Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 27, Dubia

Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 27

Textus Latinus

p. 684

DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

Dub. I

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo de ista definitione: Matrimonium est viri et mulieris coniunctio maritalis, individuam vitae consuetudinem retinens. Videtur enim, quod ista definitio sit falsa: primum, quia non est necesse, coniuges semper simul cohabitare: ergo non est necesse ad hoc, quod sit matrimonium, quod sit ibi individua vitae consuetudo. — Item, videtur esse superflua, quia, si est coniunctio maritalis, est indivisibilis¹: ergo si hoc clauditur in primo membro, videtur, quod superfluat illud addere.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod hic definitur matrimonium secundum statum perfectum sive consummatum; ista autem definitio: Matrimonium est maris et feminae coniunctio maritalis, sufficiens est quantum ad esse definiti, et tangitur ibi genus et differentia. Sed quoniam maritalis coniunctio duo implicat in se, scilicet legitimitatem personarum et indivisionem personarum; ideo ad maiorem eruditionem superadditur aliud, scilicet inter legitimas personas etc.; et non est de esse definitionis, sed explicatio primi membri². — Posset tamen dici, quod notetur ibi quadruplex genus causae, scilicet formalis, in hoc quod dicitur: coniunctio maritalis; efficiens, in hoc quod dicitur: viri et mulieris, quae, in quantum consentiunt, se habent in ratione causae efficientis³; materialis, in hoc quod dicitur: inter legitimas personas; finalis, in hoc quod dicitur: individuam vitae etc., ubi tangitur bonum Sacramenti, quod est principale bonum matrimonii. — Et per hoc patent obiecta, quia non est superfluitas nec falsitas, quia non est indivisio quantum ad coniunctum, sed quantum ad Sacramentum⁴.

Dub. II

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Si autem verbis explicant quod corde nolunt, si non sit coactio ibi vel dolus etc. Videtur enim male dicere, quia, cum impossibile sit, quod aliud exprimatur in ore, quam sit in corde, sine dolo; videtur Magister implicare incompossibilia.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod dolus dupliciter potest esse, scilicet expressus exterius per sermonem, vel solummodo in corde; sicut intentio iocandi in dando baptismum potest esse dupliciter: aut ita, quod tantum sit in corde, aut ita, quod aliquo modo exprimatur in signo exteriori. Sic dolus est in corde, quando exterius facit omnino, sicut facit qui simpliciter consentit; et de hoc dolo Magister non intelligit. Alius est, quando per signum exprimitur, sicut in decretali quadam, de Sponsalibus⁵, ponitur casus de quodam, qui, cum vocaretur Ioannes, nominavit se Petrum, in consentiendo dicens: ego Petrus, vel aliquid simile; et tunc manifeste deprehenditur dolus exterius; et de tali loquitur Magister, non de dolo occulto. Istud autem verbum intelligendum est habere veritatem secundum iudicium p. 685 in facie Ecclesiae, non secundum veritatem sive in foro conscientiae⁶.

Dub. III

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicitur de Macario, quod eremi solitudinem elegit; utrum sponsa eius fuerit soluta ab eo. Et videtur, quod non, quia ivit in eremum: ergo cum non dederit potestatem suam alii, sed fuerit liberae voluntatis; potuit redire ad saeculum: ergo videtur, quod uxor soluta non erat. — In contrarium est: quia ipse non peccabat, ergo uxori nihil subtrahebat: ergo illi licebat transire ad secunda vota.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod quamvis eremitae obedientiam non promittant, tamen, quia personae sunt religiosae, votum continentiae annexum habent; et ratione assumtionis habitus et more⁷ intelligitur in ipso solemnizari votum, maxime si est cum sociis, qui voverunt castitatem, et ipse in habitus talis susceptione ad continentiam perpetuam se obligavit.

Dub. IV

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Volumus maritum illi, etiam si iam tonsuratus est, reddere; utrum tonsuratus debeat in saeculo remanere. Et quod sic, videtur: quia non absolvitur a voto, immo post mortem uxoris non licet contrahere, immo iterum tenetur continere et compellendus est⁸: ergo videtur, quod non sit absolutus a voto solemni: ergo videtur, quod tenetur ferre habitum. — Contra hoc est, quia hoc esset in contumeliam uxoris: ergo si ipsa non debet puniri, patet etc.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod talis, qui intravit religionem, aut intravit, uxore nolente et non consentiente, tamen in saeculo existente et contradicente; et talis non tenetur ad religionem, quia non potuit votum emittere, immo si repetatur, ei reddendus est; tenetur tamen, quantum in se est, continentiam servare; unde cum alia non potest contrahere, quia continentiam, quantum in se est, potuit servare, sed non religionem intrare, quia potuit non exigere, sed tenebatur reddere. — Aut intrat religionem, uxore volente, sed tamen in saeculo remanente; et talis solvitur a voto⁹ non simpliciter, sed ad tempus, nec omnino, sed solum in quantum votum erat in praeiudicium mulieris. Et hoc habetur in quadam decretali, de Conversione coniugatorum, Ex parte¹⁰, ubi scribitur, quod si aliquis vovit castitatem et habitum religionis suscepit, uxore consentiente, sed postmodum, ipsa in saeculo remanente, et ipse remansit; illa autem mortua, ille idem postmodum cum alia contraxit. Et hoc quidem non debuit fieri, unde dicitur, quod separandus est ab illa et compellendus est religionem intrare. Et ratio redditur ibi, «quia, uxore sua manente in saeculo, religionem non potuit profiteri, ea tamen sublata de medio, sine periculo salutis votum, quod fecit, non potuit vitiare¹¹». Et ita patet, quod non tenetur ferre habitum, quamdiu uxor vivit, tum propter scandalum, tum propter uxoris vituperium.

Dub. V

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod ubi est pollicitatio contrahendi matrimonium, sponsi tantum et sponsae sunt. Videtur enim sentire, quod non licet sponso transire ad religionem, sponsa nolente, nisi sit sponsio de futuro; aliter distinctio sua ad propositum nihil videtur valere. Et hoc falsum videtur, sicut habetur in libro tertio decretalium, de Conversione coniugatorum¹², ubi dicitur in illa decretali Verum etc., quod licet alteri intrare, altero invito, et illi licet ad secunda vota transire. Et ratio ibi redditur: «quia, cum non fuissent una caro simul effecti, satis potest unus ad Deum transire, et alter in saeculo remanere». — Item, quod distinctio ista Magistri non solvat, videtur: quia Macarius et Alexius, uterque consenserat de praesenti; aliter enim non fecissent convivia¹³: ergo licet post contractum matrimonium sponsam dimittere. Et iterum, quod liceat nubere, habetur ex praedicta decretali et per rationem. Si enim ista mulier nondum est effecta una caro, et propter hoc potest vir transire: ergo si ipsa puniri non debet, aut vir suus est sibi restituendus, aut ipsa potest cum alio contrahere.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod re vera, sicut expresse dicit decretalis illa, licet his qui consenserunt de praesenti, ad religionem convolare, et alteri licet nubere; nec est credendum, quod Magister velit oppositum dicere; aliter enim iuri canonico et rationi contrairet, nec in parte ista ei consentiendum p. 686 esset. Unde distinguunt iurisperiti¹⁴ matrimonium secundum triplicem differentiam: quoddam enim initiatum, quoddam ratum, quoddam consummatum. Matrimonium initiatur desponsatione de futuro, ratificatur in consensu de praesenti, consummatur in copula carnali. Et ideo praemissae auctoritates intelligi possunt non solum de sponsa, verum etiam de coniuge. Aliquae tamen auctoritates, quae sequuntur¹⁵, intelliguntur de ea quae pure est sponsa; et propter hoc distinguit Magister duplicem modum desponsandi. Sunt tamen et alii modi, qui infra¹⁶ patebunt.

Dub. VI

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Cui copulatus ad coniugium ulterius ad sacros ordines non accederet, cum viduam duxerit. Videtur enim male dicere, quia talis non dividit carnem suam nec uxor divisit: ergo in nullo videtur praeiudicare Sacramento. — Item, talis mulier, si ingrediatur religionem, consecratur ut virgo: si ergo mulieri nullum praeiudicium generatur, videtur, quod nec viro. — Contrarium autem videtur dici in littera¹⁷.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod illud quod dicit Magister et Pelagius, fuit de rigore iuris, non propter obstaculum, quod fit ex parte Sacramenti directe. Unde secundum nova iura¹⁸ hodie non tenetur, eo quod neuter carnem suam divisit, et uxorem habuit virginem, quod attenditur ad perfectionem Sacramenti. Et si tu obiicias mihi de eo qui contraxit cum aliqua virgine et matrimonium consummavit, et post contraxit cum alia, quam tamen non cognovit, quod bigamus iudicatur; dicendum, quod hoc non est propter defectum Sacramenti, sed quia praesumitur contra ipsum de incontinentia; sicut diaconus, qui contraxit cum secunda in diaconatu — et intellige: contraxit de facto, quia de iure non potest, ut habetur vigesima octava distinctione¹⁹, cum opere subsecuto — punitur tanquam bigamus, cum tamen secundum non fuerit matrimonium.

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English Translation

DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

Doubt I

In this section there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning this definition: Matrimony is the marital conjunction of a man and a woman, retaining an undivided manner of life. For it seems that this definition is false: first, because it is not necessary that spouses always cohabit together: therefore it is not necessary, for there to be matrimony, that there be there an undivided manner of life. — Likewise, it seems to be superfluous, because, if there is a marital conjunction, it is indivisible¹: therefore if this is contained in the first member, it seems superfluous to add that.

I respond: It must be said that here matrimony is defined according to the perfect or consummated state; but that definition: Matrimony is the marital conjunction of a male and a female, is sufficient as regards the being of the thing defined, and there are touched upon genus and difference. But since the marital conjunction implies two things in itself, namely the legitimacy of the persons and the indivision of the persons; therefore for greater instruction there is superadded something else, namely between legitimate persons, etc.; and it is not of the being of the definition, but an explication of the first member². — Yet it could be said that there is noted there a fourfold kind of cause, namely the formal, in that it is said: marital conjunction; the efficient, in that it is said: of a man and a woman, who, insofar as they consent, stand in the account of the efficient cause³; the material, in that it is said: between legitimate persons; the final, in that it is said: undivided [manner] of life, etc., where the good of the Sacrament is touched upon, which is the principal good of matrimony. — And through this the objections are made clear, because there is neither superfluity nor falsity, because there is no indivision as regards the thing conjoined, but as regards the Sacrament⁴.

Doubt II

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: But if by words they express what they do not will in the heart, if there be not coercion there or fraud, etc. For it seems ill said, because, since it is impossible that something other be expressed in the mouth than is in the heart, without fraud; the Master seems to imply incompatible things.

I respond: It must be said that fraud can be twofold, namely expressed outwardly through speech, or only in the heart; just as the intention of jesting in giving baptism can be twofold: either so that it be only in the heart, or so that it be in some way expressed in an outward sign. Thus fraud is in the heart, when outwardly he does entirely as one does who simply consents; and of this fraud the Master does not understand [it]. There is another [kind], when it is expressed through a sign, as in a certain decretal, on Betrothals⁵, there is set down the case of a certain man who, though he was called John, named himself Peter, in consenting saying: I [am] Peter, or something similar; and then the fraud is manifestly detected outwardly; and of such a one the Master speaks, not of hidden fraud. But this word must be understood to have truth according to the judgment p. 685 in the face of the Church, not according to the truth or in the forum of conscience⁶.

Doubt III

Likewise it is asked about this, which is said of Macarius, that he chose the solitude of the desert; whether his betrothed was released from him. And it seems that not, because he went into the desert: therefore since he did not give his power to another, but was of free will; he could return to the world: therefore it seems that the wife was not released. — On the contrary it is: because he did not sin, therefore he took away nothing from his wife: therefore it was permitted to her to pass to a second marriage.

I respond: It must be said that although hermits do not promise obedience, nevertheless, because they are religious persons, they have the vow of continence annexed; and by reason of the assumption of the habit and by custom⁷ the vow is understood to be solemnized in him, especially if it is with companions who have vowed chastity, and he in the reception of such a habit has bound himself to perpetual continence.

Doubt IV

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: We wish the husband to be restored to her, even if he is already tonsured; whether the tonsured one ought to remain in the world. And that yes, it seems: because he is not absolved from the vow, indeed after the death of the wife it is not permitted to contract [marriage], indeed he is again bound to be continent and to be compelled⁸: therefore it seems that he is not absolved from the solemn vow: therefore it seems that he is bound to wear the habit. — Against this it is, because this would be to the reproach of the wife: therefore if she ought not to be punished, it is clear, etc.

I respond: It must be said that such a one, who entered religion, either entered while the wife was unwilling and not consenting, yet [while she was] existing in the world and contradicting; and such a one is not bound to religion, because he could not emit the vow, indeed if he is claimed back, he is to be restored to her; nevertheless he is bound, as far as in him lies, to preserve continence; whence since he cannot contract with another, because continence, as far as in him lies, he could preserve, but not enter religion, because he could not decline to demand [the debt], but was bound to render it. — Or he enters religion while the wife is willing, but nevertheless remaining in the world; and such a one is absolved from the vow⁹ not simply, but for a time, nor entirely, but only insofar as the vow was to the prejudice of the wife. And this is had in a certain decretal, on the Conversion of the married, Ex parte¹⁰, where it is written that if someone vowed chastity and received the habit of religion, with the wife consenting, but afterward, she remaining in the world, he too remained; but she having died, the same man afterward contracted with another. And this indeed ought not to have been done, whence it is said that he is to be separated from her and to be compelled to enter religion. And the reason is given there, «because, while his wife remained in the world, he could not profess religion, yet she being taken away from the midst, without peril of salvation the vow which he made he could not vitiate¹¹». And thus it is clear that he is not bound to wear the habit, as long as the wife lives, both on account of scandal, and on account of the reproach of the wife.

Doubt V

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says, that where there is a promise of contracting matrimony, they are [only] betrothed man and betrothed woman. For he seems to hold that it is not permitted to the betrothed man to pass to religion, the betrothed woman being unwilling, unless there be a betrothal concerning the future; otherwise his distinction seems to be of no value to the point. And this seems false, as is had in the third book of decretals, on the Conversion of the married¹², where it is said in that decretal Verum etc., that it is permitted to the one to enter, the other being unwilling, and to that one it is permitted to pass to a second marriage. And the reason is given there: «because, since they had not been made one flesh together, one can well enough pass to God, and the other remain in the world». — Likewise, that this distinction of the Master does not resolve [it], it seems: because Macarius and Alexius, each had consented concerning the present; for otherwise they would not have held the wedding-feasts¹³: therefore it is permitted, after matrimony has been contracted, to dismiss the betrothed. And again, that it is permitted to marry, is had from the aforesaid decretal and by reason. For if this woman has not yet been made one flesh, and on account of this the man can pass over: therefore if she ought not to be punished, either her husband is to be restored to her, or she can contract with another.

I respond: It must be said that in truth, as that decretal expressly says, it is permitted to those who consented concerning the present to fly off to religion, and to the other it is permitted to marry; nor is it to be believed that the Master wishes to say the opposite; for otherwise he would run contrary to canon law and to reason, nor in this section is he to be p. 686 agreed with. Whence the jurists distinguish¹⁴ matrimony according to a threefold difference: for one [is] initiated, one ratified, one consummated. Matrimony is initiated by betrothal concerning the future, ratified in consent concerning the present, consummated in carnal union. And therefore the aforesaid authorities can be understood not only of the betrothed woman, but also of the wife. Yet certain authorities which follow¹⁵ are understood of her who is purely betrothed; and on account of this the Master distinguishes a twofold manner of betrothing. Yet there are also other manners, which will be shown below¹⁶.

Doubt VI

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: He who is coupled to marriage should not further approach to sacred orders, when he has married a widow. For it seems ill said, because such a one does not divide his own flesh nor did the wife divide [hers]: therefore in nothing does he seem to prejudice the Sacrament. — Likewise, such a woman, if she enter religion, is consecrated as a virgin: if therefore no prejudice is generated to the woman, it seems that neither [is there any] to the man. — But the contrary seems to be said in the text¹⁷.

I respond: It must be said that what the Master and Pelagius say was of the rigor of the law, not on account of an obstacle which arises on the part of the Sacrament directly. Whence according to the new laws¹⁸ today he is not bound, because neither divided his own flesh, and he had the wife a virgin, which is attended to for the perfection of the Sacrament. And if you object to me concerning him who contracted with some virgin and consummated the matrimony, and afterward contracted with another, whom however he did not know, that he is judged a bigamist; it must be said that this is not on account of a defect of the Sacrament, but because he is presumed against as to incontinence; just as a deacon who contracted with a second [wife] in the diaconate — and understand: he contracted in fact, because by right he cannot, as is had in the twenty-eighth distinction¹⁹, with the deed following — is punished as a bigamist, although the second was nevertheless not a matrimony.

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Apparatus Criticus

1
Cod. L individualis.
Codex L [reads] individualis ("individual").
2
Hinc etiam in definitione matrimonii a Iustiniano (l. Institut. tit. 9. de patria potestate) data omittitur maritalis: « Nuptiae autem sive matrimonium est viri et mulieris coniunctio, individuam vitae consuetudinem continens ». Datur a Iustiniano (D. XXIII. de Ritu nuptiarum, tit. 2. lex 1.) etiam haec definitio: Nuptiae sunt coniunctio maris et feminae et consortium omnis vitae, divini et humani iuris communicatio [i. e. secundum S. Thom. loc. inferius cit. consortium vitae communis regulatum per ius divinum et humanum].
Hence also in the definition of matrimony given by Justinian (Institutes, tit. 9, on paternal power) marital is omitted: «But nuptials, or matrimony, is the conjunction of a man and a woman, containing an undivided manner of life». There is also given by Justinian (Digest XXIII, on the Rite of nuptials, tit. 2, law 1) this definition: Nuptials are the conjunction of a male and a female and the fellowship of a whole life, a sharing of divine and human right [i. e. according to St. Thomas, in the place cited below, a fellowship of common life regulated by divine and human right].
3
Vide supra a. 1. q. 1. et a. 2. q. 1.
See above, a. 1, q. 1, and a. 2, q. 1.
4
Idem dub. solvunt B. Albert., hic a. 2; S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1. quaestiunc. 3; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1.
The same doubt is resolved by Bl. Albert, here a. 2; St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1, quaestiuncula 3; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 1.
5
Extra lib. IV. tit. I. C. Tua nos duxit (26.), ubi quidam, animo decipiendi mulierem, illi dixit: te Ioannes desponsat, cum ipse Ioannes non vocaretur, sed finxit, se vocari Ioannem. — Superius post consentit cod. aa addit et tamen non consentit interius.
[Decretals] Extra, book IV, tit. I, chap. Tua nos duxit (26), where a certain man, with the intention of deceiving the woman, said to her: John betroths thee, although he himself was not called John, but pretended that he was called John. — Above, after consents, codex aa adds and yet does not consent interiorly.
6
Vide supra a. 2. q. 2. — Cfr. de hoc dubio S. Thom., Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.
See above, a. 2, q. 2. — Cf. on this doubt St. Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise, and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text.
7
Vat. morae. S. Thom., hic circa lit.: Eremitae... tamen votum continentiae habent annexum, et ex more secundum determinatum tempus eorum votum solemnizatur. — Praeter S. Thom. cfr. de hoc dubio Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.
The Vatican edition [reads] morae. St. Thomas, here on the text: Hermits... nevertheless have the vow of continence annexed, and by custom, according to a determinate time, their vow is solemnized. — Besides St. Thomas, cf. on this doubt Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text.
8
Cod. X repetit continere. Pro iterum cod. M tunc.
Codex X repeats continere ("to be continent"). For iterum ("again") codex M [reads] tunc ("then").
9
Ita cod. E, cuius lectio confirmatur ex seqq. et ex S. Thom., hic circa lit.: Quamvis [viri intrantis religionem] fuerit verum votum, suspenditur tamen ad tempus, vivente uxore, in quantum fuit in praeiudicium eius. Cod. K (I a secunda manu) ab ea, cod. aa a muliere, alii codd. et edd. a viro.
Thus codex E, whose reading is confirmed from what follows and from St. Thomas, here on the text: Although [for the man entering religion] there was a true vow, it is nevertheless suspended for a time, while the wife is living, insofar as it was to her prejudice. Codex K (I, by a second hand) [reads] ab ea ("by her"), codex aa a muliere ("by the woman"), other codices and the editions a viro ("by the man").
10
Extra, lib. III. tit. 32. c. 9.
[Decretals] Extra, book III, tit. 32, c. 9.
11
Textus originalis violare, qui etiam substituit de iure ad religionem nequiverit proficisci pro religionem non potuit profiteri. — Praeter S. Thom., superius allegatum, idem dub. solvit Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2.
The original text [reads] violare ("to violate"), which also substitutes by right he was unable to set out for religion for he could not profess religion. — Besides St. Thomas, cited above, the same doubt is resolved by Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 2, quaestiuncula 2.
12
Tit. 32. c. 2.
Tit. 32, c. 2.
13
Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 6. — Post consenserat cod. bb addit per verba. Inferius edd. omittunt et per rationem (scil. in decretali expressam).
See here the text of the Master, c. 6. — After had consented codex bb adds through words. Below, the editions omit and by reason (namely, [the reason] expressed in the decretal).
14
Cfr. supra pag. 670, nota 4.
Cf. above, p. 670, note 4.
15
Hic in lit. Magistri, c. 9.
Here in the text of the Master, c. 9.
16
Dist. 36. a. 2. q. 3, ubi quatuor modi exhibentur, de quibus B. Albert., hic a. 13; S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 4. a. 1; Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 2.
Dist. 36, a. 2, q. 3, where four manners are exhibited, concerning which [see] Bl. Albert, here a. 13; St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 1; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 4, a. 1; Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 2.
17
Hic c. 10, ubi etiam Pelagii verba habentur.
Here c. 10, where also the words of Pelagius are had.
18
Cfr. C. Debitam pastoralis officii (3.), X. de Bigamis non ordinandis (lib. I. tit. 21.). — Inferius pro ad perfectionem edd. in perfectione.
Cf. chap. Debitam pastoralis officii (3), [Decretals] X, on Bigamists not to be ordained (book I, tit. 21). — Below, for for the perfection the editions [read] in the perfection.
19
Can. Quando presbyteri aut diaconi (3.) et C. Praeterea placuit (7.), in quibus a diaconis exigitur promissio castitatis servandae. Plures codd. omittunt ut habetur vigesima octava distinctione, fortasse non absque ratione, quia quae hic dicuntur plenius inveniuntur in C. Nuper a nobis (1.), X. de Bigamis non ordinandis (lib. I. tit. 21.), in quo recurrit distinctio de iure et de facto, ac dicitur de talibus clericis, quod cum eis « tanquam cum bigamis non liceat dispensari, licet in veritate bigami non existant, non propter Sacramenti defectum, sed propter affectum intentionis cum opere subsecuto ». Cfr. supra d. 23. a. 2. q. 3. — Idem dub. solvunt B. Albert., hic a. 20; S. Thom., Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.
Canon Quando presbyteri aut diaconi (3) and chap. Praeterea placuit (7), in which a promise of chastity to be preserved is required of deacons. Many codices omit as is had in the twenty-eighth distinction, perhaps not without reason, because the things which are said here are found more fully in chap. Nuper a nobis (1), [Decretals] X, on Bigamists not to be ordained (book I, tit. 21), in which the distinction by right and in fact recurs, and it is said of such clerics that with them «it is not permitted to dispense as with bigamists, although in truth they are not bigamists, not on account of a defect of the Sacrament, but on account of the disposition of the intention with the deed following». Cf. above, d. 23, a. 2, q. 3. — The same doubt is resolved by Bl. Albert, here a. 20; St. Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise, and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text. ---