands] for Peter or for John, if for him the expression is true; and yet it is not [thereby] restricted to him. And this is clear, because if distribution be added, it will confound13 that term [to stand] for all; but if it were restricted, it would not confound except for those to whom the restriction would extend. Whence it is one thing for a term to be restricted to one, and another thing to render the expression true for one.
3. From the third rule, the solution14 to the third is clear. For although this is true for the Father: God generates God, nevertheless this: God does not generate God, is not true for the Son. For since this term God names a non-multipliable form, it makes no difference to place the negation before or after it; and therefore, since the negation placed before15 altogether removes the predicate from the subject, so also the negation placed after totally removes the predicate from this term God, when it is said: God does not generate, because it removes [the predicate] from any supposit. And therefore it has another mode of suppositing in the affirmative than in the negative, because in the affirmative the expression was true for the Father; in the negative, however, there cannot be truth, because the negation totally removes that predicate.
4. From the fourth rule, the fourth is clear. For since the relative entirely has the supposition of the antecedent, and this term God16 in the predicate supposits for God begotten, the relative refers for that. And so the sense is: God begot God, who [God] begotten is the Father, or is not the Father; and this is true for the negative [reading], nor is it permitted to infer: therefore God is not the Father; because the supposition is changed, indeed there is here a figure of speech17.
I. For the benefit of readers who are less practiced in the old logic, it is helpful here to set forth an explanation of certain terms which often occur in this question and elsewhere in this work. These and many other explanations placed elsewhere in the notes are taken for the most part from the Summulae of Peter of Spain, which were in the hands of scholars in the time of St. Bonaventure. After Peter had written much on philosophical matters and on medicine, in 1275 he was elected Supreme Pontiff and took the name John XXI. He died on May 16, 1277. More may be seen in any book treating of scholastic logic.
1. Signification is one thing, supposition of any term another. Signification is the representation of a thing by means of an utterance, and it belongs to all words, both substantives and the rest, whether in a proposition or outside a proposition.
Supposition, as Peter of Spain holds, in the tract on supposition, "is the taking of a substantive term for something" — understand, of which
or of which things [in the plural] such a term is verified in some proposition. Thus the term man can supposit either for man in common, as in the proposition: "man is a species"; or for its inferiors comprehended under this species, e.g. "man runs." Of suppositions, one is common, another discrete; the former is made by a common term, as "man is mortal"; the latter by a discrete (concrete) term, as "Socrates," or by a common [term], but determined by a demonstrative pronoun, as "this man." Other divisions of supposition occurring in St. Bonaventure are: simple and personal supposition. The former is the taking of a common term for the universal thing signified through the common term itself, as when it is said: "man is a species; animal is a genus." Then the term man supposits for man in common, and not for any inferior; whence it is not permitted to make a descent, as they say, by arguing thus: "man is a species: therefore some man is a species." But personal supposition is the taking of a common term for its inferiors, as when it is said: "man runs"; here this term man supposits for its inferiors. — Of personal suppositions one is determinate, another confused. Determinate is the taking of a common term taken indefinitely, or with a particular sign, as "man runs," or "some man runs"; and it is called determinate because, although in each of these propositions that term man supposits for every man, both running and not running, nevertheless with one man alone running, the proposition is true; and because to supposit is one thing and another to be a true or false expression for some [supposit], therefore in the foregoing this term man supposits for every man running and not running, although it renders the expression true for one alone running... Confused supposition is the taking of a common term for several, by means of a universal sign, as when it is said: "every man is an animal"; because the term man supposits for any of its supposits. So Peter of Spain; others explain confused and determinate supposition somewhat differently.
2. Distribution is the taking of a common term for its significates, or it is the multiplication of a common term by virtue of some universal sign, e.g. in the proposition: "every man runs," the term man is distributed (or confounded) for all men by virtue of that word every, which is called a distributive sign.
3. Restriction is the contraction of a common term from a greater supposition or extension to a lesser; thus white man does not signify all men, but a part of them.
4. To render the expression true signifies that in a proposition, in which the subject supposits for several disjunctively, the sense is rendered true by the fact that it is verified in at least one supposit; e.g. the proposition: "man runs" is rendered true with any one whatsoever running. Whence to render the expression true differs from restricting the term to one, as St. Bonaventure rightly says, here at [reply] 2.
II. These things presupposed, the four logical rules placed in the body and their application in the solution of the objections are easily understood. Thus the words (at 2): "because if distribution be added, it will confound that term for all" have this sense: if the sign every is added to the term man, then it will confound, i.e. distribute that term, so that it is verified of all men; but if the term man is restricted by white, then it would "not confound except for white men." — For the understanding of the application of the fourth rule, it is to be noted that there is a twofold relation of the relative pronoun to its noun, namely simple or personal relation. By a simple relation the relative pronoun (qui, quae, quod) is not referred to numerically the same antecedent or to the same supposit, but rather [is so referred] by personal relation. Example: "The woman damned, who saved" — here the relative quae has a simple, not personal, relation, because a different person of the women damned, namely Eve, [and] another saved, namely the Most Holy Virgin Mary. Whence the holy Doctor rightly concludes that in the inferred objection there is a figure of speech — that is, the fallacy of a figure of speech — because the term is taken under a different supposition. Concerning this, see further dub. 3 of this distinction; Alex. of Hales, p. 1, q. 50, m. 3, a. 2, § 4; Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 4.
III. Against the application of the third rule to God, Durandus (here q. 2), Aureolus, Brulifer (in this place), and other later Scholastics raised a subtle difficulty. For they deny that God is properly a singular term, since in some way it is also a common term, which St. Bonaventure too (below, q. 4) concedes. Hence they conclude that the proposition: "God does not generate God" can be conceded. But the more approved theologians, such as St. Thomas (S. I, q. 39, a. 4, ad 3), Richard (here q. 1), and others, with our Seraphic [Doctor] (here ad 3), rightly disapprove this expression. Cf. Cajetan on the cited passage of St. Thomas.
IV. As to the solution of the question, all the ancients agree. Cf. St. Bonav., below d. 9 q. 1. — Alex. of Hales, S. p. I, q. 30, m. 3, a. 2, § 1. 4. — Scotus, here q. 1, ad 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1. 2; S. I, q. 39, a. 4. — Bl. Albert, here a. 6. 7; on this and the following questions, S. p. I, tr. 43, q. 51. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 2, a. 4 and 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, on this and the following question, here 2. princ. q. unica. — Henry of Ghent, on this and the following questions, S. a. 54, q. 3. — Durandus, on this and the following questions, here q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following questions, here q. 2. — Biel, on this and the following question, here q. 4.
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- Ex mss. et ed. 1 posuimus generationem loco gignitionem.From the manuscripts and the first edition we have placed generationem in place of gignitionem.
- Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 28. (VI. 8.): In quibusdam etenim etiam manifestum est, quod generans tale est, quale quod generatur... homo namque hominem generat. Cfr. II. de Anima, text. 34. (c. 4.).Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, text 28 (VI, 8): "For in some cases it is even manifest that the generator is such as that which is generated... for man generates man." Cf. De Anima II, text 34 (c. 4).
- Multi codd. ut AFGIKT etc. cum sex primis edd. sed loco et. Cod. R hanc propositionem ita exhibet: per generationem vel ab habente deitatem, sed habens.Many codices, such as AFGIKT etc., together with the first six editions, [read] sed in place of et. Codex R presents this proposition thus: through generation, or from one having the deity, but the one having.
- De significatione et suppositione huius nominis Deus, in quibus haec et seqq. obiectiones fundantur, vide infra q. 4. — In fine argumenti plures codd. ut AFGIKT etc. cum ed. 1 generat pro genuit.On the signification and supposition of this name God, on which this and the following objections are founded, see below q. 4. — At the end of the argument, several codices, such as AFGIKT etc., together with ed. 1, [read] generat in place of genuit.
- Codd. DHO (T fl in marg.) suppositio, quod et infra in responsione ad hanc obiectionem fere omnes codd. et sex primae edd. habent pro significatio; cod. l significatio vel suppositio. Sed vide regulam paulo infra ex Petr. Hisp. allatam. Mox multi codd. et ed. 1 non loco nec; cod. R sed non. Dein post significationis cod. X addit sed consignificationis, quod concordat cum regulae istius explicatione proposita a Petro Hispano, Summula, tract. de Restrictione: Nihil positum a parte praedicati potest restringere terminum communem positum a parte subiecti quoad principalem eius significationem, ut homo est albus... Dico autem, quoad principalem eius significationem, quia praedicatum restringit subiectum quoad consignificationem, quae est genus v. g. masculinum.Codices DHO (T with fl in the margin) [read] suppositio, which both here and below in the reply to this objection nearly all codices and the first six editions have in place of significatio; codex l [reads] significatio vel suppositio. But see the rule a little below, drawn from Peter of Spain. Next many codices and ed. 1 [read] non in place of nec; codex R [reads] sed non. Then after significationis codex X adds sed consignificationis, which agrees with the explanation of that rule proposed by Peter of Spain, Summula, tract on Restriction: "Nothing placed on the side of the predicate can restrict a common term placed on the side of the subject as to its principal signification, as 'man is white'... I say, however, as to its principal signification, because the predicate restricts the subject as to consignification, which is gender, e.g. masculine."
- Aliqui codd. ut TZ cum ed. 1 addunt et. Paulo infra post sicut codd. HY omittunt et. Mox cod. Y ergo si haec est vera pro Patre, sic illa erit vera pro Filio, scilicet Deus non generat; si ergo haec non conceditur pro Filio, nec prima. Codd. aa bb circa finem argumenti: sed haec non conceditur, ergo nec prima; ed. 1 nec prima debet concedi; cod. Z si ergo haec non conceditur pro Filio, pariter nec illa conceditur pro Patre. — Plures codd. ut ACFILMRSU ff hoc tertium argumentum omittunt, sed indebite, sicut patet ex responsione infra posita; cod. O vero illud praecedenti argumento circa finem post omni persona interserit sub hac forma: Item, si haec est vera: Deus generat Deum, pro persona Patris, multo fortius haec erit vera: Deus non generat Deum, pro persona Filii et Spiritus sancti; ergo a destructione consequentis, si haec nullo modo est concedenda, nec ista. Non ergo etc. Eadem fere verba exhibet cod. Z in fine huius tertii argumenti.Some codices, such as TZ, together with ed. 1, add et. A little below, after sicut, codices HY omit et. Next codex Y [reads]: "therefore if this is true for the Father, so that will be true for the Son, namely 'God does not generate'; if then this is not conceded for the Son, neither [is] the first." Codices aa, bb, near the end of the argument: "but this is not conceded, therefore neither [is] the first"; ed. 1: "neither ought the first to be conceded"; codex Z: "if therefore this is not conceded for the Son, equally neither is that conceded for the Father." — Several codices, such as ACFILMRSU ff, omit this third argument, but improperly, as is clear from the reply set forth below; codex O, however, inserts it into the preceding argument near the end after omni persona in this form: "Likewise, if this is true: God generates God, for the person of the Father, much more strongly will this be true: God does not generate God, for the person of the Son and the Holy Spirit; therefore, by destruction of the consequent, if the latter is in no way to be conceded, neither [is] the former. Therefore not, etc." Codex Z presents nearly the same words at the end of this third argument.
- Cfr. Aristot., I. Periherm. c. 6. et II. c. 3, ubi agit de affirmatione, negatione et contradictione; et VI. Topic. c. 3. circa medium (c. 6.), ubi dicit: Nam de omni aut affirmatio, aut negatio vera est; et tandem IV. Metaph. text. 15. (III. 4.): De omni affirmatio, aut negatio. Ultimum textum et II. Periherm. c. 3. videntur codd. cum ed. 1 respexisse, omittendo vera est, quod Vat. adiungit. Paulo infra in Vat. desiderantur verba Si Deum usque ad sed quod, quae tamen in mss. et ed. 1 habentur.Cf. Aristotle, On Interpretation I, c. 6 and II, c. 3, where he treats of affirmation, negation, and contradiction; and Topics VI, c. 3, near the middle (c. 6), where he says: "For of everything, either affirmation or negation is true"; and finally Metaphysics IV, text 15 (III, 4): "Of everything, either affirmation or negation." The codices, together with ed. 1, seem to have looked to this last text and to On Interpretation II, c. 3, by omitting vera est, which the Vatican [edition] adds. A little below, in the Vatican [edition] the words Si Deum through sed quod are missing, which nevertheless are had in the manuscripts and in ed. 1.
- Cod. O hic addit novum argumentum: Item, si Deus generat Deum, Deus est genitus a Deo: ergo Deus est distinctus a Deo; ergo sunt duo dii.Codex O here adds a new argument: "Likewise, if God generates God, God is begotten from God: therefore God is distinct from God; therefore there are two gods."
- Plurimi codd. cum sex primis edd. omittunt ipsi albedini et, sed male, uti ex contextu patet.Very many codices, together with the first six editions, omit ipsi albedini et, but wrongly, as is clear from the context.
- Praedictarum regularum prima insinuatur ab Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 21. et 27. ac IX. Metaph. text. 12. (VI. c. 6. 8. et VIII. c. 7.); secunda habetur in Petri Hisp. Summula, tract. de Suppos. et Distrib.; tertia in opusculo, quod etiam Petro Hisp. attribuitur, scil. Parvorum Logicalium, tract. de Negat. et Affirm. c. 1; quarta in eiusdem Summula, tract. de Relativis.Of the foregoing rules, the first is hinted at by Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, text 21 and 27, and Metaphysics IX, text 12 (VI, cc. 6, 8, and VIII, c. 7); the second is found in Peter of Spain's Summula, tract on Supposition and Distribution; the third in a little work also attributed to Peter of Spain, namely the Parvorum Logicalium, tract on Negation and Affirmation, c. 1; the fourth in the same author's Summula, tract on Relatives.
- Ex plurimis mss. et ed. 1 substituimus etsi loco et. Mox cod. X post deitate habet non tamen imponitur formae, sed personae.From very many manuscripts and ed. 1 we have substituted etsi in place of et. Next codex X, after deitate, has: "yet it is not imposed on the form, but on the person."
- Ex illo generali principio: Actiones sunt suppositorum.From that general principle: "Actions are of supposits."
- Id est, facit supponere. — Paulo ante Cod. R subiectum pro illum.That is, it makes [the term] supposit. — A little before, codex R [reads] subiectum in place of illum.
- Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 mutavimus responsio in solutio et paulo post non multiplicabilem in immultiplicabilem.From older manuscripts and ed. 1 we have changed responsio into solutio, and a little after non multiplicabilem into immultiplicabilem.
- Vat. contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 addit totaliter et.The Vatican [edition], against the older codices and ed. 1, adds totaliter et.
- Supplevimus ex mss. et ed. 1 Deus. Paulo ante cod. K. modo negativo relativum non habet suppositionem aliam a suo antecedente.From the manuscripts and ed. 1 we have supplied Deus. A little before, codex K [reads], in the negative mode: "the relative does not have a supposition other than from its own antecedent."
- Cod. K. addit hic: Deus genitus non est Pater; ergo Deus non est Pater.Codex K adds hic ["here"]: "God begotten is not the Father; therefore God is not the Father."